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ORIGINALISM’S CLAIMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
André LeDuc* 
In this article I explore six of the most fundamental 
disagreements between originalism and its critics over 
originalism’s implications.  These implications—and the 
implications of the critics’ alternatives—figure prominently in the 
arguments advanced in the debate.  Reconstructing these 
arguments in their strongest possible form permits the confusion 
and misdirection in the debate over originalism to emerge. 
First, originalism argues that it best comports with our 
republican democracy.  Judicial review, performed by unelected 
judges with lifetime appointments, may appear inconsistent with 
the fundamental principles of our democratic republic.  
Originalism argues that deference to the original understandings 
or expectations with respect to the Constitution answers this 
challenge.  The critics offer three principal replies to that claim.  
First, the originalist strategy of finding the original understanding 
and intentions with respect to the Constitution is rejected as 
undoable.  Second, even if and to the extent that such intentions 
and understandings existed, the originalist project of finding 
meaning is rejected as blinkered and mechanical.  Third, Bobbitt 
argues that the originalist premise is flawed: there is no need to 
reconcile judicial review and constitutional interpretation with 
democracy. 
Second, originalism claims that it offers the only neutral 
method of constitutional interpretation.  Critics deny the argument 
from discretion on a number of grounds.  Third, originalism 
claims to offer a better account of the textuality of the written 
Constitution. Critics reject the arguments for that claim.  Fourth, 
I examine how originalism limits constitutional change.  Critics 
 
* © André LeDuc 2018.  I am grateful to Stewart Schoder, Kristin Hickman, and Laura Litten 
for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft and to Dennis Patterson, the late Jeff Greenblatt, 
and Charlotte Crane for helpful comments on some related material. Errors that remain are 
my own. 
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argue that the originalists fail to provide a plausible account of 
constitutional flux.  Fifth, I assess the claim that originalism is 
necessary, and therefore any other inconsistent theory of 
constitutional interpretation is necessarily impossible.  The critics 
rightly deny this singularly bold and implausible claim.  Sixth, I 
examine the claim that originalism can restore the Lost 
Constitution, and, in so doing, radically change our constitutional 
law.  Critics of originalism, and even some defenders, have 
questioned whether originalism can accomplish the mission set 
out for it.  This skepticism is misplaced, at least on the terms on 
which originalism makes its constitutional argument. 
When the claims advanced by originalism and by its critics 
are examined, they generally prove implausible or uninteresting.  
The debate over originalism has reached a stalemate on these key 
issues. The exchanges with respect to these claims offer no reason 
to rehabilitate or even to continue the originalism debate. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Originalism and its critics disagree not only about the 
claims of originalism but also about originalism’s most 
fundamental implications.1  By claims I mean the central, express 
tenets of originalism.  The implications of originalism are the 
inferences that may be derived from these claims—or the indirect 
arguments that may be made for or against originalism from those 
claims or from critics’ competing claims.  The two aspects of 
originalism are closely related.  Originalism and its critics each 
make important arguments for their claims from the implications 
of those claims.  If the debate has been more fruitful and 
productive than I have earlier claimed,2 it is likely with respect to 
these claims and implications.  This article addresses those 
readers who may be intrigued by the argument of the earlier 
articles in this series but believe that the debate about originalism 
has developed important and fruitful arguments about neutrality, 
judicial review, and the textuality of the Constitution, for 
example.  Looking at these core claims about originalism, I will 
argue that the debate displays the same fruitlessness—and many 
of the same confusions—that I have previously described more 
generally.  The exchanges with respect to these central originalist 
 
1.   I have previously explored originalism’s claims about meaning, interpretation, and 
constitutional reasoning in some detail, along with the critics’ response.  See André LeDuc, 
Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express: The New Originalism and Its 
Critics, 31 BYU J. PUB L. 111, 113-23 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning]; 
André LeDuc, Competing Accounts of Interpretation and Practical Reasoning in the Debate 
over Originalism, 16 U.N.H. L. Rev. 51, 51-61 (2017) [hereinafter LeDuc, Interpretation 
and Practical Reasoning].  In that account, I emphasize the performative and inferential 
elements in our constitutional texts and decisions.  I don’t revisit those concepts, which have, 
at least in the case of the performative analysis, caused some readers some confusion, here, 
but I certainly employ the fruits of that analysis. To repeat, the performative analysis I 
endorse, following an all-too-casually smushed together Austin and Grice, emphasizes what 
the Constitution does as more important than what it says—and calls into question the tacit 
assumption that authoritative propositions of constitutional law have non-trivial truth 
conditions. 
2.   André LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel: Originalism, Its Critics, and the Promise of 
Our American Constitution, 26 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS. L.J. 101 (2017) [hereinafter 
LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel]; see also Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the 
Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 412 (1998) (“This essay argues that the 
academic debate over the legitimacy of originalist and non-originalist constitutional 
interpretation has not progressed materially [over the past century].”).  
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claims and implications provide no reason to try to salvage or 
rehabilitate the debate. 
Originalism, most fundamentally, claims that certain 
original facts about the constitutional text—intentions, 
expectations, or linguistic understandings—generate privileged 
interpretations of that text that determine constitutional 
controversies.  In its recent formulation as the New Originalism, 
the theory asserts that the linguistic understanding of what the 
constitutional text meant when it was adopted or amended is the 
authoritative interpretation that must be applied in constitutional 
cases today.3  It is, admittedly, an appealing and seemingly 
plausible claim.  It is appealing because it appears to assimilate 
constitutional interpretation and application to paradigms of 
linguistic behavior that are common and compelling.4  
Originalism’s critics have nevertheless challenged this account 
with a number of arguments and from an array of stances.5  The 
debate continues to rage. 
In this article I explore the fundamental disagreements 
between originalism and its critics over six key claims and 
implications of originalism, including the recent statement of 
originalism offered by the New Originalism.6  These implications 
 
3.   See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
599, 609-10 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism] (arguing as a matter of 
semantics that certain provisions of the Constitution require mere interpretation while other 
provisions require the democratic political tools of construction to determine their meaning); 
see generally Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) (again distinguishing the processes of interpretation and 
construction without allocating the construction function to the legislative branch); Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).  
4.   See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING 
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 56-59 (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RADICALS] 
(cleverly—if misleadingly—invoking the analogy of following a friend’s direction in 
choosing a birthday present for him). 
5.   See, e.g., id. (defending a minimalist, consequentialist critique); Lawrence Lessig, 
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 400-01 
(1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding] (arguing that constitutional law accommodates 
change without requiring constitutional amendment through changed readings of the 
constitutional text). 
6.   See, e.g., Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 3, at 607-12.  Certain claims 
are neither explored here nor in the companion articles in the series.  Originalism 
occasionally claims to be a scientific method.  For example, Justice Scalia began his Tanner 
lectures by offering a contribution to “the science of construing legal texts.”  Antonin Scalia, 
Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in 
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are of particular importance for originalism and for the debate.  
The implications of originalism—and the implications of the 
critics’ alternatives—figure prominently in the arguments 
advanced in the debate.  Reconstructing these arguments in their 
strongest possible form is an important part in recreating the 
ideopolises of the participants in the debate.7 
 
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Interpretation; 
INTERPRETATION].  Another part of his published lectures is titled “The Science of Statutory 
Interpretation.”  Id. at 14.  Bork invoked science in comparing non-originalist theories of 
constitutional interpretation to building perpetual motion machines.  ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 251 (1990) [hereinafter 
BORK, TEMPTING].  That is, the truth of originalism is analogous to the truths of physics.  It 
is possible, of course, that these claims are only rhetorical.  What did Justice Scalia mean 
here by science?  Is it a natural science or a social science? It is undoubtedly the alleged, pre-
Kuhnian crystalline clarity and certainty of natural science that Justice Scalia sought to 
invoke.  It is the paradigm of natural scientific knowledge that is invoked.  The obvious 
tension, perhaps inconsistency, between Justice Scalia’s invocation of science, and Bork’s 
apparently casual dismissal of the Ninth Amendment because of its difficulty, should not go 
unremarked. Scientific knowledge has often been invoked as a model to be followed with 
respect to other kinds of inquiry, on the basis that it provides a firmer basis on which to know 
things.  After reason and science replaced faith and philosophy in the seventeenth century, 
scientific knowledge has been repeatedly invoked as a model in the social sciences.  The late 
Richard Rorty outlined how the aspiration to science had shaped philosophy and, generally, 
all of Western culture after the rise of the secular state.  See generally RICHARD RORTY, 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) (arguing that the model of scientific 
inquiry is seductive but misleading for philosophy).  Yet, to the extent that the scientific 
method involves fundamentally controlled, replicable experiments, it is unclear that anyone 
has ever seriously considered legal experiments.  Indeed, to the extent such experiments 
would result in checkerboard laws, Dworkin has criticized such a regime as unconstitutional. 
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 179-84 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE].  
The claim to scientific knowledge with respect to originalism would appear to be rooted in 
the philosophical premises of originalism.  Foremost among these are models of language, 
truth, and a positivist distinction between facts and values.  For the originalist, interpretive 
law operates within the domain of facts.  Values may be embodied in legislative choices 
made by democracies or other legal choices by other sovereigns, but a judge’s role is to 
determine the facts, at trial, and the law at trial and on appeal.  The best methodology for 
exploring facts—including textual facts—is science.  Thus, the claim to the mantle of science 
is the expression of other philosophical commitments inherent in originalism.  Do the 
originalists make the case that their method is scientific?  Very little effort went into 
defending that claim.  Ironically, the claim by originalism to scientific methods and 
knowledge appears more expressive than empirical.  In the originalists’ own space of reasons 
the claim to science appears a matter of value, not fact.  Neither Judge Bork nor Justice Scalia 
explained what was scientific about their interpretive theory.  Without such an explanation 
or defense, that claim would appear to reduce to an expressive statement that their 
originalisms are good and the methods are neutral, not political or based upon subjective 
values. 
7.  See Jonathan Lear, An Interpretation of Transference, 74 INT’L J. OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 739 (1993), reprinted in JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED: WORKING 
OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL 56, 69-73 (1998) (defining an ideopolis as the pathological, 
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First, one of the most forceful and engaging arguments for 
originalism is that it best comports with our republican 
democracy.  This is simply the statement of the originalist 
argument from Alexander Bickel’s countermajoritarian 
challenge.8  Federal judicial review has been challenged as 
undemocratic.9  Judicial review, performed by unelected judges 
with lifetime appointments, may override otherwise valid 
democratically-enacted legislation.10  That may appear 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our democratic 
republic.11  Originalism argues that deference to the original 
understandings or expectations with respect to the Constitution 
provides a uniquely powerful answer to this challenge because 
judges are obligated to follow the directives of the Founders, 
ratifiers, or other relevant actors, without exercise of independent 
value choices or other judicial discretion.12 
The critics offer three principal replies to the originalists’ 
claim.  First, the originalist strategy of finding the original 
understanding and intentions with respect to the Constitution is 
rejected as undoable.  Those understandings and intentions simply 
did not, and do not, exist, the critics assert.13  Second, even to the 
extent that such intentions and understandings existed, the 
originalist project of finding meaning is rejected as blinkered and 
mechanical.14  To interpret those understandings and intentions, 
 
idiosyncratic polis within which a patient constructs and lives his conceptual life); see 
generally LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 2, at 11-12 (exploring the concept of 
constitutional ideopolises and the notion of therapy for the originalism debate). 
8.   See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) [hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS] 
(arguing that the fundamental challenge of constitutional theory is to explain the role and 
legitimacy of judicial review in our democratic republic). 
9.   Id. at 16-17; Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 9 (broadening Bickel’s concerns 
to encompass traditional common law methods of judicial decision).  
10.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 139-41. 
11.   Id. at 139 (characterizing the task of reconciling judicial review with the 
democratic principles as the fundamental challenge of constitutional theory); BICKEL, LEAST 
DANGEROUS, supra note 8, at 16-23. 
12.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 139-41.  
13.   See RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33, 
34-57 (1985) [hereinafter Dworkin, Forum of Principle]; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 68-71 [hereinafter Tribe, Interpretation]. 
14. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 73; John Hart Ely, Constitutional 
Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 412-448, 445 (1978) 
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the critics assert, a different interpretative methodology is called 
for.  Those critics reject the facile assimilation of the originalist 
interpretative methodology to historical research and analysis.15  
Dworkin, in particular, described a bolder, more expansive and 
more imaginative interpretive project.16  Third, and perhaps most 
controversially, Bobbitt argues that the originalist premise is 
flawed:  there is no need to reconcile judicial review and 
constitutional interpretation with democracy.17 
The originalism debate has reached no resolution with 
respect to the originalists’ argument from democracy and judicial 
review.  Moreover, the debate has made no progress; the two sides 
do not appear to have engaged with respect to each other’s 
positions.  The reason for that failure is that originalism tacitly 
adopts an ontological characterization of the Constitution that 
makes it independent of the judicial determination of its 
consequences with respect to constitutional controversies.  They 
believe that there is an objective constitution-in-the-world that 
judges are to find and apply.18  As a result, constitutional 
arguments must be measured by the extent to which they produce 
results that are congruent with that objective Constitution.19  The 
concept of the objective Constitution as the benchmark for 
decision is often clearest in originalist discussion of precedent, 
 
[hereinafter Ely, Allure and Impossibility] (“The point of all this is this: you cannot be an 
interpretivist.”). 
15.  See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal 
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 92-93 (1997) (emphasizing the differences between 
historical research and scholarship and historical argument in constitutional argument and 
adjudication); Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 437 (1996). 
16.  DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225-75 (describing the process of adjudication 
as based upon a comprehensive interpretative project with respect to law and moral theory). 
17.   PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 181 
(1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE].  I explore that argument in André LeDuc, The Anti-
Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over Originalism, 119 
PENN ST. L. REV. 131 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge] (concluding 
that an anti-foundational account of our constitutional law and decisional practice is plausible 
and compelling).  For an important recent statement of the problem of judicial review, see 
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) 
(arguing that certain forms of judicial review are improper in democratic politics).  
18.   André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over Originalism, 7 
WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 263, 269-74 (2015) [hereinafter LeDuc, Ontological Foundations]. 
19.   Id.  
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where the originalists often characterize existing doctrine and 
precedent as erroneous.20 
Many of originalism’s critics share that same commitment 
to an objective Constitution, however.21  Because the 
constitutional text appears to the originalists generally to state 
positive law, arguments from democracy that justify judicial 
review operate at a level that seems conceptually quite different 
from arguments that go directly to the originalists’ interpretative 
mission of determining the meaning of the constitutional text.22  I 
will explore some of the ways in which these arguments have 
unfolded in the debate—and how they have failed to advance the 
competing claims of the debate. 
Originalists also claim that because originalism offers the 
only neutral method of constitutional interpretation and 
adjudication, all of the other methods permit judges to substitute 
their personal preferences and discretion for the rule of law.  This 
neutrality thesis is advanced to discredit other theories of 
constitutional interpretation and decision.  This claim, like the 
first argument for originalism from democracy, has its origin in a 
critical response to the jurisprudence of the Warren Court.  For 
originalists, the Warren Court committed the twin sins of 
overturning democratic legislation and upending the democratic 
process on the one hand and substituting its values and 
preferences for those of the Congress and state legislatures on the 
other.23  Thus, these claimed implications of originalism reveal 
both the power and the provenance of originalism. 
 
20.   See Antonin Scalia, Response, in INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 129, 139-
40 [hereinafter Scalia, Response]; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 155-59; Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and 
the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 205 (2006) [hereinafter 
Solum, Constitutional Bondage] (adopting a quite Borkian stance on non-originalist 
precedent and concluding: “This means that isolated precedents contrary to original meaning 
will have a limited effect on constitutional adjudication.”); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping 
Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 
258-62 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping] (arguing that non-originalist precedent must 
fall to the theoretical claims of originalism). 
21.   DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 355-99 (describing an open-ended 
interpretative methodology that gives a fundamental role to philosophical analysis). 
22.  See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 37 (characterizing constitutional 
interpretation as like textual interpretation but of a distinctive text). 
23.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69, 131-32; Scalia, Interpretation, supra 
note 6, at 149 (sarcastically mocking the “glorious days” of the Warren Court); RAOUL 
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The critics, however, sometimes make a strong objection, 
denying that the appeal of neutrality is coherent.24  If neutrality is 
not a coherent concept or virtue for constitutional jurisprudence, 
then the originalist claim that originalism must be adopted as a 
method of constitutional interpretation because it alone satisfies 
the requirement of neutrality fails.25  Critics also sometime make 
a conceptually weaker claim, accepting the standard of neutrality 
but arguing that originalism makes no stronger claim to neutrality 
than competing theories.26 
The debate over neutrality is similarly fruitless.  The 
failure to engage and to make progress arises from differing 
accounts of the nature of the Constitution and constitutional 
argument.  Neutrality cannot play the simple, self-evident role 
that Judge Bork sought. 
Third, I explore the originalist claim to offer a better 
account of the textuality of the written Constitution.  Originalism 
has, to a greater or lesser degree, tied its claims to the written 
nature of the American Constitution.27  Barnett, for example, 
claims that the Republic’s decision to have a written Constitution 
has implications for constitutional interpretation and decision that 
support originalism.28  Critics dispute that claim.29  They argue 
that nothing about the text of the Constitution or the 
understandings and intentions on its adoption and amendment 
require that it be applied as the originalists interpret it.30 
 
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY].   
24.   Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism 
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 804-06 (1983) [hereinafter Tushnet, 
Following the Rules]. 
25.   Id. 
26.   SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 72. 
27.   See, e.g., Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40-41; Randy E. Barnett, An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 629-35 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, 
Originalism] (emphasizing original understanding as the starting point for constitutional 
interpretation by analogy with the law of contract interpretation). 
28.   See Barnett, Originalism, supra note 27, at 617; see also Scalia, Interpretation, 
supra note 6, at 40-41 (describing the lock-in function of a written constitution). 
29.   See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1029-30 (2010) (arguing that the narrow originalist 
definition of interpretation assumes away the hard questions about how constitutional cases 
ought to be decided). 
30.   Id. at 1047-59.   
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Here, too, the protagonists in the debate appear to 
overstate their claims and to talk past each other.  The existence 
of a constitutional text makes possible textual arguments and 
enriches and enhances the force of historical arguments.  Justice 
Scalia was not wrong when he claimed that there are important 
implications for our constitutional law from the decision to adopt 
a written Constitution.31  How could there not be? 
Again, the failure for a more productive exchange arises 
from the shared assumption about the nature of the Constitution, 
its meaning, and constitutional interpretation and argument.32  
The textuality of the Constitution is central to our constitutional 
practice, but is neither a necessary33 nor sufficient condition for 
originalism to establish itself as the uniquely proper method of 
constitutional interpretation or mode of constitutional argument. 
Fourth, I examine how originalism accounts for 
constitutional change.  Originalism aspires to give us a more 
stable Constitution, yet must interpret and apply a text largely 
written in the eighteenth century in the twenty-first.  To do so 
requires an account of the kinds of change that constitutional 
theory may incorporate, as well as the kinds that it may not.  The 
unchanging dimension of the Constitution is often described by 
originalists as normative or expressing value choices.34  The 
theories offered by originalism rely on the distinction between 
changing empirical facts and unchanging values,35 but even with 
that well-accepted distinction, it is not clear that the originalists 
have offered a plausible account of constitutional flux.  On the 
 
31.   Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40-41; RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 100-03 (2004) [hereinafter 
BARNETT, LOST].   
32.   LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1 (arguing that semantic and even 
linguistic accounts of meaning defended by the New Originalists and their ilk fail to capture 
the pragmatics and inferentialist content of our constitutional practice); LeDuc, 
Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1 (arguing that originalist descriptions 
of constitutional interpretation and reasoning fail to capture much of our constitutional 
practice). 
33.   See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Essay, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 
156 (2017). 
34.   See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146 (describing the Bill of Rights as 
embedding the moral values of America in 1791); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251-
52 (characterizing the Constitution as furnishing the moral premises for judicial decision). 
35.   See Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146 (describing moral principles as 
unchanging). 
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other hand, critics of originalism, with their metaphors of the 
Living Constitution and the Unwritten Constitution, often fail to 
recognize the power of historical and textual arguments.  They 
sometimes appear to discount the certainty that arises regarding 
many issues from the constitutional text, exaggerating the sense 
of constitutional flux.  As a result, the claims on both sides of the 
debate as to the nature of constitutional change appear overstated.  
Moreover, there is a sense that the premises about the 
Constitution, constitutional argument, and constitutional decision 
endorsed by the protagonists in the debate fail to capture key 
elements of constitutional flux—and the correlative elements of 
constitutional certainty. 
Fifth, I assess the modal claim made by some originalists 
that originalism is necessary, and therefore any other inconsistent 
theory of constitutional interpretation is necessarily impossible.  
Bork suggests that such impossibility is analogous to the physical 
impossibility of theories that violate fundamental laws of physics 
or chemistry (like the alchemical project to transmute lead into 
gold or the pre-Newtonian physicists’ project to design a 
perpetual motion machine).36  That analogy is misleading, if 
rhetorically powerful. Until recently, other originalists have 
ignored this claim, but it has recently been restated.37  The critics 
had generally ignored this singularly bold claim by Bork, but, as 
it has been restated and defended, the critics have begun to 
engage.38  It is a claim that is particularly controversial with the 
past 50 years or so of the debate over originalism; on Bork’s 
account, the critics of originalism are not merely wrong, they are 
necessarily wrong. 
The claim of necessity for originalism does not warrant 
rehabilitation and a more central place in debate.  It is important, 
however, for what it reveals about certain strands of originalism 
 
36.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Alternatives to Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 479 (1995) [hereinafter 
Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism]. 
37.  See generally William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
2349 (2015) [hereinafter Baude, Our Law] (making a positivist defense of the necessity of 
originalism). 
38.  Cass R. Sunstein, There is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. 
COMMENT. 193, 193-98 (2015) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nothing] (arguing that the concept of 
interpretation cannot determine the nature or methods of constitutional interpretation). 
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and its implications for the debate.  The claim of necessity reveals 
Bork’s commitments to an account of the nature of the 
Constitution and the nature of constitutional reasoning.  Those 
premises informed his originalism.39  Originalists’ critics do not 
share those commitments about constitutional reasoning.40  The 
failure to share common ground on these issues prevents a more 
meaningful and productive debate over these questions. 
Sixth, I examine the claim that drives much originalist 
thinking that originalism can restore the Lost Constitution, and, 
in so doing, radically change our constitutional law.41  The Lost 
Constitution is that original Constitution before corruption.42  
Corruption, on this account, is the disregard for the interpretation 
of the Constitution based upon its original understanding.43  It is 
fair to speak of this error as constituting corruption, rather than 
mere error, because the consequences are both that judges 
deciding cases on non-originalist arguments or grounds have 
arrogated power to themselves and that the most fundamental, 
foundational legal authority for the Republic has been cast aside.44  
The merits of the results under alternative constitutional 
decisional approaches—in terms of social utility, wealth 
maximization, fairness, or justice—are irrelevant, as are the good 
faith or good intentions of the judges committing such error.  At 
the very least, the original Constitution is that which existed 
before corruption by the Warren Court.45  For many, however, the 
corruption that must be excised started much earlier with the 
creation of the liberal state under President Franklin Roosevelt.46  
 
39.   See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18, at 269-74, 285-88; LeDuc, 
Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1, at 93-96. 
40.   LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1, at 103-07. 
41.   See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55. 
42.   See id. at 356.  
43.   As Sunstein has pointed out, the originalists sometimes treat non-originalists as 
lawless.  See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 54. 
44.    Id.  
45.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69-100.  Thus Judge Bork wrote: “The 
Court headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1953 to 1969 occupies a unique place in 
American law.  It stands first and alone as a legislator of policy, whether the document it 
purported to apply was the Constitution or a statute.”  Id. at 69.  Originalism cannot be 
understood as a matter of intellectual history except as a reaction to the jurisprudence of the 
Warren Court.  See DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 232-35 (2011). 
46.   SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 3; see BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 
354-57.  
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For some, indeed, it began with Chief Justice Marshall and the 
doctrine of judicial review.47  Critics of originalism have 
questioned whether originalism can accomplish the mission set 
out for it.48  They argue that the originalist arguments either fail 
to establish the substantive constitutional law conclusions that the 
originalists defend49 or, more radically, that the originalist 
arguments support very different substantive constitutional law 
conclusions.50  In the context of originalism, these claims are 
admittedly counterintuitive. 
Here, the shift in the debate is sufficiently recent and 
sufficiently novel that it is difficult to assess the competing 
claims.  But it is safe to predict that few originalists will be easily 
persuaded by the claim that there is a compelling originalist 
argument for a woman’s right to an abortion.  So, at least to that 
extent, the debate will not move forward on this front.  In fairness 
to the originalists, however, it does not appear that they ought to 
be persuaded by these arguments.  The argument that the 
originalist mission fails does not account for the power traditional 
originalist arguments have had in expressing the reasons to reach 
traditional originalist conclusions about substantive constitutional 
questions and in the opinions supporting originalist decision of 
constitutional cases.  As so often with the theoretical argument for 
substantive constitutional results, theory is often impotent.51 
The six claims and implications explored here are of 
particular importance in the debate and in assessing the 
 
47.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 19-28. 
48.  David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 969, 975 (2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Why] (arguing that originalist arguments 
may be made for decidedly non-originalist constitutional results).  That bold claim 
underestimates the conservative force of arguments based upon original intentions, 
expectations, and understandings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
49.   Id. (“originalism’s characteristic features . . . makes it a decidedly non-
conservative rhetorical weapon”). 
50.   Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 
(2007) (arguing that the original meaning of the Constitution creates a woman’s right to an 
abortion). See generally JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, 
LIVING ORIGINALISM] (adapting originalist arguments to support traditionally liberal 
constitutional results). 
51.  LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18; André LeDuc, The Relationship 
of Constitutional Law to Philosophy: Five Lessons from the Originalism Debate, 12 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 153-54 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Relationship of Constitutional Law 
to Philosophy]. 
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importance of constitutional originalism.52  The power and appeal 
of originalism should at once be apparent upon stating these six 
theses.  After the relatively bitter, partisan battles that have 
surrounded the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence,53 a 
theory that promises a neutral method makes a powerful claim on 
our loyalty.  Finally, the power of that theory—if required by 
democracy—could certainly survive mere subtle philosophical 
criticism. I will explain why the originalists fail to establish this 
powerful claim.  The critics do not establish their claims or most 
of their criticisms of originalism. They fail to establish that the 
Lost Constitution cannot be recovered by originalism; it very 
likely can. 
 
52.  There is, of course, a certain arbitrariness in the selection of these six theses.  
Others before me have attempted to identify the key theses of originalism, both as proponents 
and as critics.  See, e.g., Barnett, Originalism, supra note 27, at 629-43 (defending 
originalism’s claims); Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 311, 311-13 (1996)  [hereinafter Sunstein, Five Theses] (arguing that a weak version 
of what he terms soft originalism is a valuable constitutional theory, preferable to the non-
originalism of Dworkin and the Warren Court or to more ambitious strong originalisms).  
There are other important theses in originalism.  Originalism is presented, at least 
metaphorically, as a scientific method.  Justice Scalia began his essay Common-Law Courts 
in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws: “The following essay attempts to explain the current neglected state 
of the science of construing legal texts, and offers a few suggestions for improvement.”  
Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 3 (emphasis added).  Additionally, originalists claim 
that attention to the original meaning is the only honest method of interpreting the 
Constitution.  Bork wrote, for example, that the literature of constitutional interpretation 
challenging originalism and offering alternatives “is in effect coded . . . .”  BORK, TEMPTING, 
supra note 6, at 135.  Elsewhere he characterizes such authors’ projects as “nothing less than 
the subversion of the law’s foundations.”  Id. at 136.  Strong words.  The claim that 
originalism is an honest creed with which to interpret the Constitution—and that the 
competing theories are not—is thus also a powerful and compelling thesis.  Moreover, by 
implicitly accusing opponents of dishonesty—least in the matter of constitutional 
interpretation—it is necessarily a polarizing and divisive claim.  See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, 
supra note 4, at 3-7, 54.  Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that most originalists don’t 
really believe those bold claims.  If to depart from originalism were to abandon the 
Constitution and subvert the laws, then mere claims of stare decisis would be hardly 
compelling.  Yet, as noted below, even strong proponents of originalism like Justice Scalia 
acknowledge the legitimacy of such deference.  Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 139-140 
(arguing in response to criticism from Tribe that all theories allow for deference to 
theoretically questionable precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis). 
53.   See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as Plessy. Worse., in BUSH V. GORE: THE 
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 20, 34 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (exploring the Supreme 
Court’s decisive role in the 2000 presidential election and concluding that the decision was 
“utterly indefensible”); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 9-11, 11 (characterizing the 
academic constitutional criticism of originalism as a “heresy”).   
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With respect to the other four core claims, the arguments 
are more complex and subtle than either side generally 
acknowledges.  The debate thrives on simplistic and 
oversimplified premises and unstated assumptions.  From within 
the framework within which the debate has unfolded the 
arguments have been largely inconclusive.  The originalists 
generally believe that originalism is more consistent with our 
democratic republic and their critics dissent; the claim of 
neutrality made by the originalists is rejected by their critics; and 
the claim to hew more closely to the written nature of the 
constitutional text advanced by the originalists is also rejected by 
their critics.  Moreover, there is little progress occurring in the 
debate; there is no sense that we are moving toward a resolution 
of these issues.  The debate appears at an impasse on these central 
issues and the arguments fruitless.  Companion articles have 
explored the sources of this impasse.54  This article confirms that 
the stalemate of the debate has also occurred with respect to the 
debate over these six central claims and implications of 
originalism. 
 
II.  SIX CLAIMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
ORIGINALISM 
 
A. The Originalist Argument from Democracy 
 
One of the most powerful and complex arguments for 
originalism is that all of its alternatives are undemocratic.55  If that 
were true, it would be a compelling argument for originalism.  
Describing common law adjudication, Justice Scalia concludes: 
“This is preeminently a common-law way of making law, and not 
 
54.   See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18; LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 17; André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism and 
Pragmatism in the Debate about Originalism, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 613 (2016) [hereinafter 
LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism]; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1. 
55.   See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 
143.  Dworkin characterized this argument as Justice Scalia’s “most basic” argument for 
originalism.  Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 115, 127 
[hereinafter Dworkin, Interpretation]. 
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the way of construing a democratically adopted text.”56  That is, 
the degrees of freedom in a democracy with respect to the 
construction or interpretation of a legal text are fewer than in 
adjudication in a common law tradition.  Bork made a similar 
point more forcefully:  “[O]nly the approach of original 
understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional 
adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic 
legitimacy.”57  Here, Bork apparently made the point that, in a 
democracy, the supremacy of the legislative will of the people 
requires that sources of law not derived from the democratic 
exercise of that will be rejected 
The Borkian argument from democracy is simple and 
direct.  The Constitution is the pre-eminent democratic law.58  
Judges and justices have sworn oaths to uphold it.59  Its choices 
and directives are controlling, not to be subverted or amended by 
an appointed judiciary in derogation of the democratic will.60  
 
56.  Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40.  Justice Scalia does not pause to explore 
the definition of democracy or otherwise analyze the elements of democracy that implicate 
constitutional interpretation and adjudication.  It is likely that he thinks that the 
commonsensical notion of democracy does not require more careful analysis.  The 
fundamental notion is that citizens make the fundamental choices about what their 
government does. But see generally RICHARD A POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 130-57 (2005) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND DEMOCRACY] (arguing that the 
legal academy has been cavalier in its invocation of concepts of democracy in ways that 
conflate two very different visions). 
57.  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 143.  Earlier, in Neutral Principles, Bork had 
made the same point: “If I am correct so far, no argument that is both coherent and respectable 
can be made supporting a Supreme Court that ‘chooses fundamental values’ because a Court 
that makes rather than implements value choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions 
of a democratic society.”  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles].   
58.   U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
59.   ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 163-64 (Steven G. Calabresi 
ed., 2007) [hereinafter ORIGINALISM] (remarks of Judge Easterbrook); see also Easterbrook, 
Alternatives to Originalism, supra note 36.  The significance of the judicial oath to uphold 
the Constitution goes largely unremarked in this debate.  But see JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 12 (1980) [hereinafter ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST]. Judges may take the oath more seriously than the 
commentators suggest and, to the extent that they do not, that may properly be a matter of 
concern.  The oath does not answer the relevant decisional questions, however; it leaves open 
the question of what it means to uphold the Constitution.  Dworkin might have said that it 
means to uphold it with fidelity to its highest aspirations.  But the task of upholding the 
Constitution is arguably a different task than to interpret it faithfully. 
60.   Two comments are in order.  First, the import of appointment is not entirely clear.  
Since the Progressive movement, many Midwestern states (among others) have elected their 
judges.  I am unaware of any suggestion that selecting judges by popular election solves, or 
1024 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  70:4 
Originalism claims to offer the best interpretation of the meaning 
of the Constitution and the best bulwark against interpretative 
subversion or de facto amendment.  I have previously canvassed 
originalism’s argument to offer the best interpretation.61  Most 
fundamentally, originalism and many of its critics accord a 
priority to interpretation in constitutional adjudication that is 
misplaced, and problems of interpretation are more complex than 
many originalists acknowledge.62  Originalism also claims to 
offer the best bulwark against judicial adventurism because it 
purports to limit the sources of law to which judges may look, 
thereby limiting the possibility that a judge might import her own 
subjective preferences into the decision process. 
Sunstein captures the intuitive appeal of this argument.63  
He compares it to a friend’s request for music of Barbra Streisand 
as a birthday present from one who dislikes such music.64  The 
manifestly proper response is to make the gift of the music of 
Barbra Streisand, not the gift of the “better” music enjoyed by the 
donor.65  “Fundamentalists believe courts should think in the 
same way, as agents of the people, implementing their 
 
would solve, the countermajoritarian objection.  Elected judges, performing their judicial 
roles, either re-elected or turned out of office, appear fully consistent with democracy in a 
democratic republic.  This case, so prevalent in the states since the Progressive Era, casts 
substantial doubt that the countermajoritarian difficulty is, fundamentally, a problem in 
democratic process and institutions—not a problem of the subversion of democracy itself.  
But even very careful thinkers about judicial review have missed this point.  See Waldron, 
supra note 17, at 1353.  So exploring that dimension of judicial review is a topic for another 
day.  Similarly, there is generally no suggestion that the problem of judicial review was 
exacerbated by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment and its requirement of direct 
election of United States Senators or the democracy-reinforcing decisions of the Warren 
Court that have enhanced the democratic nature of the Republic.  The second point to 
highlight is the importance of the reference to will in the formulation of the objection.  
Because it is the democratic will that is preeminent, mere argument or reason, in which a 
court might legitimately claim institutional competence, if not expertise, is discounted.  
Dworkin’s strategy to challenge originalism (and also to solve the problem that judicial 
review appears countermajoritarian) is to elevate the role of reason and argument, and their 
place in comparison to will. 
61.   See generally LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1 
(concluding that the reduction of constitutional decision to interpretation is mistaken); 
LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17 (introducing my arguments about the 
foundations of the interpretative claims in the debate). 
62.  See id. 
63.  See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, 56-59. 
64.  Id. at 57.   
65.  See id.  
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commands.”66  That is an intuitive way to think about law, 
grounded in the positivist model of law as the command of the 
sovereign67 and the classical liberal political theory of 
democracy.68  John Hart Ely, before criticizing originalism, also 
acknowledges its fundamental appeal in the context of our 
classical democratic theory.69  But Sunstein is mistaken because 
the performative mission of the Constitution is very different from 
the performative role of a friend’s report of what she would like 
as a birthday present.70  In the social context of selecting a friend’s 
birthday present, what his personal preferences are is very close 
to controlling, in the weak sense of being determinative of what a 
friend should do.  That sensitivity to another’s preferences is part 
of what makes one a good friend.71  In the context of our practice 
of applying the Constitution to resolve controversies presented in 
constitutional cases the original understanding of the text is not, 
as a matter of that practice, controlling.72  Other kinds or modes 
of argument have often proved decisive.  Originalists may argue 
against the practice, but in doing so they are pitting theory against 
practice. 
The analysis of originalism’s argument from 
democracy—and the critics’ response—requires three principal 
steps.  First, originalism’s tacit account of the linguistic meaning 
 
66.  Id.  Note also how clearly positivist such an originalist account of the law is.  See 
generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54 (exploring the positivist and non-
positivist themes in the originalism debate, emphasizing the relative absence of consequential 
differences that arise from positive and natural commitments in the debate). 
67.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18-22 (1st ed. 1961) [hereinafter HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW] (describing the jurisprudential theory of John Austin, but 
characterizing it as overly simplistic). 
68.   See generally André LeDuc, Political Philosophy and the Fruitless Quest for an 
Archimedean Stance in the Debate over Originalism, 85 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2016) [hereinafter 
LeDuc, Fruitless Quest] (criticizing the invocation of political philosophy to play a 
foundational role in constitutional interpretation and decision). 
69.   ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 4-5. 
70.   See generally SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 57.   
71.   See DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY 250-52 (2014) [hereinafter ALLEN, OUR 
DECLARATION]. 
72.  See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17 (describing the alternative modes of 
constitutional argument including prudential, doctrinal, and structural arguments that do not 
derive from the original understandings or intentions with respect to the constitutional text).  
To avoid possible misunderstanding, I should emphasize that I am here making a descriptive 
claim about our constitutional practice, not a prescriptive claim about what that practice 
ought to be. 
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of the Constitution must be expressly articulated.  That meaning 
provides the linguistic force that originalism seeks to capture. 
Second, the originalist account of the authority of the 
Constitution—which emphasizes the Constitution’s democratic 
provenance—must be articulated.  It is the democratic legitimacy 
of that authority that is at the core of the argument for originalism 
from democracy. Third, the relationship of originalism’s 
theoretical arguments from democracy with our constitutional 
practice must be highlighted.  I will explore each in turn. 
1. The Appeal to Meaning 
To make the argument from democracy, originalism must 
first establish the meaning of the Constitution that is to be 
faithfully followed.  Originalists argue that it is only that 
constitutional meaning that has democratic legitimacy.  Critics of 
originalism, after all, do not dispute that the Constitution is 
paramount or that judges and justices are bound to uphold it.73  
The disagreement is generally with respect to the claim that 
originalism is the best interpretation of what the Constitution 
means and occasionally as to how interpretation fits into 
constitutional adjudication.  The disagreement is over what it 
means to uphold the Constitution.74  For example, Dworkin’s 
reply to Justice Scalia claimed to offer a more faithful reading of 
the Constitution.75  Both he and Justice Scalia endeavored to 
determine what the Constitution means about what it says.76  Yet 
 
73.   See, e.g., Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 122.  Martha Nussbaum noted 
this recently almost in passing: “Textualists and their critics typically differ over how to find 
the meaning of the constitutional text, not over its relevance.”  Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Foreword, Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 n.210 (2007).  Nussbaum has, however, overstated the role of 
interpretation in constitutional adjudication. 
74.   LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17, at 133; see also Ronald 
Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1262 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous] (arguing that Justice 
Scalia’s originalism is not faithful to the Constitution).   
75.  Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 122-23 (“I said, for example, that, 
subject to the constraints of integrity which require judges to keep faith with past decisions, 
‘The Constitution insists that our judges do their best collectively to construct, reinspect, and 
revise, generation by generation, the skeleton of freedom and equality of concern that its 
great clauses, in their majestic abstraction, command.’”).  
76.   Nevertheless, Justice Scalia accuses Tribe and Dworkin of misinterpretation and 
Dworkin levels the same charge against Justice Scalia.  Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 
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it is surely fair to acknowledge, as with respect to the closely 
related argument from neutrality, that the apparent tension with 
democracy is clear.  There is something about a theory that claims 
judges should be merely interpreting the constitutional text based 
upon special expertise and a judicial demeanor that appears to 
comport with the proper role of judicial review in a democracy.  
Whether this promise can sustain the challenges from its critics, 
we ought to begin by acknowledging the appeal of this theory. 
If we analyze the theory and its intuitive appeal more 
closely, we can identify several strands of the argument.  First, the 
model of adjudication—following the rule—is an intuitively 
engaging account of how we are bound by legal rules. The appeal 
of this model emerges if we look more generally at our ordinary 
notions about the nature of following rules more generally.  But 
the model of rule following also emerges as more complex and 
ultimately somewhat misleading.  Wittgenstein explores the 
psychological and theoretical elements in following rules in the 
Philosophical Investigations.77  Wittgenstein’s analysis, although 
controversial, is generally understood to defend rule following as 
a social practice and to reject the claim that following a rule 
begins with an interpretation of the rule.78  He rejects the common 
assumption that we can understand how we follow rules 
expressed by our language without understanding the behavior in 
a social context. 
The role of legal rules in adjudication presents a more 
complex problem than the kinds of rule following that 
Wittgenstein focuses upon.  Most legal cases—at least most 
appellate cases—present questions as to exactly how we are to 
proceed under the relevant rule or rules.  The cases may be 
 
143 (“Professor Tribe’s methodology [of constitutional interpretation] and mine are poles 
apart.”); Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 74, at 1262 (“Scalia wants to be seen to embrace 
fidelity, but he ends by rejecting it.”).  So too Tribe: “Let us . . . take Justice Scalia at his 
word and assume that . . . he does indeed believe, as I do, that it is the text’s meaning . . . that 
binds us as law.” Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 66. 
77.  See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. reprt. 1986) (1953).  
78.   SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982); 
G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES & LANGUAGE vii-xiii (1984) (rejecting 
Kripke’s reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s argument as developing and rebutting an account 
of rule skepticism). 
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described, at least in part, as presenting the question of how to 
follow the relevant rule.  That is, in a sense, the nature of a 
question of law.  Whether that question is helpfully viewed as a 
semantic question or something else is central to Dworkin’s 
theory of law.  So if we are to invoke the notion that the judicial 
mission is to determine how to follow a rule, we are going to have 
to do so having acknowledged that we are operating in the 
borderlands of the rules.  Constitutional adjudication generally 
arises when the parties disagree about how to follow the rule or 
whether there is a rule. 
The concepts of meaning, interpretation, and 
constitutional reasoning tacitly adopted by originalism are more 
complex and problematic than they—and many of their critics—
acknowledge.79  As a result, the premises for the debate are more 
problematic than is generally acknowledged, too. 
 
79.   LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1; LeDuc, Interpretation and 
Practical Reasoning, supra note 1. To the extent that the constitutional text ought to be read 
performatively, along lines suggested by the pragmatics of Austin and Grice, the originalist 
approach to constitutional meaning is inadequate.  See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, 
supra note 1, at 150-78.  I have previously explored the apparent puzzle about the question 
whether the Vice President may preside over her own impeachment trial and shown how a 
performative and inferentialist analysis helps explain why she may not.  See LeDuc, 
Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1, at 152-53 (emphasizing the inferentialist 
commitments inherent in the constitutional text); LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical 
Reasoning, supra note 1, at 73 n.114 (emphasizing the performative dimension of the text). 
Another example arises with respect to the limitation on the ability to amend Article I 
to change the equal representation of each State in the Senate. Article V provides that such 
representation may not be changed for a State without its express agreement.  U.S. CONST. 
art. V (“[N]o state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”).  
But, by the express terms of Article V, no amendment to the restrictive terms of Article V 
itself require each State’s consent. Thus, according to the public understanding of the 
linguistic meaning of the Constitution on its adoption, a two-step process could change the 
undemocratic charter of the Senate. The first step would simply repeal the requirement of 
consent, without actually stripping any state of its equal representation in the Senate.  Again, 
a performative analysis that recognizes what the restrictive provision of Article V was 
doing—rather than merely what it was saying—demonstrates rather powerfully why such an 
approach would be impermissible.  (I think this example also highlights the fallacy of the 
infinite regress argument made by Tribe and Dorf.)  LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. 
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73-80 (1991) [hereinafter TRIBE & DORF, 
READING] (arguing that determining the level of generality at which a constitutional 
provision is to be applied requires interpretations relying upon premises outside the text); see 
also Robert Brandom has also rejected of the problem of infinite regress.  Robert B. 
Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: The Normative Fine Structure 
of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in PRAGMATISM, LAW, AND LANGUAGE 19, 21–22 (Graham 
Hubbs & Douglas Lind eds., 2014) [hereinafter Brandom, Hegelian Model] (expressly 
invoking Lewis Carroll’s logic fable of Achilles and the Tortoise to deny that a legal rule 
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Second, there is a very important strand of political theory 
to the originalist claim.  Because of the enormous direct power 
accorded judges over particular persons in the particular context 
of their lawsuits, we are anxious to cabin and constrain that 
power.  That implicit concern with power, and with its potential 
abuse, is one of the sources of originalism’s appeal.  If we can 
assimilate the judge’s role to that of an honest umpire, in Chief 
Justice Roberts’s formulation,80 we have denied her the authority 
to do more.  The model of rules appears to offer a path to do so.  
Appellate judges simply resolve disagreements about what the 
rules are or how they apply in particular cases. 
Third, related to the second consideration with respect to 
the requirement that judicial power be legitimate, is the collateral 
 
needs an interpretation before it can be applied); LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra 
note 18, at 320–22. 
80.   “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.”  
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be C.J. of the United States).  Implicit and important in this 
metaphor, but unarticulated or acknowledged is the premise that there is a fact of the matter 
with respect to what the rules of the game are.  On this matter, the judge confronts the rules 
of the game with an internal point of view, but passively, accepting the rules as they are 
without regard to whether they make sense, or are defensible.  I explore both why the notion 
that there is a fact of the matter with respect to propositions of constitutional law is an initially 
seductive notion of what makes propositions of constitutional law defensible or, in other 
terms, true, as well as why it is a misleading approach to the performative texts of the 
Constitution in three companion articles.  See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, 
supra note 18; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 12; LeDuc, Constitutional 
Meaning, supra note 1.  Leading defenders of contemporary accounts of constitutional claims 
as true and what makes them so, like Christopher Green, seem to take the truth value of 
authoritative propositions of constitutional law as so obvious as not to need any defense.  
Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2018) (available at https:// papers.ssrn.com / sol3/ papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2901157 [https://perma.cc/SEB8-H67X]) [hereinafter Green, Truthmakers] 
(devoting an entire article to the competing accounts of the truthmakers for propositions of 
constitutional law without addressing the question whether any such truthmakers exist). That 
is a surprising omission, in the light of the philosophical and constitutional literature that has 
called that premise into doubt.  Bob Brandom’s formulation of the distinction between our 
pure and practical reason is perhaps most helpful.  That is, we make propositions of 
constitutional law true (to the extent that’s a helpful notion) rather than take them as true.  
This formulation probably best captures the fundamental thrust of the alternative to a 
representational theory of constitutional texts that accounts for the truth of constitutional 
texts by their correspondence with facts about the Constitution-in-the-world. 
For my more complete analysis of the tacit and express use of political philosophy in 
the originalism debate and my assessment that political philosophy cannot provide the 
Archimedean stance from which to resolve the debate see LeDuc, Fruitless Quest, supra note 
68. 
1030 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  70:4 
concern that, in our Republic, the power to make laws is vested in 
our democratically-elected representatives.  Any lawmaking by 
the judiciary would appear to challenge this premise of our 
democracy.  This, of course, is the celebrated countermajoritarian 
difficulty;81 courts appear undemocratic, perhaps even 
antidemocratic, as and to the extent that they strike down 
otherwise properly enacted democratically enacted laws. 
The critics’ responses to this democracy-preserving 
defense of originalism are made in stronger and weaker forms.  
The strong form challenges the notion that texts have meanings 
independent of readers and interpretive communities.82  This 
skeptical challenge is most clearly associated with the Critical 
Legal Theorists83 and with Stanley Fish.84  These radical, 
skeptical arguments may be rebutted a number of ways.85  More 
powerful is a weaker form of the challenge to original meanings.  
The weaker form of the challenge to originalist claim to rely upon 
original meaning simply denies that the meaning of the provisions 
answers the concrete questions of modern times.86 Even 
committed originalists sometimes make this argument.87  All that 
I want to reiterate here is that those challenges to the implicit 
premise of a self-interpreting Constitution and the claim of an 
 
81.   BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
82.   Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 
519-21 (2003).   
83.   See generally Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 
YALE L.J. 1515 (1991); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).   
84.  See generally STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law 
and Literature, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 87 (1989) [hereinafter FISH, Chain 
Gang; DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY]; STANLEY FISH, Wrong Again, in DOING WHAT 
COMES NATURALLY, supra, at 103 [hereinafter FISH, Wrong Again]. 
85.   See DENNIS J. PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 99-127 (1996) [hereinafter 
PATTERSON, TRUTH] (arguing that the interpersonal social world is constructed not by 
interpretation but by shared understanding of social practice); see also Martha Nussbaum, 
Sophistry About Conventions, 17 NEW LITERARY HIST. 129, 129-30 (1985) reprinted in 
LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 220, 220-211 (1990) 
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Sophistry] (arguing that Fish’s radical skepticism is sophistical 
because the truth of what we say matters, even if we reject realism).   
86.   See, e.g., Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 49.  
87.   United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 420 n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“The Court suggests that something like this might have occurred in 1791, but 
this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to 
mention a constable with incredible fortitude and patience.”).   
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unambiguous statement of abstract provisions are powerful 
objections, even if not as dispositive as their proponents might 
sometimes suggest.88  In the face of those criticisms, the 
originalists’ appeal to the meaning of the Constitution, without 
more, probably fails. 
2. The Authority of the Constitution 
An implicit premise of the argument from democracy is 
that the Constitution, as a text, has an authoritative status by virtue 
of actions taken by white males, generally of Northern European 
extraction, in the eighteenth century.89  That limited class 
comprised the relevant political actors.  Their actions in revolting 
against England in the 1770’s and then overthrowing the Articles 
of Confederation of the thirteen states90 are now, still, binding 
upon all American citizens and residents.  How does that work?  
One model of explanation often employed is the model of laws.  
Properly adopted laws under the federal and the states’ 
constitutions are binding laws.  The Constitution proposed, and 
ratified by its own terms, may appear to be binding in a similar 
way.  But how is such a constitution distinguished from the 
possible constitutions of otherwise non-authoritative groups, such 
as the posse comitatus? 
 
88.   See infra Section II.C; see also Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40 
(asserting, without argument, his claim as to the inherent conservative mission of 
constitutions).   
89.   See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 171-76; Baude, Our Law?, supra 
note 37, at 2352. 
90.   Under the Articles of Confederation, the mission of the Philadelphia convention 
in 1787 was only to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation.  The convention 
far exceeded its authority, effectively overthrowing the Confederation established under the 
Articles of Confederation.  See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: 
A BIOGRAPHY 29-38 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION]; MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
(2016); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 
471-75 (new ed. 1998) (describing a “Federalist revolution”).  Thus, the original legitimacy 
and force of law of the Constitution cannot be explained easily in terms of conformity with 
then existing positive law, a point that appears to go unaddressed by Bork and Justice Scalia. 
Tribe explores the source of the legitimacy of the Constitution. His argument, of course, is 
that the legitimacy of the Constitution is a clear demonstration of the powerful “dark matter” 
of the invisible Constitution.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 6-7, 
149-51 (2008) [hereinafter TRIBE, INVISIBLE]. 
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Bork acknowledged the criticism that the Constitution, 
adopted by our forefathers—or at least, some of our white 
forefathers—cannot bind citizens of a heterogeneous democracy 
today, and, in his customary style, purports to address it head on.91  
He suggested that the argument questioning the legitimacy of the 
Constitution is confined by its proponents to the provisions 
guaranteeing rights.92  Second—and the relationship of these two 
restatements is not clear—the objection challenging the 
Constitution may be restated as a claim that judges may go 
beyond the text of the Constitution in creating rights, because of 
the limitations on the democratic process inherent in the 
Constitution’s formation.93  Once the argument for expanded 
judicial powers was so reformulated, Bork offered the reply that 
alleged defects in the Constitution’s formation cannot ground an 
anti-majoritarian defense of judicial activism.94  The power of the 
judiciary, created by the Constitution, to strike down otherwise 
legitimate laws, cannot be expanded by flaws in the adoption of 
the constituting authority.  Thus, for Bork, the challenge based on 
the provenance of the Constitution was seemingly beside the 
point.  The failure to define a broader spectrum of protected rights 
entitled to constitutional protection could not justify a court 
striking down otherwise duly enacted statutes to protect other 
rights not protected by the dead white men’s Constitution.  Thus, 
Bork concludes, the attack on the legitimacy of the Constitution 
cannot be an argument for greater judicial authority (under that 
Constitution) nor for judicial activism. 
 
91.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-76. 
92.   Id. at 170.  Bork’s claim was both too broad, and too narrow.  It was too broad 
because many rights in the Constitution are uncontroversial.  No one is today much 
concerned about the Third Amendment—prohibiting the quartering of troops in private 
homes—notwithstanding its provenance.  That could change in time, of course.  Nor, 
contrary to Bork’s implicit suggestion, is the controversy limited to the need for greater reach 
for the rights assured by the Constitution.  The Second Amendment assuring the right to bear 
arms has long been a bête noir of liberals.  See generally Sanford Levinson, Comment, The 
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989) [hereinafter Levinson, 
Embarrassing Second Amendment].  So the formulation is too narrow, too. 
93.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 172-75; Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism 
in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1230 (2012).  But see AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 90, at 15-19 (arguing that the process of ratification of the Constitution was 
democratic to an unprecedented degree at that time). 
94.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-76. 
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While Bork appears right to deny that the assault on the 
provenance of the Constitution cannot expand the powers of the 
judiciary under that same Constitution, it would also appear that 
Bork and his critics have failed to engage.  The claim of the critics 
of the Constitution ought not—at least under the principle of 
charity—be construed as one that the Constitution is invalid or 
illegitimate, but rather as a claim that the validity of the 
Constitution as a source of law, and the legitimacy of that law, 
derive from something more than the historical events of the late 
18th century along the east coast of the United States.  The 
emphasis upon the limitations of that historical process and its 
distance from the present merely serves to lay the foundation for 
an inquiry into the rest of the story of how we are today to 
interpret and apply the Constitution.  The claim that the historical 
origin of the Constitution is insufficient to explain how it applies 
today as a source of legal obligation can be restated abstractly as 
an example of the claim that no text can be self-interpreting.  Each 
text must be interpreted within the context of linguistic and, often, 
other social practices. 
We can acknowledge these claims without committing 
ourselves to the strong claims made about reading and 
interpretation by some.95  Once we do acknowledge that a text 
cannot be self-interpreting, or, indeed, self-referential in any 
controlling way, we understand why the authority of the 
Constitution is fundamentally different than the authority of a law 
enacted in conformity with the Constitution.  A corollary of this 
difference explains why the sanctions for violating the 
Constitution are different from the sanctions for violating other 
laws.  As important as the force of the Constitution is, it 
nevertheless implicates fundamental choices in our democratic 
republic.  Imposing individual sanctions, whether criminal or 
civil, would potentially constrain the expression of views and the 
making of political decisions and thereby impair the robust 
 
95.   Some critics have argued that texts are fundamentally empty and that all meaning 
is brought to them by their readers and interpreters.  That claim has achieved a certain 
currency, in certain circles, but has not played a prominent role in the debate over 
originalism.  For leading commentary on an important element of the interpretation 
controversy, see Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 84, at 87; Fish, Wrong Again, supra note 84, 
at 103; Ronald Dworkin, On Interpretation and Objectivity, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, 
supra note 13, at 167 (1985); Nussbaum, Sophistry, supra note 85. 
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democratic political life contemplated and intended by the 
Constitution. 
That historical story leads, on the best account of the 
critics of originalism, to an account of the social practices 
surrounding the Constitution; our government officials’ pledges 
to maintain and defend it, our veneration of it within the 
community, and, far from least, our practice of construing it and 
interpreting it, in the courts and in the academy.96  When we look 
at how those practices contribute to the force of the Constitution 
we are necessarily looking beyond the four corners of the text.  
That, I take it, is the better interpretation of the criticism of the 
origin of the Constitution, not the reconstruction offered by Bork.  
That better interpretation is not adequately rebutted by Bork’s 
arguments. 
3. The Place of Constitutional Practice in a 
Democracy 
Bobbitt argues that the existence of our constitutional 
practices establishes the legitimacy of judicial review.97  If that is 
 
96.   The classic account of this practice-based anti-foundationalist analysis is 
BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17; see also LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 
12 (developing Bobbitt’s analysis in the context of the originalism debate).   
97.   BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at xix n.1.  Bobbitt’s modalities, and the role that 
he ascribes to them, have often been misunderstood.  Bobbitt himself describes the reader 
who thought the subtitle of the work ought to have been “Theories of the Constitution,” not 
understanding Bobbitt’s notion that it is the very articulation and argument with and through 
these theories that gives meaning to the Constitution and legitimates judicial review; no one 
of these theories can itself be dominant and the modes themselves are incommensurable—
there is no formula for when a prudential argument trumps a structural or historical argument.  
Thus, Bobbitt’s theory is a meta-theory of how these constitutional theories legitimate the 
practice of judicial review.  See PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION xi 
(1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION].  In his first statement of those modes, their 
logical status was not made nearly so clear as in his later work.  Compare BOBBITT, FATE, 
supra note 17, at 10-11 with BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra, at 11-22.  Thus, he did not 
generally characterize the type of arguments as modes, instead terming them types or 
archetypes.  BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra, at 7-8. Bobbitt’s presentation and style was 
clearly considered; much like Wittgenstein, Bobbitt was committed to showing, rather than 
stating, his claims.  See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 77, §§ 198-240.  Bobbitt’s admiration 
for Wittgenstein expressed itself in the choice of publisher for Constitutional Interpretation.  
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra, at xi.  The pedagogical or therapeutic foundation for this 
choice would appear to be that describing the richness of constitutional argument and 
discourse more accurately than merely characterizing that discourse.  Moreover, as therapy, 
the goal was to induce the reader to experience the grip of the modes of argument.  There is, 
especially in Constitutional Fate, a very Wittgensteinian presentation.  Even many of 
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true, then there is no countermajoritarian problem, and no 
reconciliation of judicial review with democracy required.  Has 
Bobbitt successfully rebutted to claim that originalism is 
necessary to rebut the countermajoritarian challenge?  According 
to Bobbitt, there cannot be an argument for the primacy or 
exclusiveness of the historical mode, the doctrinal mode, the 
prudential mode, or any of the other three modes.  The 
deployment of such arguments by the courts—and their 
acceptance by the citizens of the republic and the professorial 
commentariat—establish their legitimacy and legitimating 
function and power.  Such an argument as to how we ought to 
interpret the Constitution has no force in the context of an inquiry 
into how we do interpret the Constitution.  Bobbitt’s novel claim 
is that the Constitution is how we interpret and apply it.  The 
aspiration to a radical, Archimedean critique of our practice is 
illusory.  From this perspective, two insights emerge.  First, 
because judicial review is a central part of our practice of 
constitutional construction—a keel, not a plank, in Neurath’s 
boat,98 it needs little, if any, defense.  Its defense and legitimation 
arises from its pride of place in our constitutional practice.  From 
this perspective, Bobbitt’s claim to have legitimated judicial 
review appears at least plausible.99  Second, given how radical an 
approach to constitutional interpretation Bobbitt is proposing, it 
is hardly surprising that his claims have largely been ignored or 
misunderstood.  Nevertheless, to the extent he has a strong 
argument to have disarmed Bickel’s countermajoritarian 
challenge, he has eliminated one of the classic best arguments for 
 
Bobbitt’s astute and sophisticated readers did not get the point.  See, e.g., Patrick O. 
Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional Tradition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1969 (1983) 
(reviewing BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17); see also Mark Tushnet, Justification in 
Constitutional Adjudication: A Comment on Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1707, 1707 (1994) (pessimistically predicting that “the insights in [Bobbitt’s] work are likely 
to be ignored or transformed by the larger scholarly community”).   
98.   See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 3 (1960) (citing Otto 
Neurath’s holistic metaphor of science as a boat at sea that can only be rebuilt in stages if it 
is to remain afloat and extending that metaphor to ordinary talk and knowledge of the world). 
99.   Bobbitt’s rejection of doubts about judicial review—in our constitutional world—
thus parallels modern philosophy’s rejection of radical Cartesian doubt as untenable and 
misguided—quite intentionally, I suspect. 
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originalism.  Because of the radical nature of this challenge and 
because I have explored it elsewhere, I will put it aside here.100 
4. Conclusion 
Returning, then, to the claim that originalism is the only 
theory of interpretation that is compatible with constitutional 
democracy, it would appear that such a claim is implicitly 
premised on a claim that the Constitution derives its legitimacy 
solely from historical events and its text.  Missing, however, is an 
account of the political theory that underlies this premise.101  In 
the absence of such an account, originalism cannot refute theories 
of the Constitution that explain its legitimacy on a different 
political theoretical account.  Originalism must therefore 
necessarily import sources beyond the text itself, and do so 
consistently with our republican democracy.  If originalism is the 
theory of interpretation most consistent with, or perhaps, the only 
theory consistent with, democracy, that claim has yet to be made 
persuasively. 
The New Originalists sometimes suggest that their 
arguments from positivism and from the nature of language and 
interpretation are independent of arguments like the argument 
from democracy of classical originalism.  They can therefore 
claim indifference to the power of the argument from democracy.  
But to the extent that the New Originalists abandon the 
rhetorically powerful classical argument from democracy in favor 
 
100.   See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 12; LeDuc, 
Fruitless Quest, supra note 68.  The problem of judicial review continues to be thought of as 
a live question in constitutional theory, of course.  See Waldron, supra note 17; TARA SMITH, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN OBJECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEM (2015) [hereinafter SMITH, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW] (defending judicial review on an analysis derived from Ayn Rand’s libertarian 
theory).  The arguments made in that literature are not made from within our constitutional 
decisional process, however. They are made as a matter of political philosophy.  Moreover, 
the premises expressly adopted by Waldron, at least, in making his criticism would be 
potentially problematic for some of the proponents of judicial review. In any case, I think 
philosophical arguments will be inadequate to reverse Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 
(1803) and that resilience ought perhaps to be explored by the philosophical critics of judicial 
review.  See LeDuc, Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy, supra note 51. 
101.   See generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54 (exploring the 
surprising little importance of the distinction between positive and natural law theories in the 
debate); LeDuc, Fruitless Quest, supra note 68 (arguing that the efforts of the protagonists 
to employ arguments from political philosophy to win the originalism debate have been, and 
will remain, fruitless). 
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of arcane arguments about linguistic philosophy, some of the 
political power of originalism’s appeal is forfeit. 
More fundamentally, critics who argue (as do I) that our 
existing constitutional practice is prior to our theoretical accounts 
of that practice, easily dismiss the argument from democracy.  
Our democracy has fit remarkably comfortably with our practices 
of constitutional argument and adjudication.  In making that 
claim, I do not mean to make a strong, normative claim about the 
quality of our democracy, either with respect to the power or 
equitable allocation of the franchise or the presence of corrupting 
elements in our democracy.  I instead mean only to assert that the 
Republic has not faced serious constitutional crises over the 
Court’s practice of constitutional decision. 
The lack of resolution or even progress with respect to the 
debate over originalism’s claim from democracy reflects the 
failure of the protagonists to work through and make express the 
premises of their argument.  There are likely inherent puzzles in 
the concept of democracy to which appeal is made.102  For 
example, it appears unlikely that originalists would view the 
democratic election of judges as responding to the 
countermajoritarian problem, but it is unclear why such a change 
would not solve the problem.  My focus has instead been on the 
gaps in the premises about the Constitution and its import that 
figure in the arguments from democracy.  Those gaps and 
ambiguities prevent the goal of assuring democratic choice in the 
Republic from translating into a conclusion as to the way the 
courts should approach the Constitution in adjudication. 
 
B. The Promise of Neutrality 
 
Originalism also claims to offer a neutral method of 
constitutional jurisprudence.103  The neutrality to be sought is 
 
102.  POSNER, LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 56, at 130-57 (describing the 
ambiguities inherent in different concepts of democracy). 
103.  Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1184-85 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rules]; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 1-8.  
New Originalists like Larry Solum do not employ the older terminology of neutrality but 
emphasize much the same concept when they make the constraint thesis a central tenet of 
originalism and assert that originalists are committed to the consistency of their interpretation 
with the original meaning of the adopted text.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and 
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usually an absence of bias that might otherwise arise from the 
particular moral or political views of the judge applying and 
interpreting the constitutional law and deciding the constitutional 
case at bar.104  As in our ordinary usage, neutrality is generally 
understood contextually, in reference to other, generally 
adversarial, or competing or alternative, persons or things.105  
Neutrality is often contraposed against partiality or partisanship.  
Understanding the claims made for neutrality also requires 
understanding the relationship between neutrality and objectivity.  
Neutrality requires acting without reference to subjective 
preference.106 
Bork may have made the strongest statement of the 
neutrality thesis, but he was not alone in making that claim for 
originalism.107  Noting that neutral application of legal principles 
has long been identified as a good, Bork asserted that such 
neutrality is not sufficient and that the principles themselves must 
also be neutral in their derivation and in their definition.108  “The 
philosophy of original understanding is capable of supplying 
neutrality in all three respects—in deriving, defining, and 
applying principle.”109  In this section I want to address three 
elements of this claim.  First, I will argue that the nature of the 
neutrality that originalism claims to offer is not well defined and 
that the resulting debate is confused.  Second, I argue that the 
contrast between the promised neutrality and the alternative of 
unfettered judicial discretion that originalism seeks to foreclose is 
an illusory dualism.  Some of Robert Brandom’s insights are 
 
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 461-62 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, 
Constitutional Construction].  With consistency to the original meaning, as with neutrality, 
the discretion of the constitutional judge is cabined.     
104.   See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46. 
105.   Thus, in international relations, we speak of nations being neutral as between 
warring countries and in our intellectual discourse we speak of being neutral as between 
competing theories or claims. 
106.   See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46 (criticizing non-originalist 
approaches to constitutional interpretation and decision and concluding that “it is up for each 
judge to decide for himself (under no standard I can discern . . .)”). 
107.   Scalia, Rules, supra note 103, at 1183-85; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Lesser Evil].   
108.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 146; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 
57, at 7. 
109.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 146.  Bork apparently first articulated this 
trinity of neutrality in 1971 in Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 7. 
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particularly helpful,110 along with Bobbitt’s pluralist modal 
account of constitutional argument.  We can (and do) have 
constraints within our constitutional decisional practice without 
either eliminating the power and freedom that judges have—or 
their need for judgment.  Third, and finally, I argue that the 
promise of neutrality cannot be delivered by an originalism that 
also preserves non-originalist precedent.  But I will also show that 
the criticisms leveled against originalism often misunderstand the 
nature of constitutional argument and decision.  They often 
exaggerate the role—and the power—of constitutional theory. 
1. The Meaning of Neutrality 
Neutrality has long been sought in constitutional 
interpretation.111  Herbert Wechsler sharpened our focus on its 
importance in the aftermath of Brown.112  It has been less often 
defined with precision, perhaps in part because it appears such an 
ordinary, commonsensical notion.113  It is seductively simple, we 
think, like the related concept of equality.114  The desideratum of 
neutrality is, generally, expressly or implicitly contrasted with the 
expression of personal preferences and occasionally with policy 
 
110.   See generally Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra note 79 (highlighting, in 
Hegelian terms, the interrelationship of authority and responsibility in adjudication). 
111.   See, e.g., BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS, supra note 8, at 49-65 (acknowledging 
the limitations of neutral principles in the resolution of difficult political issues); ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 54-55; see generally LeDuc, Interpretation 
and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1 (arguing that the role accorded interpretation and the 
formal account of constitutional reasoning is inadequate as a description of our constitutional 
law decisional practice).  Express critics, outside the Critical Legal Studies movement, are 
relatively few.  See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 24, at 804-06 (arguing 
that liberalism’s commitment to individual autonomy ensures disparate sources of 
constitutional meaning and precludes the existence of neutral principles of constitutional 
law). 
112.   Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (1959) [hereinafter Wechsler, Neutral Principles]. 
113.   The apparent simplicity of the concept of neutrality is at best exaggerated.  See 
Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 24, at 804-05 (arguing that the requirements for 
the construction of linguistic meaning are inconsistent with the liberal principles grounding 
the claims for the value neutrality of constitutional law).   
114.   See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1977) 
[hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING] (distinguishing treating persons equally and treating them 
as equals). 
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judgments.115  Understanding Bork’s claim requires 
understanding the concept of neutrality and the related concepts 
of derivation, definition, and application. 
Neutrality for Bork was Kantian; it was to treat all like 
cases alike116—that is, to apply principles “to all cases that may 
fairly be said to fall within them.”117  “Fairly” may carry a great 
deal of weight.  But its meaning is never articulated.  It may 
import the standards of the community of language users, and the 
standards they would acknowledge.  Or it may be seeking to 
articulate a purportedly more objective standard; that is, what 
really, truly would be fair.  The choice of verb may be inartful.  
Or it may be acknowledging the uncertainty.  That which only 
“may” be said to be fair, may also not be fair—or merely said to 
be unfair.  “Fairly” might acknowledge that inclusion within a 
rule is not a mechanical phenomenon.  That is, whether a rule or 
a principle applies to a particular case is not necessarily a given, 
not a matter merely of “looking.”  (Whether that means the rule 
needs an interpretation,118 or whether the concept of following a 
rule can admit of uncertainty,119 and, if so, how,120 probably does 
not need to delay us.)  Once that uncertainty is recognized, 
however, Bork needed to explain how it was to be resolved and, 
 
115.   Thus, for example, in writing about such non-neutral decision making, Justice 
Scalia proclaimed: 
 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments says 
that no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law . . . .  
No matter.  Under The Living Constitution the death penalty may have 
become unconstitutional.  And it is up to each Justice to decide for 
himself (under no standard I can discern) when that occurs. 
Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46. 
116.   See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 44, 45 
(Robert Paul Wolf ed., Lewis White Beck trans., 1969) (1785) (arguing that ethical principles 
must be universally applicable); see also Paul Dietrichson, Kant’s Criteria of 
Universalizability, in KANT, supra, at 163. 
117.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 146. 
118.   For a discussion of this question see WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 77, §§ 198-240.  
While Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a rule are far from direct and straightforward 
(and have been, as noted below, very controversial), Wittgenstein appears to be challenging 
the paired positions that (1) the application of a rule is premised upon the prior interpretation 
of that rule and (2) when a rule is unclear in its application that uncertainty can be removed 
by articulating a fuller or more precise interpretation of that rule. 
119.   Id. See generally LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1 
(denying that a rule must be first interpreted before it can be applied).  
120.   Id.  The interpretation of Wittgenstein’s comments has been controversial.  
Compare KRIPKE, supra note 78, with BAKER & HACKER, supra note 78, at viii. 
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in particular, how it was to be resolved without involving judicial 
discretion.  It is also possible that I am reading Bork too closely 
here.  He may simply have meant that we know how to work with 
a principle when we encounter it.  But that practical account 
would strip the concept of neutral principles of the apparent force 
to play the jurisprudential role Bork sought. 
Bork invoked the concept of neutrality, and used it, 
without adequately explaining and defending it.  A claim to 
neutrality is admittedly an engaging and intuitive position, of 
course, especially in the case of adjudication.  We expect our 
judges to be disinterested and neutral between the parties.  
Moreover, at least intuitively, we often know whether a principle 
covers a case, and we also often know when it would be unfair to 
claim that a principle covers a particular case. But that is not 
enough to ground a claim to neutrality in general, or neutrality in 
interpretation in particular, in the conceptual content of the neutral 
principle.  Those understandings might simply be rooted in a 
mastery of a shared practice, of knowing how to go on in the 
relevant circumstance.121 
Bork needed an account that showed that the source of the 
neutral application is in the conceptual content or linguistic 
meaning of the neutral principle.  It is not enough to be neutral; 
the interpretation and decision must follow the original 
understanding.  He also likely needed to account for the hard case 
where the application of the principle to the particular case is not 
so obvious.122  Bork needed his account to have that explanatory 
force because many constitutional controversies arise from such 
hard cases.  Moreover, he needed to defend the position that such 
application, even in the hard cases, could be established as 
neutral. 
Finally, he needed such a case to rebut those theorists, like 
Hart and Dworkin, who believe we need a theory or an 
interpretation of the principle in order to know whether and how 
 
121.   See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 77, §§ 198-240. 
122.  See DWORKIN, TAKING, supra note 114, at 81 (arguing that each legal question 
has a unique answer).  Even without endorsing Dworkin’s theory, it does seem that if Bork 
asserted that constitutional principles figure in constitutional interpretation and decision, he 
needed to explain how with some precision, since the text of the Constitution does not appear 
to state principles expressly. 
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to apply it in such hard cases.  That, of course, is just what Bork 
wanted to, and did, deny.123  But what tells us how to apply the 
principle neutrally?  We begin to ask questions that sound as if 
they came from the interlocutor of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations.124  These questions do not have apparent or 
satisfying answers.  The promise of Bork’s neutrality remains 
unarticulated and ultimately unfulfilled.  Bork’s claim that the 
application of a principle can be explained by some feature of 
neutrality in the principle is misleading.  Principles—as shorthand 
for the conclusion of constitutional arguments (by no means 
necessarily deductive or syllogistic in form)—are compelling 
because of the content and nature of the underlying argument.  
Debating an account of constitutional decision that emphasizes 
formulation and application of principles is misleading and 
unhelpful—for the originalists and for their critics. 
The neutral derivation of principle is another concept 
Bork invoked, and used, without much explanation.125  He 
appears to have assumed that principles may be found in the 
Constitution, and that such finding constitutes a derivation.126 
That is problematic because the Constitution comprises 
provisions, not principles.127  How do provisions yield principles?  
Bork did not offer much explanation, but we might conclude that 
provisions yield principles by a variety of kinds of reasoning, 
including analysis and synthesis.  Together those methods provide 
the articulation of the force of provisions.  That approach may 
capture the inferential content of the constitutional text, but it does 
not capture the performative content of the text.  When we think 
of the pragmatics of performative content, the usual logic of 
declarative utterances and texts is not very helpful. 
 
123.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251-57 (mocking the state of modern 
moral philosophy and dismissing such philosophical theory and argument as a source of 
constitutional law); Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45 (same). 
124.   Thus, for example, the complex and controversial discussion of following rules: 
“Then am I defining ‘order’ and ‘rule’ by means of ‘regularity’?—How do I explain the 
meaning of ‘regular[,]’ ‘uniform[,]’ ‘same’ to anyone?”  WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 77, § 
208.  “But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand? Don’t 
you get him to guess the essential thing?”  Id. § 210.  “How am I able to obey a rule?”  Id. § 
217. 
125.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 143-47. 
126.   Id. at 146. 
127.   Id. at 150. 
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One potentially dramatic example of the derivation of 
constitutional principle can be seen in Griswold v. Connecticut.128  
In that case, Justice Douglas analyzed the First Amendment, 
Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment to identify and 
extract the principle of a right to privacy, protected from the 
interference of the governments, state and federal.129  The 
principle, once constructed from the “penumbras” formed by 
“emanations” of the specific provisions, was deployed with 
independent force to protect the activities of Doctor Griswold.130  
Justice Douglas’s opinion captures the non-deductive methods of 
constitutional argument.131  Yet Griswold, for Bork, was an 
example of improper constitutional interpretation.132  He did not 
expressly object to the tools employed in constructing the 
argument.  His objection was that this derivation of principle fails 
the neutrality standard because it tacitly privileges sexual freedom 
over other freedoms.133  But Justice Douglas’s opinion also ranges 
far from the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. 
Other examples in which more expansive principles were 
derived from narrower provisions raise the question why Bork 
thought he needed principles and what role they play in an 
originalist theory of interpretation.  For example, Bork was 
comfortable extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
against new technology and the protections of the First 
Amendment for new technologies like television and radio.  The 
extension of the Fourth Amendment to new techniques of 
electronic surveillance was not automatic or free from difficulty.  
Indeed, when the Supreme Court first considered electronic 
surveillance, it sought to analyze the Fourth Amendment issues in 
terms of physical intervention.134  Only in 1967, in Katz v. United 
 
128.   381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
129.   Id. at 482-85.   
130.   Id. at 484.   
131.   See LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1. 
132.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 95-100, 257-59. 
133.   Id. at 258-59. 
134.  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (warrantless wiretap of 
bootlegger’s telephone did not violate Fourth Amendment because there was no search or 
seizure of a material thing).  Brandeis’s dissent, emphasizing the protection of privacy 
interests in light of changing conditions and purposes, was rejected by the Court.  See id. at 
471-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Instead, the Court adopted a common law analysis, 
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States,135 did the Supreme Court formally recognize that the 
Fourth Amendment was about persons, not places or things.  
Accordingly, with Katz electronic surveillance was brought 
within the ambit of the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment. 
Even with hindsight, we can understand why a physical 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
warrantless searches and seizures was not an obvious wrong turn.  
Grounding the protection of the Fourth Amendment on the 
established tort law concepts would provide a clarity and certainty 
that alternative approaches would not obviously provide, or, at the 
least, provide immediately.  Moreover, Justice Brandeis’s dissent 
would have extended the protection of the Fourth Amendment on 
the basis of a theory that privileges the right of privacy.  
Originalists like Bork could perhaps endorse that approach to the 
extent that it finds and applies a neutral principle found in the 
constitutional text.  But the principle so derived would perhaps 
fail the test of neutrality because it privileges expectations of 
privacy over other expectations.136  If the principle passes the 
neutrality test then it may be a permissible source of new law in 
the face of new technologies.  Originalism would not endorse 
change arising from evolving purposes or the application of non-
neutral principles–-that would make ours a living Constitution.137 
More fundamentally, the creation of a principle as a matter 
of originalist constitutional interpretation would appear to raise 
its own fundamental questions.138  After all, the meaning of the 
words of the provisions themselves would seem to require no 
 
focusing upon the absence of a physical invasion of the defendants’ property or a physical 
taking of their property.  Id. at 466.  
135.   389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
136.   To the extent such a principle privileges privacy it would appear vulnerable to 
Bork’s objection to Griswold that it improperly privileges sexual freedom over other 
freedoms.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 258-59. 
137.   See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-13 (2012) (adopting an originalist 
approach to the Fourth Amendment that purported to return to the requirement of tortious 
trespass); see generally infra Section II.D. 
138.   See LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1, at 106 
(describing the complexities inherent in Justice Scalia’s casual characterization of the 
express language of the First Amendment as a “sort of” synecdoche and the role of that 
characterization in his account of constitutional interpretation and reasoning).  Justice 
Scalia’s easy invocation of synecdoches and principles is all the more puzzling because of 
his criticism of common law methods of judicial decision. 
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principles for interpretation.139  If the task of interpretation is to 
determine the import of the meaning of the specific words of a 
specific provision, then a digression into the articulation of 
unexpressed principles would appear misguided.  Indeed, from 
Bork’s originalist perspective it might appear that the originalist 
Occam’s razor would dispatch the excrescence of principle.  
Bork, after all, wanted to distinguish very clearly between the 
Supreme Court’s decisional constitutional jurisprudence and the 
constitutional text.140  Once derivative principles are recognized 
as authoritative, it is a small step to acknowledging precedent.  
The text of the Constitution is its provisions which, by their 
express terms, do not state principles.141  So the place of derived 
principle in an originalist constitutional jurisprudence is not so 
simple as initially appears. 
It may be that the principle to be extracted from the 
Constitution arises out of its structure or its architecture.  But it is 
seemingly a small step from such a derivation to the forbidden 
territory of penumbra and emanations142 and unenumerated 
rights.  It is simply not clear what principle beyond the literal text 
of the Constitution that Bork would have wanted to derive. 
One possible reconciliation of Bork’s concept of the 
derivation of principle with his originalism is to read the notion 
of derivation narrowly.  If derivation means no more than to find 
the principle stated expressly in a constitutional provision, it may 
be possible to identify a role for principle to play in Borkinian 
jurisprudence.  Thus, for example, the First Amendment may be 
described as stating the principle of free speech or the principle of 
freedom of expression.143  So clarified, derivation would be no 
more than the restatement of the imperatives of the Constitution 
into declaratives that can figure as the major premise of a 
 
139.   Dictionaries, after all, generally define words; they do not state principles first 
to provide the foundation or theory underlying the definitions.  Accounts of linguistic 
meaning do not begin with interpretations of words or sentences. 
140.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69 (characterizing the Warren Court as 
standing “first and alone as a legislator of policy”). 
141.   Originalists like Robert Bork somehow seem to assume that the provisions do 
state principles that are naturally part of the decisional law.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra 
note 6, at 146.  An inferentialist account of the constitutional texts would support such a 
conclusion, but the inferentialist approach is not part of the originalist canon. 
142.   Id. at 97.   
143.   See id. at 147-48. 
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syllogism or other argument.  Justice Scalia appears to take the 
formulation of constitutional principles in just this way, finding 
the principles of the Constitution stated in the Constitution. 
I . . . believe that the Eighth Amendment is no mere 
“concrete and dated rule” but rather an abstract principle.  If 
I did not hold this belief, I would not be able to apply the 
Eighth Amendment (as I assuredly do) to all sorts of tortures 
quite unknown at the time the Eighth Amendment was 
adopted.144 
On this interpretation, the principle derived from the Eighth 
Amendment is that cruel and unusual punishments are prohibited.  
While we may quibble with characterizing that principle as 
derived from the Eighth Amendment (there’s not much to the 
derivation) it is a use of principle that fits with the originalist 
methodology. 
But Bork endows the derivation of principle with more 
import and power than this description provides.  The derivation 
of principle extends the express linguistic meaning of the 
constitutional text; it can also excise provisions of the 
Constitution that would otherwise appear to have substantial 
import.145  Thus, the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First 
Amendment can be extended without hesitation to the electronic 
media,146 and the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment can be 
extended to preclude warrantless wiretaps.147  The principle-
constructing power that Bork sometimes claims goes far beyond 
those types of instances, however.148  In interpreting the First 
Amendment, Bork looks first to the text and history of the 
 
144.   Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 145. 
145.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 166. 
146.   Id. at 168. 
147.   Id. at 169-70. 
148.  We are, then, forced to construct our own theory of the constitutional 
protection of speech.  We cannot solve our problems simply by reference to 
the text or to its history.  But we are not without materials for building.  The 
first amendment indicates that there is something special about speech.  We 
would know that much even without a first amendment . . . . Freedom for 
political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no first 
amendment. 
Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 22-23. 
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provision.149  Finding little guidance,150 he then looks to what he 
refers to as “the entire structure of the Constitution.”151  That 
structure creates a representative democracy, “a form of 
government that would be meaningless without freedom to 
discuss government and its policies.”152  It is on this foundation 
that Bork constructed a First Amendment theory powerful in its 
protection but narrow in its scope.153 
For all of the rhetoric of original understandings and 
expectations with respect to the constitutional text, the method of 
neutral principle took Bork very far from that underlying text.  
The power of that method of deriving and applying principles 
from the text explains why the need to constrain the method by 
the requirement of neutrality.  Whatever other questions might be 
raised as to Bork’s description of following the original semantic 
or linguistic understandings, the purported channeling of the 
derivation and application of constitutional principles with a 
requirement of neutrality seems strangely ill-defined. 
Other originalists appear more cautious in their derivation 
of principles from the provisions of the Constitution.  Harry Jaffa 
was not entirely mistaken when he characterized Meese’s 
Constitution as “without overarching principles.”154 Jaffa 
undoubtedly meant that description as a criticism, but there is a 
practicality in Meese’s approach to constitutional originalism—
and no express natural law commitments.  Nevertheless, Jaffa was 
unfair in part to Meese because Meese’s Constitution had a 
prominent place for principle, too.155  Meese believes that the 
Constitution’s principles are fundamentally those of federalism 
 
149.   Id. at 22. 
150.   “The framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not 
to have been overly concerned with the subject.”  Id. at 22. Despite the lacunae that Bork 
recognized in the original understanding, Bork was generally able to extract an application 
of the law.  See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 976-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
151.   Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 23. 
152.   Id. 
153.   See id. 
154.   Harry V. Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions” of the Framers of the 
Constitution of the United States?, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 351, 358 (1987) [hereinafter 
Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions”].  
155.   Id. at 360-61.   
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and separation of powers.156  It may therefore be more accurate to 
acknowledge that Meese’s fundamental constitutional principles 
were simply different from those of Jaffa.157  Jaffa’s originalism 
committed him to legal principles reflecting the natural law 
beliefs of the founders. Natural law originalists, of course, are 
highly committed to what they characterize as a principled 
reading of the Constitution’s provisions.158  The techniques for 
the derivation of such principles, informed by natural law 
commitments, are as ambitious as Judge Bork’s—and lead as far 
from the linguistic meaning of the text. 
Bork was also prepared effectively to excise constitutional 
provisions.  Bork gave the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment very short shrift.159  Effectively, Bork 
 
156.   See Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society 
Lawyers Division, in ORIGINALISM, supra note 59, at 71, 77 [hereinafter Meese, Speech] 
(asserting without argument that Chief Justice Taney did not follow the original 
understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Dred Scott). 
157.   See HARRY V. JAFFA WITH BRUCE LEDEWITZ ET AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND 
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION 13-22 (1994) (arguing that 
Chief Justice Taney employed a mistaken form of originalism in his Dred Scott opinion). 
158.   Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions”, supra note 154, at 359-60 (“It cannot 
be too greatly emphasized that the people’s will, properly so called, is a rational will, whose 
inherent right to be obeyed is attenuated to the extent that it becomes merely arbitrary or 
despotic.”); see also Clarence I. Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution: 
The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983 (1987). 
Having laid out his constitutional method, Jaffa is remarkably circumspect in expressly 
articulating its doctrinal consequences.  See Bruce Ledewitz, Judicial Conscience and 
Natural Rights: A Reply to Professor Jaffa, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 449 (1987).  
159.  The judge who cannot make out the meaning of a provision is in exactly 
the same circumstance as a judge who has no Constitution to work with. There 
being nothing to work with, the judge should refrain from working.  A 
provision whose meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision 
that is written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot.  No 
judge is entitled to interpret an ink blot on the ground that there must be 
something under it. So it has been with the clause of the fourteenth amendment 
prohibiting any state from denying citizens the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States.  
 
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 166.  Bork’s formulation with the simile of an ink blot is 
presumably intentionally confrontational.  Certainly it has drawn a response by other 
defenders of a more holistic Constitution who are troubled by the seemingly cavalier 
disregard of the text.  See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 79, at 53; TRIBE, INVISIBLE, 
supra note 90, at 147.  Farber reminds us of the differences between the skills of lawyers and 
judges and those of historians.  Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1089 (1989).  The moral is that judges are not particularly 
well qualified to undertake historical research—and that no responsible historian would 
simply discard an important historical document or text merely because of the difficulties 
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eliminated this provision.  Bork’s important and complex 
reductive claim warrants careful scrutiny, and his claim must be 
distilled from its overly exuberant rhetoric.160  What did Bork 
claim a judge must do when confronted by a difficult text like the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause?  Perhaps the most notorious 
example of Bork’s willingness to excise constitutional provisions 
is the Ninth Amendment, which he appeared willing to delete in 
its entirety.161 
He asserted that it was as if the provision were written in 
Sanskrit or covered by an inkblot.162  Bork could not really be 
committed to the proposition that a Sanskrit text could not be 
distinguished from an inkblot.  Admittedly, we read both the 
Bhagavad Gita and Rorschach tests, but few (none?) think the 
process remotely similar.  Moreover, to face a difficult text is not 
to face no text.  Even on Bork’s account, a judge facing an 
incomprehensible text (perhaps a statute void for vagueness) must 
offer an explanation why the text is unintelligible. 
What makes a text difficult for an originalist? 163  The 
Ninth Amendment’s text, like that of the Fourteenth, is simple and 
direct upon its face:  “The enumeration in the Constitution of 
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.”164  Twenty-one words; the longest, 
“enumeration,” contains no more than five syllables.  The 
Privileges and Immunities Clause:  “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
 
presented.  Perhaps the model is more the archaeologist confronting an inscription in an 
unknown language; but even in that context the search for a Rosetta Stone goes on. 
160.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 183-84 (“There is almost no history that 
would indicate what the ninth amendment was intended to accomplish. . . .  [T]he claim that 
the Founders intended judges to make up rights not specified in the Constitution itself is 
obviously inconsistent with the historical record. . . .  Thus, the enumeration of certain rights 
in the federal Constitution was not to be taken to mean that the rights promised by the state 
constitutions and laws were to be denied or disparaged.”). 
161.   Id. at 166.  For a description of the criticism of this position, see, e.g., BARNETT, 
LOST, supra note 31, at xii. 
162.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 166. 
163.  Scott Soames distinguishes linguistic difficulty and legal difficulty in his analysis 
of the specific features of legal texts, arguing that understanding the elements of linguistic 
content makes many of the texts treated as difficult in constitutional theory easily 
interpretable.  See 1 SCOTT SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, 
Special about Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS 
AND HOW WE USE IT 403, 404-05, 408-09, 417-20 (2009) [hereinafter SOAMES, Legal Texts]. 
164.  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
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of citizens of the United States . . . .”165  Even simpler, it is also 
only twenty-one words.  What makes reading or applying them 
difficult? 
Turning first to the Ninth Amendment, the source of the 
difficulty is, first, the verbs and, second, the direct object of the 
sentence.  The verbs are “deny” and “disparage” and the direct 
object is “others.”  The concept of denial is straightforward 
enough; a right is denied when a government prohibits its 
exercise, or burdens or regulates it in a manner that makes its 
exercise difficult. The concept of disparage is seemingly broader.  
A right may be disparaged without being denied:  shareholders’ 
voting rights in modern, publicly-held corporations rarely have 
significant import or value.166  If shareholders are unhappy with 
corporate management the typical response is to sell their 
shares.167  So one issue is what the prohibition on disparagement 
means in this context.  Most naturally, it likely means to limit the 
scope of the rights protected, to limit the kinds of rights protected, 
or the persons entitled to claim the rights, or to impose procedural 
limits on claims to the substantive rights.168 
A second textual issue is what the reference or meaning of 
“others” is.  What other rights are not to be denied or disparaged?  
The rights retained might be rights under natural law, or under 
common law.  They might be rights under the various states’ laws 
or constitution.  The language of the Constitution offers no 
express guidance.  Third, and finally, by whom are the other rights 
not to be denied or disparaged?  The two candidates, of course, 
are the states and the Federal government.169  Again, however, the 
 
165.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.   
166.  See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 407, 416-20 (2006). 
167.   See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) 
(describing the competing strategies of voicing criticism within an organization and choosing 
to exit). 
168.  See generally THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:  THE HISTORY AND 
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy Barnett ed., 1989); KURT T. LASH, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN 
CITIZENSHIP (2014). 
169.   They are the sovereigns with the authority to deny or limit citizens’ rights under 
traditional political philosophy and as a matter of political and legal realpolitik.  Nothing in 
the text sheds any light on the choice among the alternative readings of the scope of the 
provision, although the context might suggest that it is the Federal government whose power 
is limited.  
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text of the Constitution offers no guidance on the answer to this 
question.  At the end of the day, therefore, we are left with 
fundamental questions about what is being protected and how it 
is being protected.  Bork was surely right that this is a difficult 
text. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause presents some 
similar difficulties.  The first clause is relatively clear.  The 
subject, at least, is clear:  any “State.”  The verbs, too, are clear:  
“make or enforce.”  Finally, the object, “laws,” is hardly 
ambiguous, except in the ordinary sense that many words and 
concepts have a fringe of potential meaning with respect to which 
the application of the word or concept is contestable.170  The 
dependent clause brings the principal difficulties. The verb 
“abridge” presents some difficulty.  But the heart of the difficulty 
arises from the object: “privileges and immunity of citizens of the 
United States.”  What are the privileges and immunities of a 
citizen of the United States?  For Bork, the Ninth Amendment was 
limited to the proposition that the rights expressly enumerated in 
state constitutions were not to be limited or denied by the state 
protection of a more limited set of rights in the federal 
constitution.171  The two arguments Bork made for this conclusion 
are grammatical and contextual, with the latter based upon the 
proximity of the text to the Tenth Amendment.172  In the case of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Bork dismissed Ely’s 
assertion that no legislative evidence supports the view that the 
clause is meaningless.173  He further dismissed Ely’s 
interpretation, but offered no interpretation of his own.174  Thus, 
Bork at least believed that the process of constructing ordinary 
 
170.   Thus, for example, the text leaves open the questions of whether a regulatory 
agency of a state could make such a regulation and what qualifies as state action.  The notion 
of legal rules as open textured with a core as to which application is clear and a fringe, 
penumbra or neighborhood as to which the application is unclear or uncertain figured 
prominently in Hart’s statement of position in the Hart-Fuller debate and, more generally, in 
The Concept of Law.  See, HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 67, at 124-36; H.L.A. Hart, 
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-09 (1958) 
[hereinafter Hart, Positivism]; see generally TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS 36-95 
(1994).  
171.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 184-85. 
172.   Id. 
173.   Id. at 180 (citing ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 22).   
174.   Id.  
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principles of interpretation then gives judges the power to go 
beyond the words of the text, but also, at least in rare cases, the 
surprising authority to disregard seemingly meaningful language 
of the Constitution.  Other originalists have not followed Bork in 
that approach to the Ninth Amendment.175 
Third, Bork also championed the neutral application of 
principles. (This is the “from neutral principles” for constitutional 
decision making part of his theory.)  It is not clear what he 
intended here, or why principle would be invoked.  It may be, of 
course, that Bork was here again speaking only loosely, and that 
the neutral application of principle is nothing more than the 
neutral application of a constitutional provision.  Often stated in 
more general terms, there is certainly a traditional task of applying 
such general provisions to the facts of a particular case properly 
presented to the Court.  In his all-too-brief discussion of this 
critical issue, Bork offered only one paragraph explaining what 
neutral application is, and six paragraphs with an example, 
Shelley v. Kraemer.176  The one paragraph and the six are not 
easily harmonized. In the initial explanation, Bork noted that such 
neutrality “requires a fair degree of sophistication and self-
consciousness . . . .”177  That suggests that the principles to be 
applied are the general rules or statements of constitutional law 
that are inferred from the constitutional text along the lines 
explored above.  Moreover, he further conceded that the “only 
external discipline . . . is the scrutiny of professional observers 
who will be able to tell over a period of time whether he is 
displaying intellectual integrity.”178 
Bork described the demonstration of the integrity of a 
series of decisions (and associated series of opinions) as unfolding 
 
175.   See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 235-42. 
176.  334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
177.  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 151. 
178.  Id. (emphasis added).  The importance of the temporal dimension reveals 
adjudication, including the legitimation of adjudication through the articulation of reasons, 
as a social practice. It is an activity, bounded in part, by rules (broadly defined) but with 
room for creativity and innovation.  It can only be fully assessed, as an activity and social 
practice over time.  An example of such a check, presumably, would be works like 
Wolfman’s Dissent Without Opinion, in which Justice Douglas’s tax opinions were shown 
to be thoroughly ends-oriented through a comparative analysis.  BERNARD WOLFMAN, 
JONATHAN L.F. SILVER & MARJORIE A. SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE 
BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES (1975).  
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over time. The temporal dimension of this process went 
unremarked by Bork, but is significant.  The evolution of a corpus 
of decisions is more instructive, and more revealing, of its 
integrity and consistency than any one atemporal snapshot 
precisely because, over time, a theory is presented with novel, 
often unanticipated facts.  How those facts are incorporated into 
the pre-existing authority is particularly revealing.  By focusing 
upon the development of a judge’s interpretive canon over time, 
Bork was perhaps implicitly invoking the constraints of a 
practice.  It is the practice of judging, over time, that can best be 
evaluated and tested for conformity to rules.  With the addition of 
a temporal dimension Bork may have moved from doctrine or 
theory to practice.  Nevertheless, if present, that strategy is only 
implicit, and was never articulated or acknowledged by Bork and 
would not be easily harmonized with the usual self-descriptions 
of originalism. 
 In discussing Shelley, Bork offers no contextualization or 
comparative study; his criticism of that decision, while focusing 
upon the expansive interpretation of state action, does not explain 
how the Court’s interpretation is ends-oriented.179  Such an 
explanation might involve, for example, similar restrictive 
covenants barring transfers to individuals who were not 
minorities.  But the Court anticipated this objection, noting that 
“[e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved through 
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.”180  Moreover, Bork’s 
criticism that the Shelley Court did not properly sustain its 
determination of state action warrants scrutiny.  Bork noted that 
the state courts were not the source of the racial discrimination, 
they merely enforced it.181  Bork went on to characterize the 
enforcement of such discriminatory private agreements as 
“pursuant to normal, and neutral, rules . . . .”182 
Bork supported this characterization of Shelley with the 
discussion of a hypothetical case in which a guest in a private 
home speaks abusively about political matters and is ejected by 
 
179.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 152-53. 
180.   Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22.  
181.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 152. 
182.   Id. 
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his host.183  The guest sues—Bork did not expressly indicate the 
relief sought, but it is apparently the right to return to the host’s 
home and continue his abusive harangue.  Bork claimed that the 
Shelley Court is committed to the view that the denial of such 
relief is state action contravening the First Amendment.184  First, 
the example seems to confuse action with inaction, commission 
with omission.  The hypothetical court has merely denied relief, 
refused to deploy the power of the sovereign on behalf of the 
haranguing guest, against the hapless host.  That distinction may 
or may not make a difference.  But, in fairness, we can rehabilitate 
Bork’s example by adding a call to the police to assist the host in 
removing the guest, or making the host the moving litigant with a 
petition for a restraining order, for example.  In such cases the 
state action would appear affirmative, rather than a mere failure 
to act.  In such a case, nevertheless, it is far from clear what First 
Amendment violation is alleged to occur.  Bork’s example 
characterizes the guest as “abusive”; the conduct occurs by a guest 
in a host’s home.  It is well-settled First Amendment law that 
speech is not protected everywhere, and in every way.185  So an 
alternative analysis is not that there is no state action, but that 
there is no infringement of a constitutional right.  Outside the 
public sphere, in a private home, the protection of speech under 
the First Amendment may well be less robust (other associational 
rights may be more robust). 
Bork failed to deliver a compelling argument for his 
strident assertion that Shelley constitutes a political decision 
imposing non-neutral principles.  While it is clear that Bork 
 
183.   Id. 
184.   Id. 
185.   Bork himself understood the limits of the First Amendment.  Thus, in Neutral 
Principles, Bork noted some of the obvious limits of the protections of the First Amendment 
casting some doubt on the absolutist view.  Bork noted that no one believes that the federal 
government cannot prohibit urging mutiny on naval vessels engaged in action or shouted 
harangues in the visitors’ gallery in either chamber of the United States Congress.  Bork, 
Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 21.  The cases, of course, confirm Bork’s understanding 
of the limits of the right of free speech protected by the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Barnes 
v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 570-72 (1991) (upholding Indiana statute barring nude 
dancing); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (upholding conviction for 
advocating overthrow of the United States government by force and violence); Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 84-89 (1949) (upholding a Trenton, New Jersey ordinance regulating 
soundtrucks).   
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agrees with the result but disagrees with the finding of state 
action, the issues are fundamentally more complex than he 
acknowledges.  Bork offers no analysis or explanation of his 
criticism of the finding of state action.  Instead, he assumes that a 
private contract, enforced by the agents of the sovereign state, 
does not involve state action.  While that is neither a novel nor a 
ludicrous view, it is neither self-evident nor true by definition.  It 
warrants a defense, not a mere assertion. 
Justice Scalia also asserted the Neutrality Premise in his 
defense of originalism.186  The absence of neutrality with respect 
to the various critics of originalism can be confirmed for Justice 
Scalia by the absence of agreement or consensus.187  The absence 
of such a consensus confirmed, for Justice Scalia, that the critics 
are relying, at least tacitly, upon their own subjective preferences 
and values.188  Originalism, by contrast, is neutral.  To uphold that 
claim of neutrality, Justice Scalia’s originalism must address 
Tribe’s challenge that originalism imports subjective preferences 
sub rosa through its selective invocation of the doctrine of stare 
decisis. 
In response to Tribe’s suggestion that the uncertain role of 
stare decisis imports judicial discretion and non-neutrality, 
Justice Scalia made two arguments.  First, he acknowledged that 
originalism does not preclude willfulness.  He would appear to 
have acknowledged that there remains some judicial discretion 
under originalism, but he did not explore the nature of that 
discretion or how it differs from discretion in a non-originalist 
constitutional theory and practice.  Second, Justice Scalia asserted 
that stare decisis is not part of originalism, but is instead “a 
pragmatic exception to it.”189  I now turn to these two arguments 
and the critics’ response. 
 
186.   Thus, Justice Scalia wrote, “Perhaps the most glaring defect of Living 
Constitutionalism, next to its incompatibility with the whole antievolutionary purpose of a 
constitution, is that there is no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be 
the guiding principle of the evolution.”  Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 44-45. 
187.   Id. 
188.  Id. at 46.  Justice Scalia takes the disagreement with respect to the substantive 
alternatives to originalism to evidence that the theories encompass judicial discretion 
because, tacitly, neutral principles are self-evident.  
189.   Id.  
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2. Neutrality, Will, and Discretion 
Justice Scalia conceded that originalism offers no 
inoculation against willfulness.190  When Justice Scalia implicitly 
characterized other interpretative doctrines as “cater[ing]” to 
willfulness and originalism as not “inoculat[ing] against it” what 
are the relationships he was describing, in non-metaphorical 
terms?191  Beginning with the particular, what Bork had in mind 
as an exemplar of the method to be avoided was that of the Warren 
Court’s jurisprudence.192  The outcomes, interpretations, and 
interpretative methods of that constitutional jurisprudence were 
all to be avoided and condemned. 
More abstractly, how did Bork seek to distinguish the 
implications of the two methods as a matter of discretion?  To 
cater to willfulness, an interpretative theory or method 
presumably has to provide doctrinal or technical support for the 
judge who inclines toward deciding cases as seems just to him, 
regardless of constitutional arguments to the contrary, precedent, 
or other law.193  So, for example, a judge who is a perfectionist in 
Sunstein’s terms would be reinforced in her willingness to 
construe the Constitution on terms different from the original 
understanding in order to secure a more perfect interpretation and 
better outcomes, so interpreted.  Similarly, a judge who believes 
that constitutional interpretation is informed by considerations of 
the structure of the Constitution and of the Republic that it creates, 
is likely to interpret the Constitution in ways that may depart from 
the original understanding.194 
Critics may question whether those inclinations or 
predispositions are properly characterized as willfulness.  Even 
conceding that the interpretative doctrine one holds either 
supports or militates in favor of a given particular interpretation, 
how is that a matter of willfulness?  Choice of constitutional 
 
190.   Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 140 (“I have never claimed that originalism 
inoculates against willfulness; only that . . . it does not cater to it.”). 
191.   Id.  
192.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69-100; Scalia, Response, supra note 20, 
at 149. 
193.  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69-70.   
194.   Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional argument capture the richness of the 
arguments available.  BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 7-8.   
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interpretation may be a matter of will (choosing an interpretation 
that enriches one’s brother in law, for example) but it would seem 
equally possibly a matter of reason (holding a different view of 
language or the role of prefatory clauses, for example). 
The concept of the dualism between will and reason, and 
its place in classical democratic political theory, is complex.195  
Fortunately, because of the thinness of the concepts deployed in 
the debate, we do not need to understand these concepts very 
deeply here. At a risk of oversimplification, democratic 
republicanism sought to harness and channel the will and the 
passions for the public good.196  Unfettered will apparently poses 
a fundamental general challenge to that regime.  The goal of the 
democratic republic is to provide institutions for the reasoned 
expression of the public’s values in an ordered way, and in so 
doing, to channel will into the form of reasoned expression.197  If 
judges could exercise their own will in derogation of the 
democratic choices of the citizens then democracy would be 
subverted.  In particular, if a judge were to exercise judgment 
based upon her own values or preferences—according to her own 
will—she would not be acting in furtherance of the people’s 
collective will expressed by their democratic choices.198 
Justice Scalia adopted a concept of willfulness and the 
articulation of the risk it poses to the democratic republic like that 
articulated by Dean Landis.199  Willfulness refers to the 
imposition by judges of their own substantive views—political, 
moral, economic, whatever—in deciding cases presented to them, 
 
195.   See generally Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American 
Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449 (1989) (arguing that in pre-Reconstruction 
constitutional theory, reason was understood within a technical, rational space and will was 
understood to operate within a larger, organic space). 
196.   “The psychological virtue required by republican government is not simply well-
formed habit. Rather, it is precisely the capacity to act on the basis of reason . . . .  The virtue 
required is the capacity to overcome passion, or appetite, in both reason and will.”  Id. at 459 
(footnotes omitted). 
197.   See Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions,” supra note 154, at 359 (citing 
President Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address). 
198.  Brandom describes this as the tension in our judicial system between authority 
and responsibility.  Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra note 79, at 38.  The focus on the role 
of discretion and will emphasizes the place of authority and loses sight of the mechanisms of 
responsibility. 
199.  James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 
887-91 (1930). 
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in derogation of the substantive judgments on such matters made 
by the enacting legislative or constitution-adopting authorities.200  
Will, by implication, is contrasted with deference, reason, and 
principle.201  More fundamentally, the contrast between principle 
and will follows classical Lockean political theory.202 
With this gloss in mind, it is perhaps a little difficult to 
identify the theorist or theorists against whom Justice Scalia was 
writing.  Who, after all, speaks or writes in favor of judicial 
willfulness—even among Scalia’s biggest bugaboos?  For 
example, Dworkin argued that there is discretion in judicial 
decision making, in the sense that the applicable rules often do 
not determine the outcome of cases.  But he asserted that 
discretion is circumscribed and, more importantly, informed by 
the duty to decide the case in a manner that can be reconciled with 
making the law best.  Best in this context is not unfettered, to be 
determined by the values of the judge but, like the analogy of the 
chain novel, must remain truest to the preceding chapters of the 
law.203  The answer can be found less in the target theorists of The 
Tempting of America than in the defenders of the Warren Court 
engaged in Bork’s earlier Harris lectures.204  Skelly Wright of the 
D.C. Circuit was a principal target for allegedly endorsing the 
view that the defense of the Constitution required the making of 
substantive value choices by the federal judiciary.205  According 
to the argument Bork attributed to Wright, those fundamental 
value choices are required to fill in, or complete the gaps of, the 
Constitution.206 
Justice Scalia’s and Judge Bork’s dualism can also be 
restated in terms of objective rules or principles and subjective 
preferences.  Originalism promises objective rules or principles 
(no Dworkinian dualism is intended here).  Competing theories 
appear to leave no alternative to judges’ imposition of their own 
subjective preferences, detached from the words of the 
 
200.  See, e.g., Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46-7. 
201.  Kahn, supra note 188, at 450.   
202.  See id. at 463 n.57.  
203.  See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 245-50; DWORKIN, TAKING, supra note 
114, at 28-39 (describing the role of legal principles in adjudication). 
204.  Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57. 
205.   Id. at 4-5.   
206.   Id. at 5-6. 
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Constitution or the will of the people. Several of the leading critics 
of originalism would acknowledge the role of the judge’s 
choice.207 They would plead necessity as a defense; the 
determining authority claimed by originalism is insufficient to 
determine decision.208  The originalists would accept that plea 
neither as defense nor excuse. 
The contrast Bork thus sought to make is between a 
judiciary that makes its own substantive value choices in deciding 
cases and a judiciary that neutrally implements those value 
choices made by the Founders in the Constitution.209  Whether 
that contrast can be sustained, the apparent contrast is clear.  
Equally clear is the promise of a theory of constitutional decision 
making that can deliver such neutrality in a democratic republic.  
With neutrality the allocation of power and legitimacy to the 
legislature and the executive is given effect, not to be subverted 
by alternative or competing values of the judiciary.  Thus, the real 
advantage originalism offers its advocates is a limitation on 
judicial discretion.210  In contemporary constitutional language 
we more typically speak in terms of discretion than will.  In so 
doing, I don’t mean to endorse the view that willfulness equates 
discretion, only that the ongoing debate about positivism and 
legal rules are, at least in part, couched in terms of judicial 
discretion,211 and that Bork’s argument can be translated into 
more contemporary terms.  A judge can willfully act effectively 
only if one has discretion, but not all exercises of discretion are 
willful.  A judge may exercise her discretion in a particular way 
 
207.  See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 79, at 98-101; Dworkin, Forum 
of Principle, supra note 13, at 34-38; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 247-49 
(embracing a judicial strategy of minimalism in constitutional adjudication). 
208.  See, e.g., Dworkin, Forum of Principle, supra note 13, at 34-38 (the original 
understandings and intentions on which originalism claims to rely do not exist as a matter of 
linguistic philosophy); TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 79, at 98-101 (because texts are 
not self-interpreting, judges charged with interpreting and applying the constitutional text 
must import extra-textual sources of law); TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 90 (describing the 
myriad non-textual sources of constitutional law); SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 71-
73 (arguing that originalism is indefensible because of the consequences of following its 
methods). 
209.   See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57.  
210.  Id. at 4.  But see William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 2213, 2219-28 (2017) (arguing that originalism can provide only a weaker, 
internal constraint, not an external constraint, on judicial decision). 
211.   See generally DWORKIN, TAKING, supra note 114, at 14-80. 
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because of a reasoned belief in a very abstract proposition.  
Originalism circumscribes judicial discretion through a decision 
process that permits, indeed, provides for, the resolution of 
constitutional cases by appeal to rules without the addition or 
substitution of the judge’s personal values or preferences.  The 
preferences and values imbedded in the Constitution trump. 
Why, then, did Justice Scalia qualify his claim that 
originalism limits will or discretion?  What residual role does 
discretion play in his originalism? Justice Scalia did not answer 
this question clearly.  At first impression, discretion would not 
appear to have any place in the originalist theory of constitutional 
appellate adjudication.  As described above, the inquiry into 
meaning, coupled with the application of the principles uncovered 
to the facts determined by the trial court, completely describes the 
process.  In that process, there is no apparent place for discretion.  
Discovering the meaning of the constitutional provisions may 
present a difficult historical or linguistic problem, but the task 
does not call for judicial discretion.  Determining the relevant 
facts found by the lower court may not be as simple as reading the 
decision and underlying record, but, again, while the 
determination of the legally relevant facts found may be difficult, 
no call would appear for the exercise of judicial discretion.  The 
concession of a role for discretion may therefore be another deus 
ex machina for originalism, like stare decisis (as described 
below), to avoid the consequences of its theory in the real world. 
Bork also did not speak directly to the problem of judicial 
discretion, what to do when the original meaning of a 
constitutional provision is unclear or when two provisions 
conflict.  Indeed, those possibilities almost seem precluded by 
Bork’s account of constitutional interpretation.212  Bork did admit 
of a place for discretion and judgment when the originalist 
confronts non-originalist precedent, but his account is murky.213  
 
212.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 155-60; Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025 (2011) [hereinafter Fried, On Judgment]. 
213.   Indeed, he sets the stage by denying that the doctrine of stare decisis has ever 
been clearly articulated: “The law . . . has no very firm theory of when precedent should be 
followed and when it may be ignored or overruled.”  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 157.  
The theory of precedent is much less critical to many of those other theories of constitutional 
interpretation, however, particularly to the extent that they acknowledge a place for prudence 
and doctrine in their interpretative arsenal.  Prudential and doctrinal arguments are the usual 
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He merely described a series of factors to be taken into account in 
the decision whether to respect such precedent:  whether the 
precedent has “become . . . so embedded in the life of the nation, 
so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private and 
public expectations of individuals and institutions . . . .”214  To the 
untutored, this might sound like a defense of Roe, but Bork 
immediately went on to distinguish Roe because of the ongoing 
public dissent from it.215  The extent of doctrinal deviation from 
the original understanding also seems a factor.216  Finally, the 
vitality and potential implications of a decision also appears to be 
a factor, the extent to which a prior erroneous precedent may 
engender further error.217  The application of these factors appears 
complicated, if not difficult, and to require seemingly non-legal 
judgments.  For example, how does a judge assess the extent to 
which a judicial decision has become embedded in public and 
private expectations?218  Similarly, how does a judge determine 
the extent to which the public originally dissented from a 
decision?  How does she determine how potentially powerful a 
precedent may be in engendering further doctrinal departure from 
the original understanding?  This enumeration of factors or 
considerations does not shed much light on how the decision 
process is supposed to go.  Accordingly, it is hard not to conclude 
that the potential for judicial discretion to intrude into the decision 
process whether to respect or overrule non-originalist precedent, 
with the result that the claimed neutrality is forfeit. 
Intuitively, the originalist position that we should commit 
to a neutral approach to constitutional interpretation and decision 
is very engaging.  After all, verbal communication appeared to 
work pretty well in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it 
is reasonable to anticipate that we can figure out what the 
provisions of the Constitution adopted in those centuries (among 
 
reasons offered for respecting otherwise questionable precedent.  It is precisely because of 
the deontological nature of originalism and its failure to endorse prudential and doctrinal 
arguments generally that its account of stare decisis is at once so critical, and so difficult. 
214.   Id. at 158. 
215.   Id.  
216.   Id. at 158-59. 
217.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 159. 
218.   Cf. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45 (criticizing potential reliance upon 
public opinion in judicial decision making). 
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others, of course) meant.  To the extent that this account 
misunderstands the nature of the original communications, the 
optimistic premise behind originalism may be flawed.  That could 
be the case, for example, if the communicative strategy of the 
Constitution were not to anticipate and answer such questions, but 
merely to provide broad concepts and an institutional structure for 
future consideration and resolution of more specific questions.219  
Under those circumstances, it would seem that asking the judge 
to interpret the meaning of the terms of the Constitution, and thus 
the meaning of the Constitution itself would be a relatively simple 
decision procedure.  So discretion ought to be limited at the least, 
and eliminated at best.  But the point that originalism glosses over 
or, perhaps, obscures, is that the methods that originalism must 
introduce to determine the principles that underlie and inform the 
provisions of the constitution and to determine when and how to 
accommodate non-originalist precedent are complex.  Moreover, 
the kinds of judgment that those methods call for a judge to make 
require determinations that are anything but the application of 
only logical reasoning from the constitutional text, even 
supplemented with historical exegesis.  As a result, the intuitive 
appeal of originalism to offer an interpretive theory that dispense 
with the complexities that may result in, or be mistaken for, 
discretion, has not been easily realized in practice. 
3. Neutrality, Originalism, and Stare Decisis 
Justice Scalia defends his deference to the principle of 
stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to originalism.220  That 
defense, however, raises some important questions, because of the 
extent to which originalism would appear to depart from 
established constitutional doctrine, unless non-originalist 
 
219.   See generally Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 
(1980) [hereinafter Dworkin, Forum], reprinted in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 13, 
at 33 (challenging the linguistic and social theory underlying the originalist project). 
220.   The demand that originalists alone “be true to their lights” and forswear 
stare decisis is essentially a demand that they alone render their methodology 
so disruptive of the established state of things that it will be useful only as an 
academic exercise and not as a workable prescription for judicial governance.   
Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 139; see also id. at 140. 
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precedent is accorded a very substantial place.221  Thus, when we 
examine the accommodation that stare decisis provides for the 
status quo against the fundamental changes that a strict 
originalism would require, it creates a more substantial set of 
exceptions than Justice Scalia’s language might suggest.222  A 
critic might (and many have)223 conclude that the deference to 
stare decisis is the deus ex machina that saves originalism from 
the consequences of its own principles.  It is not entirely clear, of 
course, whether those consequences would be particularly 
troubling for most originalists.  To the extent those consequences 
follow from the theory and to the extent that theory is presented 
as the sole legitimate foundation for judicial review in a 
democratic republic, it is hard to avoid them.  Yet it must be 
acknowledged those implications could create a fundamental 
political problem for originalism.224 
With respect to the impact of the role of non-originalist 
precedent in weak or non-exclusive originalism, it would appear 
that the claim to free judges from the meretricious appeal of 
discretion is highly problematic.  The kinds of factors that Bork 
would introduce to determine the precedential weight to be given 
to such prior non-originalist decisions would appear to re-
introduce the kinds of judgments that present the hazards of 
discretion that Bork purported to avoid.  It must also be 
acknowledged that Bork, at least, never gave an express account 
of the role of discretion in originalism.225  Even when describing 
 
221.   Sunstein suggests that originalism would, among other things, result in 
constitutionalizing state bans on the purchase and sale of contraceptives, holding key 
provisions of the Clean Air Act, Federal Communications Act and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act unconstitutional, permitting state establishment of churches, and striking 
down even modest gun control laws.  SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 1-3.  More 
recently, he has also suggested that racial discrimination by the Federal government would 
be permitted and that the right to privacy would be entirely eliminated.  ORIGINALISM, supra 
note 59, at 292-94. 
222.   See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 76. (“[Justice Scalia] describes 
himself as a ‘faint-hearted originalist.’ His faintness of heart is a frank recognition that taken 
seriously, [originalism] would lead in intolerable directions.”). 
223.   See, e.g., Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 82-83. 
224.   See LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54, at 685-87 (discussing 
Sunstein’s arguments against originalism and explaining why they miss the mark). 
225.   The closest Bork came is when he acknowledged the rare gaps in the historical 
understanding of the constitutional text, as in the case of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and the Ninth Amendment.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 180-85. 
1064 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  70:4 
the factors that an originalist judge should consider (which carry 
with such terminology an implicit concession that a judge must 
adopt a decision process that takes such factors into account in 
some, non-deterministic manner), Bork never suggests that we 
have reached the stage at which judicial discretion may be 
deployed.  In light of the enormous attention that judicial 
discretion has received in mid-twentieth century jurisprudential 
theory,226 this gap is surprising.  It would appear that the failure 
to acknowledge the place of judicial discretion, even in originalist 
decision theory, arises from an unwillingness to confront the 
qualification that such recognition imposes on the claim to 
neutrality.  In the case of Justice Scalia, the most he could do was 
to articulate the cryptic concession that originalism does not 
inoculate against willfulness or discretion.227  Buried in that 
concession is a tacit acknowledgment that the originalist claim to 
neutrality still needs a foundation and a defense. 
Originalism’s critics have recognized some of these flaws.  
For example, the critics have asserted that the approach of the 
Warren Court can be criticized and the scope of its novel 
constitutional jurisprudence rejected without a commitment to the 
bolder originalist claims.228 They have shown that whatever the 
provenance of originalism, it is unnecessary for a more restrained 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
4. Conclusion 
Despite the central place of originalism’s claim to 
neutrality in the defense of classical originalism and in the critics’ 
response, the debate over this claim shows little progress or signs 
of imminent resolution.  Originalists continue to assert the 
argument from neutrality.  Their critics continue to dismiss it.  
 
226.  See Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1162 
(2015) (“For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-Dworkin 
debate.”); Noel B. Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574, 574-76 (1975).  
But see Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 165 (2005) (denying that Dworkin’s analysis of judicial discretion was a major 
jurisprudential contribution). 
227.   Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 140. 
228.   See Sunstein, Five Theses, supra note 52, at 313 n.12 (criticizing the Warren 
Court’s decisions in Griswold and, amazingly, Brown).   
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Originalists have made scant progress defending either classical 
versions of the claim or more modern versions like Solum’s 
fixation thesis.229  The fixation thesis measures neutrality by 
reference to the constitutional meaning allegedly fixed at the 
earlier time.  Neutral interpretations articulate that earlier 
meaning.230  Originalism’s critics reject those arguments from 
neutrality.231  Their criticisms that the originalists have not 
defended their concept of neutrality nor their arguments from it 
generally have some force. 
Originalism’s critics have been less successful in 
articulating their competing non-originalist accounts and 
defending them against originalist criticism.232  The radical 
challenge to the concept of neutrality by Critical Legal Studies 
theorists or by Stanley Fish appears to face a powerful, practical 
response that there is far more agreement about the neutral 
interpretation and application of the Constitution than such 
theories would recognize.233  The strong claims of 
indeterminateness sometimes made by critics234 lose sight of the 
constraints on constitutional argument and decision.235  The 
indeterminacy objection to neutrality is mistaken.  But neutrality 
can be questioned without need to rely on a claim that legal 
argument is indeterminate (rather than merely underdetermined). 
 
229.   See Solum, Constitutional Construction, suora note 103, at 456  (asserting that 
originalism commitments to the meaning of the Constitution that was fixed at the relevant 
time of its adoption or amendment). 
230.   Id. at 459 (Solum does not, however, expressly articulate this claim as a matter 
of neutrality); ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM 36-63 (2011). 
231.   See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 
(2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, New Originalism] (arguing that the New Originalism relies on 
the same evidence and sources as the old originalism); Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra 
note 24, at 804-06. 
232.   Thus, few originalists have renounced their originalism in response to their 
critics’ arguments. 
233.   See, e.g., Nussbaum, Sophistry, supra note 85, at 130, 134-38.   
234.  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QLR 339 
(1996); Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
235.  Bobbitt’s modal argument description captures important dimensions of the 
constraints on the argumentation and decision in our constitutional law practice.  BOBBITT, 
FATE, supra note 17, at 9-119 (describing six canonical modes of constitutional argument).  
Brandom describes in more conceptual Hegelian terms the constraints imposed by the 
responsibility judges have with respect to their authority.  Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra 
note 79, at 38. 
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To the extent that theories like Dworkin’s would assert 
that the historical or textual statement of neutral constitutional 
principle is always defeasible by moral or other philosophical 
theory again appears inaccurate and implausible as a matter of the 
description of our constitutional decisional practice.236  Some 
originalist arguments are compelling and prove dispositive. 
Finally, and most importantly, it is not clear how the 
debate about substantive constitutional theory and practice has 
been advanced by the focus on the nature and place of neutrality 
of principle.  Appeals to neutrality do not easily resolve the 
tensions that have resulted in complex and discontinuous 
constitutional doctrine and precedent or the apparent 
inconsistencies between constitutional text and constitutional 
decisional law.  Nor do such appeals authoritatively point the way 
to a path to harmonize such complexities.  The focus on neutrality 
is another example of how highly theoretical arguments prove 
largely unhelpful in critiquing or refining our constitutional 
practice. 
C. Originalism’s Account of the Textuality of the 
Constitution 
Originalism also argues for its claim to be the only proper 
method of constitutional interpretation and, implicitly, of 
constitutional decision on the basis of a simple characterization of 
the Constitution.  The originalists claim to offer an account of the 
Constitution that hews more closely to the text of the Constitution 
because it reflects the textuality of the Constitution.237  That is, 
originalism is a better interpretation of the written Constitution 
because it recognizes and emphasizes the writtenness of that text. 
The argument from writtenness here emphasizes two 
features of the written Constitution:  its accessibility and 
transparency and the fixed nature of the text.238  Originalism 
claims to correspond to the text better than all or most other 
theories of constitutional interpretation.  This argument is 
 
236.  See Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a 
Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1674 (2009).   
237.   See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1, at 125 n.65.   
238.   Justice Scalia emphasized the conservative nature of the Constitution.  See 
Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 40. 
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content-neutral; it relies on how the Constitution is expressed 
rather than what it says. It is expressed in writing, locking in the 
linguistic content (as an oral constitution would do less 
effectively), if not the substantive constitutional law.239 
The first element of that closer correspondence is the 
conformity principle, which requires that interpretations of the 
Constitution ought not to be less transparent and accessible than 
the text of the Constitution itself.240  Transparency is a 
desideratum of constitutional interpretations.  Transparency 
makes the text of the Constitution more effective.  The 
Constitution as a whole and each provision in particular give 
guidance to the citizens and to governmental officers as to their 
rights and duties and the limits on their powers. If that mission is 
to be performed, the text must be accessible and its meaning and 
force reasonably transparent and understandable.  Transparency 
and accessibility is generally defined by reference to ordinary 
citizens; they ought to be able to read and understand at least at a 
fundamental level what the Constitution says.241  On the other 
hand, constitutional law experts can certainly have a deeper, 
technical understanding of our constitutional law.242 
Critics have neither accepted the implicit criticisms of 
their own theories nor the express claims made for originalism.  
Many do not expressly accept the conformity principle itself and 
articulate theories that appear to flout it.243  Some simply 
disregard any suggestion that transparency is to be sought in 
constitutional law.  Dworkin, for example, in his theory of law as 
 
239.   See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
269, 271 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 479 (2013) (distinguishing the linguistic content of the text from the 
substantive legal force of the text). 
240.  See André LeDuc, Evolving Originalism: What’s Privileged?, section III.A 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter LeDuc, Evolving Originalism]. 
241.   See ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION, supra note 71, at 160-66 (exploring what the 
Declaration of Independence’s claim that certain propositions are “self-evident” means). 
242.  See generally Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers 
Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981) (describing the respect in which legal reasoning is 
independent of other forms of practical reasoning).  
243.   See, e.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6 (endorsing an account of 
constitutional interpretation and decision that employs philosophical analysis and argument 
as a central feature); Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal 
Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013) (also introducing philosophical analysis into 
judicial decision theory to better explain the meaning of legal texts). 
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integrity, was prepared to construct a complex ideal for 
constitutional interpretation, a model, indeed, that he 
acknowledges cannot be satisfied in practice.244  Dworkin’s 
rejection of the conformity principle rejected the principle on both 
sides of the claimed equivalence.  Not only did he deny that 
constitutional interpretation should have the transparency and 
accessibility of the Constitution, but he denied that the 
Constitution itself has that transparency.245  The understanding 
and interpretation of the Constitution, at least with respect to its 
most fundamental provisions, requires a Hercules.  Dworkin 
never adequately explained why such a construct does not reveal 
his theory of law as integrity as unworkable.246 
Posner’s wealth maximizing theory of interpretation also 
appears susceptible to challenge, insofar as it employs a 
reasonably sophisticated economic analysis to explain how cases 
should be resolved.247  Posner’s theory may be defended on the 
basis that he is simply offering a deeply theoretical analysis of 
why cases come out as they do, rather than defended as an express 
theory of justification. 
The theories of other critics appear less susceptible to such 
a criticism.  For example, Sunstein’s theory of judicial 
minimalism would appear to avoid such an objection.248  
 
244.   Dworkin created the mythological figure of Judge Hercules to present his theory 
of law as integrity.  Judge Hercules has proven to be one of the most consistent elements of 
Dworkin’s jurisprudence, having made his debut in Dworkin’s inaugural lecture when he 
assumed his Oxford chair.  His powers and his role have not diminished with age.  See 
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 264-65. 
245.   Dworkin and law as integrity read the Constitution as Catholicism reads the 
Bible, with a complex textual exegesis informed by a large corpus of canonical interpretation 
and mediated by privileged interpreters.  Ironically, Justice Scalia, an observant and public 
Catholic, offered a Lutheran critique of that style of interpretation with its philosophical 
mumbo jumbo and its apparent dispensation of indulgences. See id. at 238-58 (describing the 
task and role of Herculean interpreters of our constitutional law). 
246.  Dworkin defends his use of the supernatural by characterizing Judge Hercules as 
the ideal.  He sees no need to address a possible concern that the theory of the second best 
may have something to say about the aspirations of his theory of adjudication.  
247.  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-76 (1981) [hereinafter 
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE].   
248.   See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM 
ON THE SUPREME COURT 24-48 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, MINIMALISM] (case by case 
adjudication is less costly and less likely to result in error than a more sweeping decision 
process, and errors that do occur are likely to result in smaller costs); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 60-61 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING] (fundamental principles of a political society ought to be developed through 
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Sunstein’s non-originalist minimalism would appear to satisfy the 
conformity principle because the judicial decisions that it 
endorses and the associated opinions that it advocates do not 
require complex, conceptual, or theoretical agreements.249  By 
recognizing implicit disagreements and the legitimacy of 
conflicting values and interpretations, Sunstein’s theory allows 
citizens to understand judicial outcomes.250  That is because such 
judicial outcomes are to be understood based almost exclusively 
on their result, rather than on the basis of a complex theoretical 
derivation or justification.  Reaching a narrower result for the case 
at hand is easier done, Sunstein implicitly urges, than 
understanding the theoretical constructs that might support 
broader conclusions.251  Similarly, while Tribe is more willing to 
construct bolder and broader constitutional theories, he argues 
that those theories are accessible and compelling, like the 
Constitution itself.252  Originalists respond that there is no 
foundation for Tribe’s constitutional arguments and attendant 
conclusions,253 and some originalist critics agree with that 
criticism, too.254  Without those foundations, Tribe’s claim to 
transparency would appear hard to sustain. 
There is a second implicit thread to the originalist textual 
argument.  Originalists also argue that their account, by relying 
on the original understanding, intent, or expectations, better 
accounts for the decision to adopt a written Constitution.255  
Justice Scalia makes this point forcefully:  “It certainly cannot be 
said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the 
contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed 
certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot 
 
democratic decision rather than by adjudication).  Thus, Sunstein’s defense of minimalism 
is largely procedural rather than substantive. 
249.   SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 248, at 61; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, 
supra note 4, at 27-30 (restating the argument of Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict in 
the context of the debate over originalism).  
250.   SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 248, at 60-61.   
251.   SUNSTEIN, MINIMALISM, supra note 248, at 44.   
252.  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 19-20 (1985) [hereinafter 
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES].   
253.   See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 140-42, 142 (criticizing Tribe’s 
interpretation of a changing “vagrant Constitution”). 
254.   See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 126-31 (2006). 
255.   Barnett, Originalism, supra note 27, at 617. 
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readily take them away.”256  From the commitment of the adopters 
of the Constitution to a policy or principle to lock in, Justice 
Scalia argues that the interpretation of the Constitution should 
also commit to a principle of conservation.257  Interpretation of 
the Constitution should acknowledge and honor the original 
commitment to bind future generations.258  To do so, Justice 
Scalia argues, requires attention to, and deference to, the original 
understandings and expectations. 
The critics also discount this second argument from 
textuality.  They offer two responses.  First, they dispute that the 
adopters of the Constitution shared any such commitment to a 
conservative interpretation of its terms.259  Acknowledging 
contemporary expressions of such a conservative approach to 
constitutional interpretation,260 those critics cite others, like 
Thomas Jefferson, who appears to adopt a radically different 
perspective.261  Second, the critics invoke the dead hand argument 
against such an interpretive approach.  Put most simply, 
regardless of what the adopters thought or intended, the dead hand 
argument urges that the dead cannot control the living, and it is 
for us and our contemporaries to determine how we read the 
Constitution and what it means.  The dead hand argument appears 
in two related forms.  The first is a linguistic argument, based 
upon a theory of meaning.  On that version, a text must be given 
contemporary meaning by a contemporary linguistic community.  
A text cannot sail forward into time and impose its meaning upon 
future individuals or communities.262  The second version is an 
argument from political theory; there is no legitimacy in an effort 
 
256.   Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40. 
257.   See id.   
258.   Id. 
259.   See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985). But see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding 
of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 79 (1988) (questioning Powell’s historical 
argument). 
260.   See Lofgren, supra note 259, at 77 n.1, 78 nn. 4-5. 
261.   Traditionally cited is Jefferson’s comment that the United States should adopt a 
new Constitution each generation.  See GARRETT WARD SHELDON, THE POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 84 (1991) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32-44 
(Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)) see also Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions,” supra 
note 155 (emphasizing the natural law perspective of Jefferson and the other Founders).   
262.   See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 239-40. 
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by one temporal community to bind a later, otherwise unrelated 
community.263 
Bork made two arguments against the dead hand 
argument.  First, he urged that the dead hand argument is 
incoherent.264  He contended that those making the argument rely 
precisely on the institutions constituted by the dead hand of the 
dead—the Republic’s courts—to accept their challenges to the 
original understandings and expectations.  Thus, he urged, such 
arguments are internally inconsistent.265  This argument appears 
mistaken. Its flaw is that critics of the interpretation need not rely 
on the dead hand to legitimize the courts or judicial review.  They 
may, for example, rely upon the extant practices of interpreting 
and applying our American Constitution without regard to the 
original understanding.  The vitality and authority of the courts is 
not subject to a significant fundamental challenge.  The status of 
many historical understandings of the constitutional text is very 
different.  Moreover, if Bobbitt is correct that those practices are 
themselves the bedrock legitimation of constitutional 
propositions,266 there is no implicit recourse to the legitimacy of 
original understandings, intentions, or expectations.  It is far from 
clear that Bobbitt is mistaken267 and, in any event, there was no 
argument for that conclusion by Bork. 
Second, Bork argued that the dead hand argument is 
essentially an argument against democratic majority rule.268  He 
asserted that this argument is invoked to overturn democratically 
enacted legislation.269  With the argument so recharacterized, 
Bork may be understood to have simply urged that nothing in the 
Constitution supports such an argument.  Indeed, the Constitution 
asserts that it and the laws enacted to it are “the supreme Law of 
the Land” without regard to when adopted or enacted.270  Bork 
 
263.   For an originalist acknowledgment of the weakness of this argument, see 
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 19-22. 
264.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-71. 
265.   Id. at 171.   
266.   See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 237-40. 
267.   See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17. 
268.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-71. 
269.   Id. at 171. 
270.   U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
1072 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  70:4 
therefore concluded that these challenges should fail.271  But Bork 
was not really fair to the dead hand argument.272  That argument 
asserts that the Constitution should be interpreted as we 
understand it today.  Article VI does not shed any particular light 
on the validity of the claim.  Bork did not explain why such 
invocations of a different reading of the Constitution should 
fail.273 
As noted above, Dworkin and Tribe present the strongest 
criticism of this second argument.  They argue that the 
Constitution neither offers, nor even was originally understood to 
offer, answers to all constitutional questions that would later arise 
in the Republic.  Thus, the argument from textuality certainly does 
some work in defense of originalism, insofar as it raises serious 
questions about at least a couple of the alternative theories.  But 
some of the critics offer theories that satisfy the conformity 
condition as well as originalism.  Thus, a variety of theories, 
originalist and not, would appear to take the textuality of the 
Constitution into account. 
 
D. Accounting for Constitutional Flux 
 
271.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-71. 
272.   He was not fair because the dead hand is not made as a textual argument; it is 
made as an argument from political philosophy or from the philosophy of action.  (Gary 
Lawson recognizes the theme of ambiguity in the debate as to the nature of the claims made.  
Gary Lawson, Originalism Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2013) 
[hereinafter Lawson, Originalism Without Obligation] (“Originalism-as-interpretation is a 
theory of meaning; originalism-as-adjudication is a theory of action.”).  So claiming 
incoherence because of a reliance on the constitutional text is unfair.  Judge Bork might have 
argued that critics making the dead hand argument must rely on the Constitution if they make 
an argument to courts created by the Constitution.  But I don’t think that claim is self-evident 
either.  He needed an argument that the critics cannot require the support they insist on for 
the Constitution.  While I think such an argument exists, made from an anti-foundational 
stance that accords our constitutional practice priority, that argument is not easily made by 
originalists. 
273.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 171.  Bork did not directly engage the 
linguistic version of the dead hand argument.  There are two reasons why.  First, writing as 
judge and lawyer, Bork took for granted that old texts have meaning; he was neither attentive 
to, nor interested in, the philosophical questions that Dworkin and Bobbitt might identify, 
for example.  Second, to the extent that Bork had a theory of meaning, it would appear to 
rebut the dead hand challenge.  That is, the objective meaning of the constitutional text, 
determined by the truth conditions of propositions about that text, is an alternative account 
of meaning to that offered by anti-foundationalist, anti-representationalist accounts like that 
defended by Bobbitt and Patterson. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17; 
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 85. 
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1. The Problem of Constitutional Change 
Any adequate account of constitutional interpretation and 
decision must offer an account of constitutional change.274  That 
the interpretation, application, and understanding of the 
Constitution has changed over time appears incontrovertible.275  
Constitutional change takes a variety of forms.  It may also be 
characterized a variety of ways.  A whiggish account of 
constitutional change would treat all such change as the correction 
of earlier error.  Such an account could assert that all precedent 
that had been reversed was wrong the day it was decided.276  A 
more pessimistic account, often at least hinted at by the 
originalists, is that constitutional change reflects a corruption of 
earlier, sound law.277  An ontologically more complex account 
might treat the constitution as unchanging, confining the account 
of change as only a matter of interpretation, understanding, or 
application.278  But some account of change must be offered. 
2. Originalism’s Reductive Approach to 
Constitutional Flux 
Because originalism looks to the original meanings and 
intent, it accommodates constitutional change only in limited 
 
274.   See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference 
Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 559 (2006) [hereinafter Green, The Sense-Reference 
Distinction] (“I explain how distinctions of long standing in the philosophy of language can 
present a compelling distinction between which of the Constitution’s attributes change and 
which do not.”). 
275.   Thus, for example, segregated public schools were understood to satisfy the 
Equal Protection Clause under Plessy but held to violate that clause in Brown.  Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).  Anti-miscegenation statutes were held to violate that 
clause in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). 
276.   Such decisions are characterized in academic constitutional vernacular as “wrong 
the day they were decided.” See Green, Truthmakers, supra note 80,  (manuscript at 5). 
277.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 161.   
278.   But this account would introduce an important distinction between the 
constitutional law and the interpretation of that law that few originalists would welcome. 
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ways.279  That is one of its claimed strengths.280  In general, of 
course, originalism has challenged281 non-originalist theories of 
constitutional interpretation that embrace broader avenues of 
change, usually by looking to changing extra-textual sources of 
law.282  That response to other theories’ endorsement of sources 
of constitutional change is consistent with originalism’s 
conservatism as a theory of constitutional interpretation.  For 
originalism, conservatism in interpretation, in the sense of hewing 
to the original understanding of the text, is a paramount virtue.283  
Nevertheless, the world around us changes284 and those changes 
 
279.   I have previously explored technological progress and the changing scope of the 
Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless searches.  See André LeDuc, Beyond 
Babel: Achieving the Promise of Our American Constitution, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185, 197-
99 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Beyond Babel].  Ironically, one of the most telling objections 
to originalism is that it offers insufficient stability and excessive change to our established 
constitutional law.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 75-76.  While some 
proponents of originalism urge that originalism offers the interpretive path by which we may 
restore the Lost Constitution, most originalists and most critics wrestle with the problem of 
saving a century or so of precedent within originalism.  See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, 
at 335-351.   
280.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 139-41; Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, 
at 38-40, 46-47.  
281.   See, e.g., Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 38-40, 46-47.  Justice Scalia 
made a number of arguments, including that embedding certain rights in the Constitution 
locks them in in a way that blocks further social and political evolution, on the one hand, and 
that the commitment to a Living Constitution elevates majority rule to the exclusive source 
of rights and obligations, on the other.  Some might find these two arguments in tension, if 
not inconsistent. 
282.   See, e.g., Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Georgetown University 
Text and Teaching Symposium,  (October 12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 59, at 55, 
61 (“We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentieth 
century Americans. . . . What do the words of the text mean in our time?”); STEPHEN 
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 115-32 
(2005) (arguing that the interpretive goal should be to interpret and apply abstract principles 
to the modern world, informed by that world); DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225-75 
(describing construction of philosophically grounded harmonic interpretation of law as the 
best reading of the law and the preferred means of establishing the integrity of law).  Most 
fundamentally, Dworkin’s criticism of legal positivism was a challenge designed to permit 
the importation of authoritative sources of law from outside the practice (or texts) of positive 
law. 
283.   See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015) [hereinafter Sachs, Legal Change].  Of course, as 
Dworkin and Sunstein, among others, have repeatedly pointed out, originalism is anything 
but a conservative theory of interpretation as applied to the existing understanding and 
practice of our American Constitution. 
284.   See JOHN MANSLEY ROBINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY GREEK 
PHILOSOPHY: THE CHIEF FRAGMENTS AND ANCIENT TESTIMONY, WITH CONNECTING 
COMMENTARY 89 (1968) (assertion by Heraclitus that all is flux). 
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require reinterpretation or rethinking of constitutional doctrine.285  
How then does originalism accept and account for constitutional 
flux?  Originalism’s critics charge that the doctrine cannot 
provide a coherent and plausible account of such change.  To 
assess this element of the debate, it is helpful to explore a general 
theory of constitutional change before looking to what the 
originalists and their critics have said. 
Larry Lessig offers one of the most thoughtful, highly 
articulated, and comprehensive theories of constitutional 
change.286  He claims to offer a theory of change that even 
originalists can agree with.287  That claim may be overstated.  
Nevertheless, there is much in Lessig’s view of the constitution 
that originalism would reject.288  But that theory may be helpful 
in articulating and analyzing the problem of constitutional change 
and the sources of permissible constitutional change for 
originalism.  First, and foremost, Lessig emphasizes 
constitutional change:  “Readings of the Constitution change.  
This is the brute fact of constitutional history and constitutional 
interpretation. . . .  No theory that ignored these changes, or that 
presumed that constitutional interpretation could go on without 
these changes, could be a theory of our Constitution.  Change is 
at its core.”289  Lessig crucially distinguishes readings of 
constitutional provisions from the meaning of those provisions.290  
Readings are context specific.  By introducing and emphasizing 
the concept of constitutional readings, distinct from the meaning 
 
285.   How one characterizes that interpretative or adjudicative response is, of course, 
one of the central questions of originalism and its competing theories. 
286.   Lessig, Understanding, supra note 5, at 439-42 (arguing that changes in 
background context of the constitutional text can explain changes in the interpretation and 
application of the constitutional provisions in our constitutional decisional practice). 
287.   Id. at 396 (“Are these changed readings always changes of infidelity? Everyone, 
whether originalist or not, agrees that they are not.”).  Although Lessig asserts this point 
without citation, it is surely true in at least the trivial sense that many of the changed readings 
advocated by originalism would reverse unfaithful precedent, and in so doing, would restore 
fidelity.  Whether it is true in a stronger sense may be questioned, as explored below. 
288.   For example, few originalists would likely be willing to accept Lessig’s notion 
that changes in uncontested views like the characterization of homosexuality could alter the 
proper interpretation of the Constitution.  If they did, their views on recent cases addressing 
the relationship of homosexual activity and protected privacy rights would likely be very 
different. 
289.   Id. 
290.   Id. at 402.  Readings are applications of a constitutional provision to a particular 
set of facts. 
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of the constitutional text, Lessig creates the field within which 
constitutional change may unfold, without committing him to the 
counterintuitive proposition that the meaning of the Constitution 
changes. 
Lessig’s attempt to construct a theory of constitutional 
change is intended to explain how the apparent discontinuity in 
the Supreme Court’s approach to the Commerce Clause and the 
New Deal legislation in 1937 can be legitimated without invoking 
a theory like that of Bruce Ackerman that there was a de facto 
constitutional amendment.291  To do so, Lessig constructs a matrix 
of types of possible constitutional change.292  Those four types of 
change involve changed readings of the constitutional text or 
changed readings of the constitutional context.293  The key claim 
that Lessig makes is that in addition to changes of factual 
context—like the kinds of technological change I have already 
explored—the reading of the Constitution may change with a 
changed understanding of context.  One of the examples that 
Lessig cites of such change is the medical characterization of 
homosexuality.294  What Lessig’s article contributes to our task 
here is a description of fidelity as the translation of a reading in 
one context as a reading in another context that preserves 
meaning.295  Originalists, by contrast, often simply focus on the 
unchanging meaning of the Constitution.296  Inherent in the nature 
of a Constitution is stability, resistance to change.  Lessig captures 
some of the complexity in the project of preserving that 
unchanging meaning.  What, then, are the legitimate sources of 
change?297 
The first permissible type of constitutional change comes 
in response to technological change.  Perhaps the most obvious is 
that the permanent Constitution must be applied in a changing 
 
291.   See id. at 472. 
292.   Lessig, Understanding, supra note 5, at 404-07. 
293.   Id. at 404.   
294.   Id. at 415-19. 
295.   Id. at 401-02. 
296.   See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 143-44; Scalia, Interpretation, supra 
note 6, at 47.  This rejection of change—or at least impermissible sources of change—lies at 
the heart of the rejection of the notion of a “Living Constitution.”  See generally William H. 
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976). 
297.   Compare Lessig, Understanding, supra note 5, at 404-05, with Scalia, 
Interpretation, supra note 6, at 41-44. 
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world.298  The First Amendment299 and Fourth Amendment300 
present the clearest examples in the case of originalist writings, 
but the Second Amendment301 and the Sixth Amendment302 
provide similar instances where originalists confront potential 
new constitutional rules to respond to because they reflect the 
technologically changed world.  How, then is such change 
accommodated?  It would appear that such technological change 
is incorporated into the interpretation through a two-step process.  
First, a principle is extracted from the constitutional provisions.  
Second, that principle—which on its face already goes beyond the 
text—is applied to the new technology.  I have discussed 
examples of such applications with respect to the First 
Amendment in Evolving Originalism.303 
Beyond technological change, are there other forms of 
scientific or non-scientific changes that would properly be taken 
into account under originalism?  The other two types of change 
acknowledged by originalism, constitutional amendment, and the 
correction of prior error, are not conceptually particularly 
interesting.304  Are there then any other legitimate sources of 
 
298.   Technologies change, religions change, political practices change, foreign threats 
change, states join the Union, States purport to secede from the Union, Federal government 
roles evolve, treaty partners’ demands and expectations change, life expectancies change, 
demographics change. 
299.   See the discussion in LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra note 240, at section 
II.A.(5). 
300.   See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.   
301.   See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
302.  See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 43-44 (rejecting a proposed 
interpretation of the confrontation clause to permit a child who is an alleged victim of sexual 
abuse to testify by live video feed). 
303.   See LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra note 240, at section II.A.(5); see also 
LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 2, at 197-204 (discussing the Court’s efforts to 
grapple with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment with respect to GPS tracking 
technology). 
304.   A second source of permissible change for originalists is constitutional 
amendment.  On December 31, 1932, the sale of beer and wine was illegal in the United 
States, and any court should have so held; on January 1, 1934, such sale was, at least as a 
matter of United States constitutional law, not prohibited, any court should so hold.  The 
difference in constitutional law was a matter of the proper adoption of the Twenty-First 
Amendment.  That change was entirely proper under originalism.  See, e.g., Meese, Speech, 
supra note 156, at 80. A third source of legitimate change is the correction of prior error.  
Thus, we had Brown correcting and reversing Plessy v. Ferguson, West Coast Hotel 
correcting Lochner, and Crawford v. Washington apparently correcting Maryland v. Craig.  
All would be examples of proper and permitted constitutional change for most originalists.  
Much of the originalist corpus addresses the need to reverse precedent that is inconsistent 
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constitutional change in originalism?  The answer to that question 
turns on the relevant version of originalism at issue.  At least two 
sources of law are acknowledged by certain versions of 
originalism, and those sources of law may therefore be sources of 
change.305  In weak originalism, precedent is accepted as a 
binding source of law.306  That precedent, when applied in 
conjunction with other doctrine to novel facts, may generate 
change.307  In non-exclusive or moderate originalism, other 
interpretive modes are also accepted, and those others modes may 
be sources of change.308 
With respect to the other stronger (narrower) versions of 
originalism, it is less clear that there are other permissible sources 
of change.  Justice Scalia addressed these questions directly in his 
criticism of those who would find the death penalty prohibited by 
the Eighth Amendment.309  One helpful way to analyze the debate 
over the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment is to ask what 
kinds of change are permissible to take into account in the 
interpretation of the Constitution.  Technological change is 
apparently relevant.  To the extent that we develop new, more 
humane ways of execution, those ways can make the old ways 
constitutionally obsolete because they become cruel (if hardly 
 
with the original meaning.  See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 155-59 (criticizing 
Roe v. Wade, and the expansion of the commerce power, but grudgingly accepting Shelly v. 
Kraemer and Griswold).  Such corrective change is also legitimate in originalism. It is this 
type of permissible change that opens originalism up to the criticism that it is too radical a 
doctrine of constitutional interpretation. Other theories do not deny the ability to correct 
error; they disagree as to what constitutes error in existing constitutional law. 
305.  See generally BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 155-59 (acknowledging 
constitutional amendment and the correction of prior constitutional error as sources of 
change). 
306.   See LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra note 240, at section II.B.(12). 
307.   For example, once Griswold v. Connecticut was decided recognizing a right to 
privacy and extending certain constitutional protection to certain sexual behavior, Roe v. 
Wade was arguably a natural extension; so, too, Casey. While few originalists would endorse 
these developments, an argument may be made that a weak originalist should accept these 
results.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 159. 
308.   Thus, for example, were a non-exclusive originalist to conclude that the language 
of the Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment is ambiguous, she might 
follow non-originalists in looking to emerging international legal consensus against the death 
penalty as a source of interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to capital 
punishment. 
309.   Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146. 
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unusual).310  But what cannot be taken into account are public 
opinion,311 the views of other sovereigns,312 moral theories about 
the state and the individual,313 or any other topic.314 What tells us 
which sources of change are legitimate, and which sources 
constitute judicial arrogations of power in derogation of the 
constitutional text?315 
One strategy employed by Judge Bork and Justice Scalia 
is substantially the same, although articulated rather differently.  
As presented by Bork, the limitation on change is classically 
positivist.316  The commands of the Constitution, as the 
commands of the sovereign, are to be respected as positive law.317  
It would take an authoritative action to change that positive law.  
Those commands may implicitly or explicitly incorporate 
normative or moral choices.  Those choices are to be given effect, 
not because they are correct or uncontroversial, but because they 
are positive law.318  Thus, having reduced the implicit moral 
choice to a statement of positive law, any change in public 
morality or philosophical perspective becomes irrelevant.  Justice 
Scalia, by contrast, emphasized the unchanging moral view of the 
 
310.   Cf. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45 (endorsing application of First 
Amendment to protect new technologies). 
311.   Id. 
312.   See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J. dissenting).  
313.   Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45 (“[Does the extraneous source of 
constitutional law include] the philosophy of Hume, or of John Rawls, or of John Stuart Mill, 
or of Aristotle?” That is a rhetorical question, dripping with sarcasm, to be answered in the 
negative.). 
314.   Id.  
315.   The Congress could, of course, exercise its legislative function to prohibit capital 
punishment; there is no apparent constitutional mandate requiring capital punishment. 
316.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 177; see generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of 
Positivism, supra note 54.   
317.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 177. 
318.   Id. at 177-78; see also Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146 (“[The founders] 
were embedding in the Bill of Rights their moral values . . . .”). 
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Founders, trapped as it were, in amber.319  As a historical fact, it, 
too, cannot change.320 
Justice Scalia’s claim that the meaning of cruel and 
unusual in the Eighth Amendment cannot change may be tested 
with a couple of hypotheticals.  Consider the use of the guillotine 
as an instrument of capital punishment.  That method of capital 
punishment was well-established in contemporary Western 
societies at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights and was 
not generally regarded as cruel or barbaric.321  Would the use of 
the guillotine be permitted today as an instrument of capital 
punishment, or has the guillotine joined the stocks and the lash as 
an instrument of cruel and unusual punishment?  If so, what has 
changed?  What if we discovered that all available methods of 
capital punishment operate not to dispatch their victims 
expeditiously, but instead impose an eternity of suffering on the 
souls of those so condemned?  What if we discovered that all but 
one of our techniques of capital punishment had that effect?  
Would either of those discoveries result in a change in our 
understanding of the relationship of some or all of our techniques 
of capital punishment to the prohibitions of the Eighth 
Amendment?  Although Justice Scalia appears to have been 
denying that even such discoveries would change our 
interpretation,322 perhaps a more charitable reading is that he is 
simply reflecting on the current state of our law in the absence of 
any such hypothetical discoveries. 
With this survey of the originalist perspective on 
permissible sources of change we come, finally, to the great 
Princeton mink debate.323  That debate offers one of the clearest 
statements of the disagreement between originalism and its critics 
as to the permissible sources of constitutional flux.  The exchange 
 
319.   Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146 (“[P]rovision for the death penalty in a 
Constitution that sets forth the moral principle of ‘no cruel punishments’ is conclusive 
evidence that the death penalty is not (in the moral view of the Constitution) cruel.”).  The 
express characterization of the moral grounding of the Constitution in Justice Scalia’s 
jurisprudence makes his rejection of natural law in his originalism all the more puzzling. 
320.   Id.  Sometimes Justice Scalia states this premise in moral absolute terms, but this 
does not appear essential to his argument, and when he does, he does so tentatively: “‘[M]oral 
principles,’ most of us think, are permanent.”  Id. 
321.   See id.  
322.   Id. at 144-46. 
323.   Id. at 146; Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 121. 
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between Justice Scalia and Dworkin addressed sources of 
permissible constitutional change.  The debate hypothesized the 
interpretation of a statute that both protected endangered species 
and regulated the hunting of unendangered species, including, in 
particular, mink.324  Dworkin explored the proper interpretation 
of such a statute in the face of changing populations of mink.325  
Both Justice Scalia and Professor Dworkin addressed the question 
of how to interpret an endangered species act that protects 
“endangered” species, as populations rise and fall and threats of 
endangerment to particular species rise and fall.326  To Dworkin, 
the statute should be read to respond to those changing facts in the 
world;327 fidelity to the statute demands it.  Moreover, for 
Dworkin, that model of derivative statutory change was a model 
of constitutional flux.328  So Dworkin invoked the changing 
interpretation as a model of how we should, for example, interpret 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments.  Most simply, Dworkin intended his hypothetical 
statute as a counterexample to Justice Scalia’s simple, oft-
repeated claim329 that the mention of capital punishment in the 
Constitution precludes a determination that such punishment is 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual.  
Justice Scalia would apparently read the statute no differently; he, 
too, would protect the newly endangered mink (or call off the 
protections for newly unendangered mink).330 Justice Scalia 
denied that such change with respect to the protection required 
corresponds to a change in the interpretation of the relevant 
statute.331  Similar changes in constitutional protections ought not 
 
324.  Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 121; Scalia, Response, supra note 20, 
at 146.  
325.   Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 121. 
326.  Id.; Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146.  
327.   Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 121-23.   
328.   Id. at 121-22. 
329.   Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46. (“No fewer than three of the Justices 
with whom I have served have maintained that the death penalty is unconstitutional, even 
though its use is explicitly contemplated in the Constitution.” (footnotes omitted)). 
330.   Id.  
331.   Id. 
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to be understood as deriving from a change in interpretation of 
Dworkin’s “majestic” clauses of the Constitution.332 
Justice Scalia appeared to rely on the distinction between 
facts and values.  Changes in animal population are changes in 
facts; changes in the definition of cruel or equal or others highly 
abstract terms are often changes in moral or other values.  The 
latter are not properly taken into account by an implicit positivist 
account of law that denies such moral theories the status of law.  
Thus, Justice Scalia could easily distinguish Dworkin’s mink case 
to the extent he could distinguish facts from values or otherwise 
rely upon a positivist account of law.333  While neither of those 
foundations is free from doubt,334 neither are they suspect or 
unusual in American jurisprudence.  Indeed, the distinction 
between facts and value is very much a traditional one.  In short, 
Dworkin needed to do a lot more work before the mink case 
would pose a difficult challenge for Justice Scalia’s theory. 
Beyond operating as a counterexample to Justice Scalia’s 
capital punishment argument,335 Dworkin appeared to use his 
hypothetical statute more generally as a proxy for the types of 
change that must be accommodated in constitutional 
interpretation.  As noted, Dworkin accepted that there is a 
distinction between facts and values, but he believed that values, 
including moral values, evolve. That argument was not made with 
the endangered mink example, however. Instead, Dworkin’s 
argument that the moral values and principles inherent in the 
Constitution may evolve was based upon the text of the 
Constitution itself.  Dworkin argued that the language of the 
Constitution demonstrates a commitment to the highest and best 
moral theory available to us.336 
 
332.   See Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 123 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, 
LIFE’S DOMINION 145 (1993)). 
333.   See Hart, Positivism, supra note 148, at 625-29; see generally LeDuc, Paradoxes 
of Positivism, supra note 54 (exploring the positivist character of most originalist and non-
originalist theories in the debate). 
334.   See HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 9-10, 99, 101-02 (2002) (arguing, following Dewey, that the distinction 
between facts and values does not generate a philosophically important ontological 
dichotomy); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 87, 88-99 (1996) (defending the objective truth of value judgments). 
335.   See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46-47. 
336.   See, e.g., Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 122-23. 
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Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s originalism appears to offer 
a theory of constitutional flux that acknowledges a limited array 
of sources of change.  The Constitution may change as technology 
changes.  I described the evolution with respect to the First 
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment above.337  For Justice 
Scalia, it sometimes appeared as if sorting out the impact of 
technological change on the Constitution was not difficult.338  The 
history of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests 
otherwise.  It also raises a question whether Griswold v. 
Connecticut339 should be reconciled with originalism theory as a 
technological change case.  Just as the eighteenth-century 
Constitution permitted married couples to access the forms of 
contraception then available, that same Constitution ought to 
permit the use of newer technologies in the twentieth century.  
Other sources of constitutional change are generally not 
permitted.  Of particular importance, changes in community 
standards or morality would not be properly taken into account.  
There remain at least a few rough patches in this account.  Two 
examples are the criminal punishments of lashing and 
branding.340  This account of Justice Scalia’s originalism still does 
not explain why stocks and whipping are cruel and unusual and 
thus prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  He invoked stare 
decisis to avoid the implication that such punishments would not 
be prohibited under the Constitution.341  The second is the implicit 
reliance and the distinction between facts and values.  But that 
distinction is not manifestly wrong—and is certainly customary. 
3.  Conclusion 
A powerful objection to originalism’s account of change 
is that the account is inadequate.  For example, Justice Scalia did 
 
337.   See supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.  
338.  For example, note Justice Scalia’s discussion of the First and Fourth 
Amendments’ proper interpretation in the face of technological change.  See Scalia, 
Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45-46.  
339.  381 U.S. 479, 480, 486 (1965). 
340.   Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 107, at 861 (acknowledging that such penalties 
would not be sustained under the Eighth Amendment by an originalist, characterizing 
originalism as, in “its undiluted form, at least, . . . medicine that seems too strong to 
swallow.”) 
341.   Id. 
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not explain why stocks and lashing are prohibited, but capital 
punishment is not (except as a matter of deference to non-
originalist precedent).  Nor did he explain why the First 
Amendment protects broadcast television and flag burning.342  
Justice Scalia asserted that the concepts of speech and press serve 
as “sort of” synecdoches, but this is itself more a metaphor than 
an explanation or an argument. Moreover, it is hardly an 
apparently originalist claim about semantic or linguistic 
meaning.343  Simply distinguishing facts and values does not 
make possible performance of the task that originalism seeks to 
accomplish.  Our objections to stocks and lashings are rooted in 
our changed values, not in any changed facts.  Our protection of 
flag burning, which cannot be justified by reference to original 
expectations, understandings, or intentions, is similarly rooted in 
changed values, understanding of democracy, and the permissible 
scope of debate within the public discourse.344  The originalist 
account of constitutional flux falls not from the criticisms of its 
critics, but from its own inadequacy. 
 
E. The Claim of Necessity 
 
The final principal implication Bork drew from 
originalism’s claims is that all other theories of constitutional 
interpretation are impossible.345  The sense in which theories were 
impossible for Bork is strong:  such theories are no more possible 
than a perpetual motion machine under the laws of physics.346  
 
342.   Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 138.  
343.   See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 38; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, 
supra note 1, at 138 (criticizing the casual invocation of the concept of synecdoche in 
interpretation of the constitutional text—and questioning how Justice Scalia’s approach 
differs from Justice Douglas’s much criticized penumbras and emanations in Griswold). 
344.   See Lessig, Understanding, supra note 5, at 400-01.   
345.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251.  Although Douglas Ginsburg and Frank 
Easterbrook do not expressly defend originalism on the basis that alternatives are impossible, 
Ginsburg’s characterization of non-originalists as lawless and Easterbrook’s analogy of non-
originalism to infant baptism sound parallel themes.  See Easterbrook, Alternatives to 
Originalism, supra note 36, at 479.  Tara Smith dubs a related argument for the necessity of 
originalism the “iron grip argument.”  See SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 100, at 165 
(naming the argument that interpretation must be originalist).  Critics have likewise claimed 
the impossibility of originalism.  See, e.g., Ely, Allure and Impossibility, supra note 14, at 
412-15. 
346.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251. 
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Other originalists argue that non-originalist theories are erroneous 
or misguided, but the modal claim about the world appears to have 
been made first by Bork.347  The necessity argument makes two 
turns: a positivist turn, to be restated as a claim about the absence 
of legal change that could alter the original law and 
understanding348 and a linguistic turn, to be restated as an 
argument about the nature of interpretation.349 
Bork’s argument was that moral choices are required in 
our foundational constitutional law.  We have to choose how we 
want to live as individuals and as a political and civil society.  If 
a judge, following originalism, simply implements the moral 
choices made by the Founders in the Constitution, that process 
becomes possible.  Reliance upon the express or implied moral 
choices of the Constitution reduces the “ought” of such moral 
judgments and choices to the “is” of the constitutional text.  In 
constitutional interpretation, “is” implies “ought.”350  But any 
attempt to make our own moral choices to resolve hard cases 
unanswered by the choices implicit or express in the Constitution 
is necessarily controversial because of moral relativism.  A judge 
embarked on such a project becomes “at once adrift on an 
uncertain sea of moral argument.”351  Implicit in that criticism is 
that a debatable or controversial moral theory fails as a foundation 
of legal obligation.352  (Bork quite nicely anticipates the objection 
that the moral theory of the Constitution is no less controversial, 
acknowledging that fact, but noting that the theory of the 
Constitution is vindicated not because it is less controversial, but 
because its constitutional embodiment makes it authoritative.)353 
 
347.   Id. at 251-52.  
348.   Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at  2352. 
349.   SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 100, at 165. 
350.   See LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54, at 634.  That is, Bork relied 
on the reduction of the moral judgments of the Founders to positive law to purge those 
judgments of their controversial nature as moral judgments.  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 
6, at 252. 
351.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 252. Bork’s moral relativism is descriptive, 
not prescriptive.  
352.   Id.  
353.   Id.  
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Dworkin rendered this argument a little differently, with 
four steps: 
 
(1)  Any method other than originalism requires “major 
moral choices.”354 
 
(2)  Judges cannot show legitimate authority to make such 
moral choices. 
 
            (3)  Absent authority, judges must follow rules based upon 
a theory that “the public would accept.”355 
 
        (4)  There is no such theory.356 
 
Dworkin challenged the second premise, arguing that belief in, 
and acceptance of, such authority “is very widely accepted.”357  
Dworkin offered no defense for such claim.358  That support is 
probably not critical, however, because Dworkin offered his 
claim about public opinion not to establish the proposition that 
judges have such authority but merely to show that to the extent 
one holds the view contrary to Bork’s (and thus believes that 
judges have legitimate authority to make such decisions), then 
such a non-originalist theory would be possible.  Without 
establishing the falsity of Bork’s second premise, Dworkin could 
refute Bork’s argument simply by showing that Bork has not 
established the truth of his premise.359 
 
354.  RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 301-02 (1996) (quoting Bork). 
355.   Id. at 302. 
356.   Id.  
357.   Id.  
358.   That omission is perhaps understandable or appropriate in a book review.  If 
Dworkin were to defend that claim, it would likely be on both empirical and theoretical 
grounds.  Empirically, there are wide areas of consensus in our Republic on a wide range of 
moral questions.  Theoretically, Dworkin is committed to the view that there are right 
answers, as a matter of law and as a matter of moral theory.  See, e.g., DWORKIN, TAKING, 
supra note 114, at 81-130; RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard 
Cases?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 13, at 119 (arguing that complete analysis 
of legal doctrine and moral philosophy will provide a unique right answer to all legal 
questions).  See generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011) (defending 
a unified theory of value). 
359.  Dworkin was likely correct that Bork’s second premise is questionable. A variety 
of judges have claimed that power expressly or implicitly and a wide range of commentators 
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Reverting to my initial rendition of Bork’s argument, 
however, may put that argument in a more charitable light.  First, 
Dworkin asserts that judicial decision making must ultimately be 
based upon moral judgments to be morally legitimate; that claim 
misses the mark as a response to Bork.  Bork did not deny 
Dworkin’s moral theory.  Rather, he only asserted the existence 
of conflict among both theorists and citizens more generally over 
the correct moral theory.  That is, Bork’s argument need assert 
only that Dworkin’s claim is contested.  From the existence of that 
controversy Bork argued that a controversial decision, resting on 
controversial premises or arguments, is not legitimate as a 
foundation for a holding of constitutional law.  From this absence 
of uncontested outcomes Bork first inferred an absence of 
legitimacy and then inferred the failure of non-originalist theories, 
including those like Dworkin’s that turn to moral philosophy for 
a foundation.  I think this more charitable rendition of Bork’s 
argument is closer to the mark; it is certainly more interesting.  
There is a plausibility that applying moral choices embedded in 
the Constitution has a manifest legitimacy that other, more 
avowedly interpretive theories cannot claim on their face.  
Perhaps because of his vocation as a legal philosopher, Dworkin 
had sufficient confidence in the power of reason that the 
complexity of the analysis and argument necessary under his 
theory does not appear to have caused him concerns.360 
If Bork’s argument fails, it is because the first premise is 
flawed.  Implicit in the premise is the claim that originalism 
requires no new moral choices in the interpretation of the 
Constitution or the decision of constitutional cases.361  It would 
not be enough to defer to the moral judgments of the Founders if 
those judgments left unresolved a range of other moral choices 
 
from Posner to Tribe and Dworkin have claimed that power for judges, too.  While Bork may 
have strenuously disagreed with the claim to such authority, he could claim neither that such 
authority is uncontroversial nor that he had generally persuaded those who champion such 
authority.  See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 240 at 60-61; see also DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra 
note 6, at 225-75; RICHARD A. POSNER, What Am I? A Potted Plant? in OVERCOMING LAW 
238-39 (1995); TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 252, at 21-22 (1985).   
360.  See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 264-66 (rejecting the challenge that a 
second-best account of judicial decision is to be preferred to Dworkin’s idealized but 
impossible description of Hercules’s method). 
361.   BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 252.  
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that face the objections that Bork has asserted.  The moral choices 
inherent in the constitutional text must be complete.  It must be 
sufficient for originalism merely to follow the implicit moral 
choices embedded in the positive constitutional text.  That is a 
strong claim.362  In fact, originalism itself requires moral choices, 
as Dworkin and others have noted.363  Here Dworkin is on solid 
ground for two reasons.  First, originalism cannot escape moral 
choices by relying on the language of the Constitution because 
that language does not give us the answers to all of the kinds of 
questions the Court must confront.364  The subjects covered by the 
Constitution and the Republic governed by the Constitution are 
more complex and uncertain than the Ten Commandments and 
the limited aspect of human conduct that they governed.365  To 
extract purported answers from ambiguous texts is both to follow 
non-textual sources of law and to render that practice opaque.  In 
any event, moral or other choices—within a structured 
constitutional practice itself—are required.366 
Second, if the critics of originalism are correct that the 
Constitution is not self-executing, and that its continuing vitality 
and force requires the political, social, and judicial practices in 
which it is imbedded, then the choice to look to the text of the 
 
362.   Having acknowledged that technological change may sometimes pose new 
constitutional questions and denied that new moral questions may arise, it follows that the 
originalists are committed to the claim that technological changes can generate no new 
constitutional questions with a moral dimension.  That seems a strong claim and hardly 
obvious a priori. 
363.   DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 98-101; James E. Fleming, Living 
Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the American Constitution, 
92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1173-75 (2012).   
364.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (wrestling with the application 
of the Fourth Amendment to the warrantless installation of a GPS tracker); see generally 
LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 279 (exploring the exchange between Justices Scalia and 
Alito as to the salience of originalist methods with respect to the dramatically different 
technology of GPS tracking). 
365.   The Ten Commandments, after all, merely articulated a narrow set of personal 
ethical requirements for a relatively homogeneous set of co-religionists.  Even in the case of 
the Ten Commandments, moreover, arguments may be made that difficult interpretative 
questions may be imagined if that text is subjected to the same scrutiny as is routinely applied 
to the constitutional text.  See Sanford Levinson, On Interpretation: The Adultery Clause of 
the Ten Commandments, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 719, 722-23 (1985) (conjuring up various 
purported ambiguities in one of the commandments).  
366.   The very different but complementary accounts Bobbitt and Brandom offer are 
perhaps the most helpful to understand the constraints that apply and channel decisional 
choice in our constitutional decisional practice.  See Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra note 
79, at 38. 
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Constitution as it was interpreted on adoption is to choose to 
practice in a particular way.367  There are alternatives to that 
original practice.  One of the starkest examples would be to follow 
Bork’s imperative to apply the Constitution with a single, 
consistent stance but to follow the early Posner position with a 
social wealth-maximizing practice.  That is, we could interpret 
and apply the Constitution not as if it codified Spencer’s Social 
Statics, but as if it codified Posner’s early law and economics 
account of justice.368  The arguments as to why that approach 
would be problematic would take us far from the constitutional 
text.  Another approach would be that offered by Ely, to interpret 
the Constitution in a manner that maximizes the democratic 
features of our Republic.369  Bork, of course, would dispute the 
legitimacy of those other practices.  But he had no neutral, 
Archimedean position from which to make that criticism.  It 
follows, therefore, that originalism itself must make moral 
choices.  In so doing, it is no different from those other theories 
and practices, except insofar as it makes better or worse choices. 
Will Baude makes a positivist argument for the necessity 
of originalism.370  Such an argument could potentially avoid the 
challenges that Bork’s argument faces.  Baude argues that 
originalism must be our law because, under legal positivism, there 
is no source of law that would explain how the law changed from 
that originally adopted or enacted.371 
Baude’s argument faces three threshold objections.  The 
first objection comes from natural law theorists who reject the 
positivist foundations of Baude’s argument.372  Natural law 
asserts that the foundation for our constitutional law is natural law 
and that natural law informs the interpretation of the Constitution 
 
367.   See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 79, at 98-101.  
368.   See POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 247, at 60-76 (offering an early 
argument that justice requires wealth maximization, a position he later abandoned). 
369.   See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 73-104.  
370.   Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at  2352. 
371.  Id. at 2263-65. 
372.   Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 
97, 117-21 (2016) [hereinafter Pojanowski & Walsh, Enduring Originalism] (offering a 
competing, natural law account of originalism). 
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and the adjudication of constitutional controversies.373  If this is 
so, then constitutional and other legal change comes, not 
ontologically, from a change in the underlying, unchangeable 
natural law, but epistemologically, from a better understanding of 
the natural law.374  As a result, the sources of potential change are 
not entirely a matter of social fact—and might even include the 
kinds of Herculean philosophical reasoning endorsed by 
Dworkin.375  Thus, a natural law theory fatally undermines 
Baude’s argument. 
Second, Baude’s argument assumes that constitutional 
law has an independent ontological status independent of the 
arguments we make and accept in deciding constitutional 
controversies.  The result of this positivist account is that our 
existing constitutional law has a priority over the arguments and 
theories about that law.  We don’t generally think we already have 
an originalist constitutional law.  Baude anticipates that objection 
and tries to disarm it with his very creative interpretation of our 
constitutional doctrine as originalist.376  That interpretation likely 
strikes many—originalists and critics alike—as unpersuasive.  
Baude’s account also doesn’t explain the absence of more 
originalist constitutional law.  Most originalists believe that a 
consistent or even a stronger commitment to originalist arguments 
would substantially change our constitutional law.377  Baude’s 
theory does not explain all of that missing originalist 
constitutional precedent and doctrine.  Fundamentally, Baude’s 
positivist originalism is inconsistent with our constitutional law 
 
373.   See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 284-90 (2d ed. 2011) 
(describing the concept of the determinatio); see generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, 
supra note 54, at 651 n.296. 
374.   I am oversimplifying here; natural law, with its concept of the determinatio, 
accommodates positive law elements that may change in the manner required by Baude. See 
generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54, at 651 n.296. 
375.   See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 355-99. 
376.   Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at 2376-86; LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, 
supra note 54, at 675 (rejecting Baude’s creative reimagining of our constitutional canon as 
pervasively originalist). 
377.   See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 149 (describing the future for the 
constitutional protection of individual rights); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69-128 
(criticizing the non-originalist constitutional law of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist 
Courts); BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55; BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, 
supra note 23.  
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and practice.378  The result is the paradox of a positivist 
originalism that does not fit the social facts of our constitutional 
practice. 
Third and finally, Baude’s pervasive originalist 
reinterpretation of our constitutional doctrine runs roughshod 
over the arguments actually made for the Court’s holdings.379  
Those decisions make a variety of prudential, doctrinal, structural, 
and ethical arguments.380  Making the arguments for those 
decisions on originalist arguments fundamentally changes those 
decisions.381  As Bobbitt points out, the genius of Griswold was 
its authoritative re-reading of the precedents that it cited to 
support a right of privacy.382  While one may disagree with that 
re-reading and even the decision of the case, it is important to 
recognize what Justice Douglas’s decision does. 
It changes those decisions because why we reach a 
constitutional decision is generally almost as important as what 
the decision is.383  The reading of a precedent or a constitutional 
provision carries further inferential content that the mere holding 
does not.  That is part of the lesson of an inferentialist account of 
the language of constitutional argument and decision.384  Thus, an 
originalist restatement of the prior, self-consciously non-
originalist decisions does not do justice to those decisions. 
The final argument for the necessity of originalism is that 
made with the linguistic turn and emphasizes what interpretation 
 
378.   Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at 2376-86 (reading the constitutional canon 
creatively as originalist and rejecting arguments that key elements of the canon are non-
originalist); LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54, at 644-45 (rejecting Baude’s 
originalist reading of the constitutional canon).  
379.  Bobbitt offers a survey of the kinds of argument actually made in the opinions in 
constitutional cases. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17. 
380.   Id. at 25-119. 
381.  See Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra note 79, at 38 (describing the 
complementary elements of responsibility and authority in judicial decision, which are 
mediated through the expressive content of the legal opinions accompanying decision). 
382.   BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 224-25, 225 (“I must read Pierce and Meyer 
differently having read Griswold and must read them all differently having read Roe.”). 
383.   I have qualified the claim because there may be unusual decisions, like Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) where making the decision, regardless of the nature of that 
decision, is more important than what the decision is.  In those rare cases what the decision 
is may be of relatively little importance, and so the comparison may be less meaningful. 
384.   See id.; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1, at 168-73; BOBBITT, 
FATE, supra note 17, at 224-25 (describing the implications that arise from decisions and 
their accompanying opinions). 
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requires.385  On this argument, only originalism satisfies the 
requirements of interpretation.386  What does this claim mean?  
What does it entail?  The claim that interpretation requires an 
originalist methodology of course assumes that constitutional 
decision begins with interpretation.387  That assumption is likely 
mistaken;388 leaving that objection aside, the claim that 
interpretation requires originalism argues that interpretation is the 
method of determining the meaning of a text.389  The argument 
appears based upon a concept of communication.390 
I have previously explored the role of meaning and 
interpretation in the originalist debate.391  Briefly, the accounts of 
meaning inherent in the claim that the nature of language and 
interpretation makes originalism the only legitimate method for 
interpretation misunderstands language, misunderstands the 
world, misunderstands the role of truth, and misunderstands the 
performative and inferential elements in constitutional texts.392  
Language does not grab us by the throat to force us to be 
originalists—as our constitutional decisional practice 
demonstrates. 
Although the argument about the necessity of originalism 
has revived recently, that debate reflects the elaboration of more 
scholastic and baroque embellishment than fundamental 
contributions either to assessing the claims of originalism or its 
implications for our constitutional doctrine and decision.  Bork’s 
 
385.   Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, supra note 272, at 1311-12.  But see 
Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 38 (asserting that the concept of interpretation does not have 
the meaning and commitments that Lawson claims). 
386.   See Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, supra note 272, at 1311-12. 
387.   See LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1, at 86-92 
(arguing that interpretation is not logically prior to decision and the process of constitutional 
decision does not begin with interpretation); see also LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, 
supra note 18, at 325. 
388.   Id.; Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685 (2005) 
[hereinafter Patterson, Interpretation] (arguing against the priority of interpretation). 
389.   Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, supra note 272, at 1316 (“To interpret 
a communicative instrument is to seek to ascertain its meaning. Otherwise, one simply is not 
engaged in the enterprise of interpretation.”). 
390.   Id.  
391.   LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1; LeDuc, Interpretation and 
Practical Reasoning, supra note 1. 
392.  LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1; LeDuc, Interpretation and 
Practical Reasoning, supra note 1; LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18; LeDuc, 
Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17. 
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claim for the necessity of originalism is manifestly implausible.  
The positivist and linguistic arguments for the necessity of 
originalism, while conceptually more sophisticated than Bork’s 
argument, are equally implausible.  While I think it is possible to 
score this particular exchange in the debate over originalism, that 
assessment is hardly shared among the originalists themselves—





F.  Can Originalism Restore the Lost Constitution? 
According to the originalists, the Constitution, like China 
in 1949, has been lost.394  Along with the task of determining the 
culpable, originalism, unlike Republican foreign policy in the 
early fifties, offers the prospect of a recovery.395  Unlike the case 
of China, however, in the case of the Lost Constitution, it is not 
always clear what has been lost, or when.396  At the least, it was 
lost with the Warren Court’s decisions; however, it was likely lost 
much earlier with the jurisprudence of the later New Deal, and it 
may have been lost at the earliest stages of the Republic with the 
broad scope of judicial review.397  What was lost was the 
constitutional text unencumbered by such later doctrinal 
development.  It was a Constitution of greater States’ rights and 
of more limited individual freedoms, and with a Federal 
government of much lesser powers. 
 
393.   Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 38. 
394.   See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55, 354 (“Imagine holding up 
a copy of the Constitution and seeing empty holes in the parchment where these passages 
once appeared—or seeing ink blots over them.”); Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 149 
(predicting that the late twentieth century constitutional law recognizing individual rights 
“disfavored by the majority” faces hard times and implying that the change would be a return 
to a truer Constitution). 
395.   See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55.   
396.   Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitution in Exile, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 669-70 (2006) [hereinafter, Barnett, Exile] (arguing that the Lost 
Constitution includes the provisions that have been disregarded in the development of our 
constitutional law).   
397.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 20-28 (criticizing Chief Justice Marshall’s 
role in the development of judicial review).   
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One of the most puzzling challenges offered against 
originalism is the counterintuitive claim that it fails to deliver in 
its mission to reverse the constitutional history of the Warren 
Court and to restore, to a greater or lesser degree, the Lost 
Constitution.398  This argument against the instrumental efficacy 
of originalism is dramatic.  If it were true, it would cast the entire 
originalist project into disarray.  But it is also counterintuitive; it 
asks us to conclude that the originalists fundamentally 
misunderstand the nature of the interpretative arguments that they 
make. 
The argument was first advanced by Michael Perry399 and 
has been recently renewed by David Strauss.400  According to that 
argument, whatever the truth or other merits of originalism, it 
cannot reverse the law made by the Warren Court or the New 
Deal, or restore the Lost Constitution sought by conservative 
originalists.401  The claim is counterintuitive precisely because 
originalism’s mission is to restore the Lost Constitution.402  
However strongly originalism’s proponents believe in the 
linguistic and jurisprudential claims it makes, they generally 
believe equally strongly in the substantive constitutional law that 
emerges from the application of that theory.403 
Critics argue that originalism cannot restore the Lost 
Constitution for three reasons.  First, the critics argue that 
originalist arguments also support the constitutional 
 
398.   BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 23 (arguing against the 
Warren Court’s expansive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis that it was 
inconsistent with the original intent and purpose in adopting the Amendment); see also 
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55. 
399.   MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 
53-69 (1994) (arguing that the indeterminacy of history prevents originalism from 
eliminating judicial discretion). 
400.   See Strauss, Why, supra note 48, at 975-76 (arguing that historical and textual 
arguments privileged by the originalists can be advanced for classically liberal constitutional 
positions). 
401.   BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354 (describing the provisions of the 
Constitution that would be revived (or resurrected) by his libertarian originalism).   
402.   See id. at 356; see also BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6. 
403.   BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354.  But see SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra 
note 4, at 76 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s equivocation about the consequences of 
originalism reveals the weakness of originalism); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:  A 
Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006) (arguing that Justice 
Scalia ought not to disavow the implications of originalism, while conceding that he has done 
so); Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 107, at 861.  
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developments that the Lost Constitution would repudiate.  We can 
see this in Brown v. Board of Education404 and District of 
Columbia v. Heller.405  Brown was not decided on originalist 
terms;406 originalists, however, have sought to reinterpret that 
case, perhaps not wholly persuasively, with an originalist 
foundation and rationale.407  In so doing, they have offered an 
originalist rationale for reversing Plessy v. Ferguson and 
sustaining Brown.408  To the extent Brown stands as one of the 
prime examples of the activism of the Warren Court that 
originalism would abjure in its quest for the Lost Constitution, 
rehabilitating the decision in Brown would not appear wholly 
desirable for originalism.  On the other hand, because Brown is 
now the quintessential element of the constitutional canon, 
originalism must rehabilitate the result in Brown if it is to be 
credible. 
The originalist efforts to rehabilitate Brown consider only 
the task of constructing an originalist argument for its result and 
fail to consider the performative dimensions of Brown.  That case 
not only had to strike down the laws that created segregated public 
schools; it had to do that in a powerful, accessible way that could 
lead the country.  The performative role of the Brown decision 
and opinion were to initiate a substantial change in the legal 
relationship of the races in America.  Would McConnell’s 
reconstruction, making a subtle and controversial argument about 
original understandings on the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,409 satisfy that requirement?  I don’t think so. The 
lack of a compelling, emotionally engaging argument would 
 
404.   347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
405.   554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
406.   For an extensive contemporaneous discussion of the Court’s efforts to find an 
originalist foundation for the rejection of the “separate but equal” construction of the 14th 
Amendment, see generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the 
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) [hereinafter Bickel, Original 
Understanding and Segregation]. 
407.   See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 
VA. L. REV. 947, 949-53 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Originalism and Desegregation] 
(arguing that the linguistic understanding of the Equal Protection Clause is inconsistent with 
racially segregated public schools).  But see Michael J. Klarman, Response, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 1881, 1883 (1995) (rejecting McConnell’s historical arguments). 
408.   McConnell, Originalism and Desegregation, supra note 407, at 1120-40.   
409.   Id.  
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likely have kept any such analysis from having the same 
performative role that Brown had.410 
More recently, more serious problems for the originalist 
project may have emerged in Heller, decided by Justice Scalia in 
what some have been termed the most fundamentally originalist 
case in Supreme Court history,411 was met with a vigorous and 
robust originalist dissent by Justice Stevens.412  These two cases 
exemplify the flexibility of originalism.  Originalism, in the hands 
of Justice Stevens, purports to show the ability of Congress and 
the states to regulate gun ownership.413  The same point, however, 
can be, and has been, made with respect to vast swathes of 
precedent that was expressly decided on non-originalist 
grounds.414  For example, as I have discussed elsewhere, the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment 
admits of an originalist interpretation that would prohibit capital 
punishment.415  Even originalists have applied the prohibitions of 
 
410.   But some have expressed skepticism as to the extent to which the courts can lead 
the country to social change.  GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
411.   See Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 231, at 609-10.  But see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 247 
(2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism] (arguing that Heller is 
analogous to Griswold in that each was a minimalist decision that struck down a statute lying 
well outside the democratic consensus on the issues it governed). 
412.   See Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism, supra note 411, at 256.  Perhaps 
only a third-year law student could take that split as evidence of the differing forces of 
competing versions of originalism.  Fundamentally, and despite the thrust of the Heller 
opinion, Justice Stevens is no originalist.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 425-
446, 479 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (offering an originalist 
rebuttal to the Court’s argument before concluding: “In a democratic society, the 
longstanding consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh 
the wooden application of judge-made rules.”).  But see Brian A. Lichter & David P. 
Baltmanis, Foreword: Original Ideas on Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 491, 493 (2009) 
(arguing that Heller “illuminates the debate about the proper method of originalist 
interpretation”). 
413.   District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636-62 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
414.   See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).  But see Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at 2376-
86 (creatively assimilating a great deal of non-originalist precedent into the originalist 
canon). 
415.   See supra Section II.D.  That argument was made most clearly by Dworkin: that 
the term (or terms) “cruel and unusual” were intended and understood to incorporate our 
citizens’ best understanding, rather than merely their contemporaneous meaning.  See 
Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 124.   
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the Fourth Amendment to bar surveillance never anticipated in 
the eighteenth century.416 
Nevertheless, this argument appears ultimately 
unpersuasive.  The originalist promise of the Lost Constitution is 
persuasive because the eighteenth century was a different world.  
It was a world in which criminal defendants had far fewer rights.  
Women and minorities were disenfranchised in the broadest 
meaning of that term.  Freedom of belief, association, and 
expression were far more limited. Finally, the needs of the 
economy and of the society for regulation and defense were far 
simpler.  Originalism aspires to that world, and the originalist 
reading of the Constitution from that era is far more often 
consistent with that world.  Originalism can, indeed, replicate 
many (if not most) of the features of that earlier world, looking 
generally to the values of a world no later than the mid-nineteenth 
century when the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted.  It 
is therefore not surprising that Robert Bork followed up his 
defense with a broader critique of the culture of modernity.417  
New originalists and other contemporary originalists may not 
share this stance. 
Second, critics assert that originalism may be unable to 
protect the Constitution from further loss. Again, the concern, as 
in Heller, is that originalist arguments have greater diversity—
and permit more diverse constitutional outcomes in 
adjudication—than sometimes appears.418  On this account, for 
example, David Strauss argues that originalism could become an 
interpretive weapon in the hands of liberal theorists of the 
Constitution.419  He cites McConnell’s effort to justify Brown 
based upon original understandings.420  He could today just as 
easily cite Justice Stevens’s dissent in Heller with respect to the 
 
416.   See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 169; see also United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 402-11 (2012) (holding that the use of a GPS tracker on a suspect’s automobile 
qualified as a search that required a warrant under the Fourth Amendment); LeDuc, Beyond 
Babel, supra note 279, at 197-204. 
417.  See ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM 
AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).   
418.   Heller, 554 U.S. at 645-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
419.   Strauss, Why, supra note 48, at 975-76. 
420.   McConnell, Originalism and Desegregation, supra note 407, at 953-55.   
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scope of the Second Amendment.421  In the face of the 
indeterminacy of the original understandings or original 
meanings, a doctrine that disparages precedent could be a 
powerful tool for liberal jurists seeking to reverse conservative 
precedent. 
Two immediate cautions come to mind.  First, this concern 
with originalism would apply only to forms of originalism that 
adopt a narrow view of stare decisis and precedent.  Second, 
Strauss is not embarked upon a project of strengthening 
originalism.422  His goal runs in the opposite direction. His real 
goal, at best, is a more candid and transparent constitutional 
debate.  As noted elsewhere in this article, that may well be a fair 
concern.  But what Strauss’s criticism overlooks is that 
originalism has proven an extraordinarily powerful tool—as strict 
constructionism never proved to be—for conservatives 
challenging liberal constitutional interpretation.  Strauss is 
effectively proposing unilateral disarmament. 
The third argument against the feasibility of the project to 
restore the Lost Constitution is the role of the appeal to original 
understandings as a classical strategy of constitutional dissent.  
Hinted at by Strauss,423 this argument emphasizes the 
argumentational strategy of challenging established 
interpretations by appealing to the original understanding.  If the 
current crop of originalists were to establish their reading of the 
Constitution, we may easily imagine a liberal reaction that would 
emphasize a broader reading of the rights expressed in the 
Constitution to challenge that new status quo.  The language and 
historical record would likely be no more adequate to rebut that 
reading than the current evidence is to rebut the originalists.  
Evidence for that proposition can be found in the dissent in 
 
421.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
422.   See Strauss, Why, supra note 48, at 976 (somewhat brazenly characterizing 
originalism’s claims as inviting “intellectual disingenuousness”).  I characterize Strauss’s 
criticism as brazen because he is hardly forthright in his acknowledgment of his more 
fundamental rejection of originalism. 
423.  See DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 31 (2010) [hereinafter 
STRAUSS, LIVING] (describing the effective use of an appeal to original understandings by 
Justice Black to broaden the scope of constitutionally protected rights against the then 
dominant doctrinal position championed by Justice Frankfurter); see also BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM, supra note 50  (adapting originalist arguments to support traditionally liberal 
constitutional results). 
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Heller.424  Nevertheless, in fairness to current originalism, 
because the Constitution was adopted and the Reconstruction 
Amendments added in a world without many of the current views, 
there is a core of originalism that will likely prove difficult to 
overturn. 
Originalism does offer a robust constitutional promise to 
the conservative constitutional theorist because it promises a 
return from modernity.  It offers a world before the Romantics, 
before the uncertainty of quantum physics and without the 
complexities of Freud.  Returning to the simpler world of the 
Enlightenment, originalism offers a simpler account of 
constitutional understandings and meanings.  Originalists are 
right that it is a world without paper money or a Federal Reserve 
System, still less an Environmental Protection Agency or a Food 
and Drug Administration.425  That was a simpler and more 
conservative world.  If the originalists can resort to it as the 
touchstone of constitutional interpretation, they will construct a 
simpler, more conservative constitutional world.  Whether that 
world is one in which we are safe from international stateless 
terrorists,426 or protected against global economic or 
environmental crisis would appear highly unlikely.  But this is a 
matter of prudence, not original understanding. The suggestion 
that originalism cannot perform at least a large part of the mission 
assigned to it is not very plausible.  The argument that historical 
and textual arguments cannot accomplish the originalist mission 
is perhaps only evidence of the desperation among some of 
originalism’s critics—and of the stalemate that has developed in 
the debate itself.427 
 
424.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
425.  Compare SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 63-65 (cataloging widely 
accepted elements of our contemporary Federal regulatory welfare republic that would be 
called into question or eliminated under originalism) and STRAUSS, LIVING, supra note 423, 
at 12-16, with ORIGINALISM, supra note 59, at 27-39 (denying the full range of effects 
asserted by Sunstein but endorsing certain substantive constitutional results under 
originalism). 
426.   See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND 
THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002) (arguing that the national state that emerged in Europe in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is increasingly obsolete as a result of economic, 
technological, and ideological developments). 
427.   Will Baude offers a similar assessment of the debate, although his response to 
rehabilitate originalism’s claims is more traditional.  See Baude, Our Law, supra note 37, at 
2351 (“Debates about originalism are at a standstill . . . .”). 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
Three principal conclusions emerge from this survey of 
the debate about these six central claims and implications of 
originalism.  First, the stalemate that I have elsewhere sketched is 
equally applicable to these key questions in the debate.  Second, 
many of the sources of the stalemate and fruitlessness lie in the 
unexamined assumptions that ground the debate—and make it 
possible.  Third, the moves in the debate are becoming ever more 
arcane and academic—without generating any meaningful 
progress within the debate itself or as the debate informs our 
constitutional law.  We can see the evidence for these conclusions 
in more detail if we look at the debate about each of these six 
claims. 
Originalism’s argument from democracy faces strong 
objections.428  The argument from democracy—an argument 
premised on the celebrated countermajoritarian problem—has a 
powerful intuitive appeal, and Judge Bork and Justice Scalia make 
powerful statements of the argument for it.  But I think the three 
principal arguments canvassed here against that position have the 
better position. In particular, the fundamental premise of 
originalism that there is a countermajoritarian problem in our 
constitutional practice is flawed.  Judicial review is grounded not 
in theoretical argument but in our constitutional decision 
practice.429 
Second, the claim for neutrality is probably the most fully 
articulated important claim for originalism, and the intuitive 
appeal of this claim is manifest.  The claim for neutrality relies on 
the implicit premise that there exists a neutral interpretation or 
adjudication process.  While intuitive, it is not clear that the 
originalists have established a concept of neutrality with the 
 
428.   In an earlier, unpublished article Larry Solum has even questioned whether the 
argument is “fully coherent.”  See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Univ. of Ill. 
Coll. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, 2008), 
https://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 [https://perma.cc/746G-
HVYB]; see generally LeDuc, Fruitless Quest, supra note 68. 
429.   BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 97, at 6-8 (lampooning the received 
account of Marbury that treats Chief Justice Marshall as having created judicial review in a 
judicial bid for power). 
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specificity and transparency sufficient to perform the role 
required.  Neutrality is the concept that is intended to allow us to 
assess interpretations and readings of the Constitution for their 
faithfulness to the constitutional text.430  If that concept of 
representation is unfounded or if the process of constitutional 
decision cannot be reduced to constitutional interpretation, then 
neutrality cannot be the measure of the legitimacy of 
constitutional decision. 
Despite the enormous scrutiny that Brown has received, 
there is no consensus whether its holding and reasoning would 
qualify as an application of neutral principles.431  Originalists, as 
well as other constitutional commentators, have divided over this 
issue.432  The debate over the neutrality of Brown suggests that 
the concept of neutrality is itself suspect.  Other less celebrated 
cases are no easier to assess from a neutral perspective.433 
The argument for originalism from its exclusive claim to 
neutrality is thus fundamentally flawed.  Originalism’s critics 
often err, too, in overstating their objections to originalism’s 
claimed neutrality.  The critics of that claim who go on to deny 
that there are constraints on constitutional argument, 
interpretation, and decision also misunderstand the nature of the 
real constraints that channel and inform our constitutional law and 
practice.  Originalism may misunderstand constitutional language 
and argument when it claims neutrality, but its critics 
misunderstand that same language and argument when they assert 
that constitutional argument and decision are indeterminate.  By 
 
430.    The New Originalists, as noted above, state their claims in linguistic terms.  They 
claim originalism is the only approach to the constitutional text that preserves the original 
meaning of that text when it was adopted.  I have explored those claims more fully in earlier 
articles in this series. See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1; LeDuc, 
Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1. 
431.   Compare Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 112, at 29-30 (arguing that 
recognition of special race-based protections violates neutrality) with ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 73-104 (arguing for neutrality based upon the constitutional 
principle of protecting insular minorities to enhance democracy). 
432.  See, e.g., Bickel, Original Understanding and Segregation, supra note 410, at 6-
65 (arguing that racially segregated public schools were not inconsistent with the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment); McConnell, Originalism and Desegregation, 
supra note 407, at 953-55 (arguing that the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was inconsistent with racially segregated public schools); Wechsler, Neutral 
Principles, supra note 112, at 22-24.  
433.   See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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focusing on neutrality and the specter of judicial discretion and 
willfulness, the originalists and their critics distract us from more 
important questions about constitutional doctrine and practice. 
The third controversial implication of originalism arises 
from originalism’s account of constitutional change.  Originalism 
purports to permit certain kinds of change to be incorporated into 
its constitutional interpretation, while fiercely rejecting other 
types of change and sharply criticizing alternative interpretative 
theories that permit or welcome such change.434  That approach is 
persuasive only if the distinction between permissible and 
impermissible sources of flux can be articulated.  The originalist 
reliance upon a fundamental distinction between fact and value to 
help distinguish permissible and impermissible sources of change 
appears one of the less problematic features of the originalist 
account. 
Critics also argue that the originalist claim that the 
meaning and the appropriate reading of the Constitution do not 
change does violence to the constitutional text.435  That challenge 
is harder to disarm.  It is harder to disarm in light of Lessig’s 
helpful distinction between meaning and readings, because it 
allows us to account for changed understandings of the 
constitutional text without committing to the counterintuitive 
claim that the meaning of the Constitution itself changes or 
morphs.  The proponents of change, the critics of originalism, 
have history and the world on their side, not just in the general 
sense, that we recognize that the world and we ourselves have 
greatly changed since the Constitution was ratified.  It is also true 
in the important parochial sense that there has been constitutional 
change, too.436  For the originalist to repudiate those changed 
 
434.   See generally Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 41-44 (rejecting the Living 
Constitution of originalism’s critics); Rehnquist, supra note 296; Baude, Our Law?, supra 
note 37 (making a positivist argument that the original understanding of the Constitution 
must remain law in the absence of amendment). 
435.   See, e.g., Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 94; Dworkin, Arduous, supra 
note 74, at 1262.   
436.   Larry Lessig asserts this claim very strongly, but the existence of constitutional 
flux appears incontrovertible, even without regard to the ramifications that have emerged 
from constitutional amendments or the correction of perceived constitutional error. Lessig, 
Understanding, supra note 5, at 396. But even originalists generally acknowledge the 
existence of constitutional change—and endorse it.  See, e.g., Scalia, Interpretation, supra 
note 6, at 41-44; Green, The Sense-Reference Distinction, supra note 274.  But see Peter J. 
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readings of the Constitution is itself a radical challenge to our 
American Constitution and to our Republic. But it is also hard for 
their critics to establish this claim.  It is harder for the critics 
because of the intuitive appeal of the unchanging Constitution, 
and our very rhetoric of constitutional interpretation.  That 
rhetoric as well as the substance of the debate’s arguments 
generally treat the Constitution and the constitutional text as an 
objective Constitution-in-the-world.437  That premise underlies 
the reduction of constitutional decision to constitutional 
interpretation.  The critics must persuade us to abandon the simple 
and initially attractive account that originalism offers. 
The critics can successfully challenge originalism’s claim 
to privilege constitutional arguments from the original intentions, 
expectations, and original public linguistic understandings.  But 
they cannot establish that the other forms of constitutional 
argument they generally want to emphasize are themselves 
privileged.  They are not.  Originalist arguments from history and 
text are, in certain cases, dispositive.438  They appear compelling 
to the Court439 or to dissenting Justices440 and they often persuade 
us.441  Originalism’s critics make the case that the originalist 
arguments from text and history are not a complete account of 
constitutional interpretation, argument, and decision.442  Other 
non-originalist modes of argument are also dispositive in certain 
cases.443  Pluralist theories make a place for originalist and non-
 
Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485, 556 (2017) (arguing that 
the originalist claim to neutrality is inconsistent with key decisions in the modern 
constitutional canon that changed prior constitutional law). 
437.   LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18, at 269-74, 306-18.   
438.   See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
439.   See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 754-59, 768-78; Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-628; 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-53.   
440.   See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution . . . .”).   
441.  See Levinson, Embarrassing Second Amendment, supra note 92 (arguing that the 
contemporary widespread academic hostility to the Second Amendment is unjustified and 
the resulting pre-Heller constitutional doctrine difficult to reconcile with the constitutional 
text). 
442.   BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 7-8; Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 
72-74.   
443.   See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (largely disregarding the constitutional text 
that tacitly limits the power of eminent domain to property taken for public use in deference 
to doctrinal and precedential arguments that do not). 
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originalist arguments.444  The pluralist, anti-foundational 
accounts don’t explain when such arguments are dispositive.445  
But those theories don’t concede that such an explanation is 
necessary.446 At least as importantly, they deny that such an 
account is possible.447  Thus, the pluralist theories are also 
incompatible with the originalist claims of privilege (as well as 
the corresponding claims of privilege by the non-originalists). 
The fourth challenge, that originalism cannot 
accommodate non-originalist precedent and a robust theory of 
stare decisis, generates another key controversy.  Some strong 
originalists would avoid this challenge by denying a robust role 
for non-originalist precedent.448  But most would seek to 
accommodate precedent, including those versions defended on 
the bench by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Judge Bork and 
defended in the academy by, among others, Larry Solum.449  That 
accommodation of precedent deflects Tribe’s challenge to 
stronger forms of originalism that would systematically overturn 
non-originalist precedent. 450 
The accommodation of precedent is not easily reconciled 
with other key claims of originalism, including the claim to limit 
judicial discretion.  Reconciling originalism with such precedent, 
and harmonizing such disparate authorities, requires judgment, 
not an algorithm.451  With judgment comes discretion.  
 
444.   See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 7-8 (describing the existing modes 
of constitutional argument); Green, Truthmakers, supra note 80 (manuscript at 21-22).   
445.   Green, Truthmakers, supra note 80 (manuscript at 28-30) (criticizing anti-
foundational modal accounts as incomplete); BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 5-6 
(acknowledging that his theory does not provide a means by which competing argument 
might be harmonized or privileged); BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 97, at x-xi. 
446.   See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 5-6; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 97, at x-xi; see generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17. 
447.   See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 5-6; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 97, at x-xi; see generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17.  
448.   See, e.g., Barnett, Trumping, supra note 20, at 258-62 (arguing that non-
originalist precedent must fall—even though originalists on the bench have not gone that 
far). 
449.   Solum, Constitutional Bondage, supra note 20, at 205. 
450.   See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 82-83 (asserting that Justice Scalia’s 
constitutional decisional practice has sustained non-originalist precedent in the face of his 
theoretical claims). 
451.   The emphasis on judgment—and the associated, implicit acceptance of 
discretion—is the source of Fried’s express repudiation of originalism.  See Fried, On 
Judgment, supra note 212, at 1043-46.  Similar objections have been made by some 
originalists to the New Originalists’ introduction of the distinction between interpretation 
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Originalism ought to be prepared to sacrifice its claim to cabin 
discretion, in the strong sense that it has claimed, to establish the 
defense of a non-exclusive originalism, for two reasons.  First, 
non-exclusive originalism cannot prevent judicial discretion 
because there remains substantial play in the joints of judicial 
decision with respect to the weight to be accorded to non-
originalist precedent and other modes of argument.  Second, a 
non-exclusive originalism can do the work that need be done.  The 
accommodation of non-originalist precedent requires substantial 
discretion, as well as the departure from original understandings, 
expectations, and intentions.  The kinds of judgment that Judge 
Bork and Justice Scalia called for requires the exercise of 
discretion: judges must determine how central non-originalist 
precedent has become in our constitutional doctrine and legal 
practice.452  Justice Scalia’s argument that originalism has no 
more trouble with precedent than other theories of interpretation 
overlooked the fundamental theoretical challenge that originalism 
offers to much precedent in our American constitutional practice.  
Many other theories do not challenge precedent so fundamentally, 
and this is the sense in which Sunstein aptly characterizes 
originalism as radical.453 
Fifth, the weakest argument made by the originalists is for 
the necessity of originalism.  The arguments made for that claim 
appear implausible, for several reasons.  First, if originalism be 
true, it is only contingently true.  At a somewhat conceptual level, 
for modern Hegelians as well as pragmatists, history is 
contingent.  There is nothing essential or fundamental that must 
necessarily be the case about how history and society evolve or 
the values that are endorsed at any point in time.454  Second, it 
 
and construction.  See Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the 
Complete Constitution, U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2017, at 2, 7 (criticizing the 
introduction of the distinction between constitutional interpretation and construction because 
it reintroduces substantial judicial discretion). 
452.   See Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 139-40; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, 
at 157-59. 
453.   SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 26 (criticizing the far-reaching doctrinal 
implications of a pervasive constitutional originalism).  
454.   See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, THE SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE 
MODERN IDENTITY (1989); ARTHUR C. DANTO, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
(1968).  The minority strand of natural law originalism would assert the ahistorical 
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would be surprising if the critics of originalism were so confused 
that they advocated the impossible.  The protagonists in the debate 
may be confused or reliant on mistaken, confused, or unhelpful 
premises in the debate, but it is implausible that either side is 
committed to a manifestly impossible position.  By contrast, in 
the face of the fruitless, stalemated debate that has unfolded over 
the past half century, it seems quite plausible that the debate 
reflects unproductive scholastic commitments and confusions.455  
Proof that the kinds of argument endorsed by originalism’s critics 
are integral parts of our constitutional decisional practice comes 
directly from the Court’s decisions and opinions.456  A broader 
array of authority and arguments were deployed there in central 
roles in decision.  The modern positivist and linguistic arguments 
are no more effective. 
To the extent that most of originalism’s critics would 
privilege arguments made otherwise than on the basis of history 
or text, those claims also appear indefensible.457  Arguments from 
text and history are sometimes persuasive and determinative.458  
Thus, the arguments of originalism’s critics that originalism’s 
modes of constitutional argument are disfavored or marginal are 
also unconvincing.  The sources of the fruitless quest for both 
 
foundations of our constitutional law.  See generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra 
note 54. 
455.  LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 2, at 17-31; LeDuc, Ontological 
Foundations, supra note 18; LeDuc, Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy, supra 
note 51. 
456.   See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556-57 (2014) (following 
structural arguments about the relationship of the Executive and Legislative Branches in 
articulating the limits of the Recess Appointments Clause); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 532-38 (2012); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687-
705 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (advancing prudential arguments for a limited, not 
absolute, application of the protections of the Second Amendment).  I discuss the role of the 
originalism debate in shaping the reasoning and decision of Canning and Sebelius in LeDuc, 
Beyond Babel, supra note 279 (arguing that the tacit premises and conceptual framework of 
the originalism debate has distracted and weakened the analysis and reasoning in our 
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence). 
457.  See generally SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4 (insisting on the primacy of 
prudential, consequentialist arguments in constitutional law). 
458.  See authorities cited supra note 438; see also LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 
279, at 197-220; BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 9-119.  
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sides in the debate include tacit, mistaken ontological 
assumptions that go unstated and unacknowledged.459 
Sixth, the counterintuitive claim that the originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution would not yield a very different 
constitutional doctrine than that which we have seems 
questionable.  Few critics of originalism advance this claim.460  
Indeed, some, like Cass Sunstein, argue that the substance of the 
constitutional law that arises under originalist theory is the most 
powerful argument against originalism.461  The originalist 
arguments deployed against many constitutional doctrines 
grounded on prudential, structural, doctrinal, or ethical arguments 
would, on their terms, do the work claimed by originalists.  
Without those modes of constitutional argument, our 
constitutional decisional discourse would be confined to 
arguments from history and text.  Originalism passes the 
functional test; if originalism fails, it is not because originalist 
interpretation and decision would not create the Constitution that 
originalists seek.  It fails to accomplish that mission only because 
its arguments cannot delegitimize non-originalist modes of 
argument and privilege the originalist modes. 
These six central claims of originalism and their 
implications capture many of the most salient features in the 
debate over originalism.  While it is possible to assess those 
claims and arguments from within the debate, it is also possible 
to step back to look at the claims and arguments of the debate 
from the outside.  From that vantage the claims and arguments 
appear problematic.  Many of the claims on both sides of the 
debate appear implausible—like the claim by originalism that it 
is necessarily so, the claim that our constitutional law is 
systematically originalist, and the claim by the critics that 
originalism, even if adopted, cannot restore the Lost Constitution.  
The arguments for those claims, while often creative and 
 
459.   See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18; LeDuc, Relationship of 
Constitutional Law to Philosophy, supra note 51 (arguing that philosophical therapeutic 
argument can sometimes reveal and treat confusion in constitutional argument).   
460.  See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 50 (making originalist 
arguments for untraditionally originalist constitutional conclusions).  
461.   See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 15-19. 
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rhetorically sophisticated, appear more often desperate or 
disingenuous than persuasive. 
The sources of the sterility are harder to identify, but 
common threads emerge.  Part of the difficulty in seeing the 
problems inherent in the debate is a matter of achieving the 
perspective necessary to recognize a scholastic debate and to 
escape the seductive grip of its puzzles and intricate controversies.  
That’s easier to do with respect to earlier debates and with the 
benefit of centuries of intellectual history than in the present.  But 
even in the present we can be struck by the lack of progress and 
increasingly Ptolemaic intricacy of the distinctions, arguments, 
and strategies in the debate over these fundamental claims.  We 
can also be struck by the enormous gap between the theoretical 
claims made within the context of the debate and our 
constitutional decisional practice. 
Ironically, some perspective can be gained by considering 
again Justice Scalia’s oft-repeated claim that it takes a theory to 
beat a theory.462  This claim reflects a fundamental 
methodological error.  In the case of describing our constitutional 
decisional practice, it doesn’t take a theory to beat a theory.  It 
doesn’t even take a theory.463  Understanding here is a matter of 
mastering our constitutional practice, not conceptualizing a 
theoretical superstructure.  Justice Scalia’s own decisional 
practice reflected the primacy of practice.464  When we understand 
the priority of practice, the apparent paradox of the divergence of 
that practice from the proclaimed originalist theory dissolves.465 
It is hard to avoid a “don’t care” conclusion as to the 
increasingly sophisticated and arcane exchanges on these issues.  
When we look closely at the claims and arguments that comprise 
 
462.   See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 107, at 855 (accusing the non-originalists of 
offering a compelling alternative to originalism).  But see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism 
Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (making the overstated claim of his title). 
463.   See generally LeDuc, Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy, supra 
note 51 (arguing that philosophical theory and argument plays a very limited role in our 
constitutional law).  
464.   Barnett, Trumping, supra note 20. 
465.   See Fried, On Judgment, supra note 212, at 1043-44 (suggesting that Justice 
Scalia wrote his strongest opinions when he paid the least attention to the constraints of his 
originalist theory). 
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the debate we see a controversy that appears more misdirected 
and confused than vital and robust. 
Finally, it is valuable to consider what may be 
productively winnowed from the chaff of the debate over 
originalism.  It is not clear that there is an important argument that 
has convinced an opponent on either side of the controversy and 
so advanced the debate.  But there are insights into the nature of 
our constitutional law that are valuable.  Justice Scalia’s 
reminders that rights of individuals may adversely impact the 
interests of the majority or even the society as a whole and that 
philosophical argument generally lacks the finality that we need 
in our constitutional argument and decision is valuable.  Ely’s and 
Black’s argument that the meaning of particular clauses of the 
Constitution are affected and informed by the meaning and import 
of other provisions of the Constitution is also important.  But 
salvaging those insights leaves us very far from a commitment to 
the value of the debate—or a need to carry the debate forward. 
  
